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The events of 9/11 and the subsequent “War on Terror” activated long standing 
stereotypes in the United States that portrayed Muslims as fundamentally different from 
other Americans. In this project, I interview 15 Muslims who have served in the U.S. 
military since 9/11 to determine if and how the activation of this us/them boundary 
shaped their military experiences. 
I find that the us/them atmosphere that characterizes civilian discourse about 
Muslims is present in the military. However, most of my respondents felt that it had little 
practical effect on them. I discuss this in terms of the presence but irrelevance of this 
boundary. I connect this finding to the history of racial integration in the U.S. military, 
arguing that characteristics of the military, including an emphasis on policies of equal 
opportunity, the ability to compel certain behaviors, and the nature of military service, 
which promotes close contact among diverse individuals, can mitigate some of the 
negatives effects of being othered. While most of my respondents had positive 
experiences, in some units the us/them discourse wa ex cerbated, creating atmospheres 
of distrust and suspicion which led to negative outc mes including harassment, 
accusations, and decisions by Muslim service members to leave the military.  
  
 
A theme that emerged in exploring this dichotomy of experience among my 
respondents was the role of leadership. Leadership that saw value in diversity and was 
invested in supporting it, mitigated negative effects of othering, making this an irrelevant 
frame. However, leadership that repeated stereotypes or fears reinforced this tension, 
creating toxic environments in which Muslim service m mbers felt excluded.  
I began this project with the expectation that citizenship would be a central 
narrative for Muslim service members, as it was for Japanese Americans in World War 
II. However, the respondents in my sample rarely use their military service to directly 
make claims on citizenship. They do however express institutional motivations to serve 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) four passenger jets w re hijacked and flown into 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in a coordinated terrorist attack that killed 
almost 3,000 people. It was an unprecedented act of terr r on American soil, and defined 
the new century as the United States grappled to find a balance between security and civil 
rights while engaged in what became a long-lasting, u conventional war on two fronts. 
The events of 9/11 fundamentally shaped the experiences of Muslim Americans who 
suddenly found themselves sharing an identity with the terrorists. Within this context, 
thousands of Muslims chose to serve in the U.S. armed forces. In this project I consider 
the experiences of some of these Muslim service members.  
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent “War on Terror” activated long standing 
stereotypes in the United States that portrayed Muslims as fundamentally different from 
other Americans. These processes of othering have shaped the experiences of Muslim 
Americans. In my examination of the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. 
military, I find that this us/them1 distinction is salient in the military. The Muslim service 
members I spoke with identified this attitude and expected it to shape their military 
careers. For many of my respondents, despite expecting this boundary to matter, they felt 
that it ultimately did not. For others, attitudes of suspicion born out of this mentality 
fundamentally shaped their experiences in the military. Differences in leadership emerge 
in many of the narratives, suggesting that leadership plays a central role in either 
mitigating or exacerbating us/them tendencies.  
                                                
1 Throughout this dissertation I will conceptualize this dichotomy as between “us” and “them”. The terms 
“we” and “they” can also used to communicate this concept. Us/them is more commonly used in 
contemporary literature focusing on the experiences of Muslims.  
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MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Islam came to the United States long before 9/11 brought it to national attention. 
Among slaves brought to the United States, as many as 10 percent were Muslim, though 
most were later converted to Christianity (Ba-Yunus and Kane 2004). Early in the 
twentieth century, there was a slow flow of Muslim i migrants from the Middle East. 
However, this flow was largely stopped by the quotas of the National Origins Act of 
1924. In 1965, immigration from the Islamic world resumed. In recent years there has 
been speculation that a uniquely American form of Islam is emerging. Some have 
suggested that American Islam is more universal, trnscending nationality, race, and sect,   
A certain schism is evolving between two generations in the United States, those 
who came as immigrants to the United States, and their c ildren. Muslim youth 
see themselves as both more socially daring and closer t  religion than their 
parents. […] the parental generation is perceived to be stuck in the trench of 
ethnicity, and thereby unable to allow Islam to reach what is seen as its social and 
non-divisive, trans-ethnic potential. To these youngsters, Islam is a message to all 
humankind, potentially outlived by all humankind, thus doing away with ethnic 
fragmentation (Schmidt 2002: 9). 
 
It is difficult to get an accurate estimate of the U.S. Muslim population. Pew 
(2011) estimates the Muslim population in the United States to be about 2.75 million 
while Ba-Yunus and Kane (2004) calculate that there are 5.7 million Muslims in the 
United States. Pew (2011) reports that of U.S. Muslims, 30 percent are white, 23 percent 
Black, 21 percent Asian, 19 percent other/mixed, an 6 percent Hispanic. According to 
Pew (2011), 63 percent of the adult Muslim population in the United States is foreign 
born, and 15 percent are the children of immigrants. Of foreign-born Muslims in the 
United States, 41 percent were born in the Middle East or North Africa, 26 percent in 
South Asia2, 11 percent in Africa, 7 percent in Europe, 5 percent in Iran, and 10 percent 
                                                
2 The category “South Asia” usually includes India, P kistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh.  
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elsewhere3. Sirin and Fine (2008) note that the Muslim community i  the United States is 
the most ethnically and racially diverse in the world.  
 
MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
Muslims serve throughout the 
armed force. Estimates of the number of 
Muslims in the U.S. military vary wildly; 
reports range from a low of 3,400 (Azad 
2008) to a high of 15,000 (Amanullah 
2005). The Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) collects official data on religious affiliation, and as of March 2009, 
reported a total of 3,535 Muslims serving in the active forces and 1,503 in the reserves. 
Table 1 shows these data by branch. These are the estimates commonly used by the 
media; however, these data have some significant limitations. DMDC collects these data 
voluntarily upon entry into the military, and so cannot account for individuals who 
choose not to reveal their religion, those who change their religion during their service, or 
religiosity of service members.  
 Muslims are fully integrated into the U.S. military. Muslim service members 
deploy to both Iraq and Afghanistan.4 There are Muslim cadets at the service academies 
(Serrano 2006) and there are Muslim chaplains. Captain Abdul-Rasheed Muhammad was 
commissioned in the Army as the first Muslim military chaplain in 1993. In 2001, there 
                                                
3 Although Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesians make up a very small 
proportion of the Muslim population in the United States. Ba-Yunus and Kane (2004) estimate that 
Indonesians make up less than 3 percent of the Muslim population in the United States. 
4 As of 2006, seven had been killed and 212 awarded Combat Action Ribbons (Elliott 2006). 
Table 1: DMDC data on Muslims in U.S. 




Total Active Duty 3,535 .002 
 Army 1,668 .003 
 Navy 740 .002 
 Air Force 454 .002 
 Marine Corps 673 .002 
Total Reserve/Guard 1,503 .002 
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were fourteen Muslim military chaplains (Goodstein 2001). By 2008, the number of 
Muslim chaplains in the military had dropped to six (Turner 2008). Even though they are 
few and far between, the existence of Muslim chaplains is important. According to 
Hansen (2008), “because there was a Muslim chaplain resent, the [Muslim] sailors felt 
better about being in the military than they would have if there hadn’t been. This is 
exactly the function the military chaplains are supposed to serve” (44).  
 
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
As one of the first studies of its kind, this project seeks to document the 
experiences of members of this minority group in the military. The central question this 
project explores is: What are the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military? In 
answering this question, I address several sub-questions. After establishing the existence 
of an us/them discourse in the civilian world, I ask if this idea also suffuses the U.S. 
military. Upon finding that it does, I consider the role of leadership in shaping the effects 
of this discourse. Finally, I ask if Muslim service members are using their military service 
as a way to negotiate this us/them atmosphere by using it to make citizenship claims as 
Japanese American veterans did during World War II. 
This project utilizes a qualitative research design. Data were collected through 
interviews with service members and veterans who self-identified as Muslim and have 
served since 9/11. In total, 15 respondents were interviewed. These respondents came 
from a variety of backgrounds and have served through t the U.S. military. See Chapter 
5 for a full discussion of methodology.  
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OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Othering and Us-versus-Them in the Military 
I find that the us/them atmosphere that characterizes civilian discourse about 
Muslims is present in the military. However, although this discourse is clearly present, 
most of my respondents felt that it had little practical effect on them. I discuss this in 
terms of the presence but irrelevance of this boundary. My respondents were aware of the 
use of us/them rhetoric. Many expected being Muslim to atter for their careers; 
however, ultimately they felt that it did not. I connect this finding to the history of racial 
integration in the U.S. military, arguing that characteristics of the military, including an 
emphasis on policies of equal opportunity, the ability to compel certain behaviors, and 
the nature of military service, which promotes close contact among diverse individuals, 
can mitigate some of the negatives effects of being othered.  
However, although they were the minority in my sample, I did find that in some 
units the us/them discourse is exacerbated, creating mospheres of distrust and suspicion 
which leads to negative outcomes including harassment, accusations, and decisions by 
Muslim service members to leave the military.  
While the use of the us/them framework was supported by the narratives of my 
respondents, it also became clear that the frame itself s too simplistic to fully capture the 
complexity of processes of othering. Using the framework of us/them requires the 
researcher (and respondent) to implicitly take on a particular perspective. In this case, the 
implicit perspective is the one in which “us” is equated with non-Muslim Americans and 
“them” is equated with Muslims (both American and foreign). However, othering is not 
limited to one perspective, and just who is “us” and who is “them” depends entirely on 
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where you stand. This point is driven home in the experiences of Jamal (Chapter 6) who 
finds himself violently targeted by al-Qaeda. This does not undermine the utility of the 
us/them frame, but reminds us to be aware of the implicit perspective that is necessary in 
using the frame.  
 
Leadership 
The idea of us/them appeared in almost all of my interviews. However, for some 
respondents this discourse had little effect while for others it fundamentally shaped their 
experiences. A theme that emerged in exploring this dichotomy of experience among my 
respondents was the role of leadership. Leadership that saw value in diversity and was 
invested in supporting it, mitigated negative effects of othering, making this an irrelevant 
frame. However, leadership that repeated stereotypes or fears reinforced this tension, 
creating toxic environments in which Muslim service m mbers felt excluded.  
 
Performing Citizenship  
I began this project with the expectation that citizenship would be a central 
narrative for Muslim service members, as it was for Japanese Americans in World War 
II. However, the respondents in my sample rarely use their military service to directly 
make claims on citizenship. Some of the difference may be due to historical experience. 
The bloviation of a few politicians aside, the right to serve in the military has not been 
seriously threatened for Muslims, nor have they been systematically interned as Japanese 
Americans were. My respondents serve for a myriad of reasons, but they all take their 
ability to serve for granted. 
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I argue that rather than seeing military service as a way to fight for rights, my 
respondents take their rights for granted, and in so doing, military service become a 
symbolic performance of citizenship. My respondents don’t feel that they need to serve to 
prove their loyalty or their American-ness. They don’t serve to become Americans; 
because they see themselves as Americans, they serve.   
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY 
 This research is a study of inclusion and exclusion and institutional diversity. It 
contributes to a greater understanding of processes of othering by looking at the military, 
an institution central to the social construction of the nation (Krebs 2006). It examines the 
effects of othering within the institutional contex of the military, and considers the role 
of leadership on the success or failure of inclusionary measures. In Chapter 9 I build on 
this finding to propose a series of intermediary factors that may shape experiences of 
othering. It will become clear throughout this dissertation that while us/them processes 
are present, they are much more complex and fluid that often theorized.  
This study  also adds to the literature on the connection between military service 
and citizenship by presenting a case in which military service is used not to gain 
citizenship, but as a performance of citizenship. 
 Muslims in the United States are understudied, and a greater understanding of 
how members of this group negotiate the often divisive environment of post-9/11 
America provides insight into stigmatized minority groups. This research begins to fill 
the lacuna of empirical evidence in scholarly and popular discussion on the varied roles 
of Muslims in the United States.  




ORGANIZATION OF MANUSCRIPT 
This manuscript is divided into two sections. The first section consists of 
introductory and theoretical material. Chapter 2 considers processes of othering and 
activation of the us/them boundary following 9/11. In Chapter 3, I discuss diversity in the 
military, including a discussion of leadership. Chapter 4 is a consideration of citizenship 
and the relationship between military service and citizenship. Chapter 5 describes the 
research design including research questions, sample selection, profile of the sample, and 
a discussion of data analysis.  
 The second section of this dissertation focuses on the analysis of the data. 
Analysis is organized by person, rather than by theme, although individual narratives are 
grouped together in order to draw out certain themes and concepts. In Chapter 6, I 
explore issues related to us/them in the military. I use the cases of Mahmood, Ahmed, 
and Kareem to illustrate the existence of the us/them discourses in the military. However, 
for these three respondents (and others), it is seen as having little actual effect. Therefore, 
these three cases illustrate my conceptualization of the presence but irrelevance of the 
us/them frame in the military. Next I consider the cases of Omar and Dani, both linguists 
who have studied at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), their narratives illustrate the 
role of us/them discourses in military education. Fi ally, I introduce Jamal whose 
narrative illustrates the complexity of perspective when using us/them as a framing 
concept.  
 In Chapter 7, I consider the role of leadership in shaping the manifestation of 
us/them. I first introduce Tarek, Najib, and Pervez all of whom experienced strong 
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leadership that was invested in diversity and successfully mitigated the effects of 
us/them. I then introduce Basim, Zafir, and Sadia, the respondents in my study who had 
negative experiences resulting from being othered. A common theme throughout these 
cases is the role of leaders in shaping their experiences.  
 In Chapter 8, I explore the idea of military service as a performance of 
citizenship. While use of military service to make direct claims of citizenship was rare in 
my sample, many respondents articulated their desire to serve in terms of institutional 
motives arising from a sense of belonging. I use the cases of Hakim, Rahma, and Yusuf 
to illustrate this conceptualization.  
 
 
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
When using Arabic terms, I use the transliteration hat I anticipate will be the 
most familiar to the readers. For example, I use the spelling Osama bin Laden although 
Usama is a more accurate transliteration. I use both the spellings Qur’an and Koran in 
reference to the Islamic sacred text. I use the spelling Koran when I am quoting a source 
that uses this spelling. I also use this spelling to signal that a respondent has used a tone 
that is meant to be read as an imitation of ignorant or malicious mispronunciation. 
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CHAPTER 2: OTHERING AND US-VERSUS-THEM 
 
 The events and reactions to 9/11 activated an us/them boundary that distinguishes 
between “Americans” and “Muslims” and imagines these categories to be mutually 
exclusive. These boundaries were activated as Muslims were identified with the enemy. 
In this chapter, I consider processes distinguishing us from them. I begin with a 
discussion of the concept of othering and then examine how social theorists have 
conceptualized this process under different names; I xamine racialization in particular. I 
then examine the specific history of othering of Islam using Said’s concept of 
Orientalism and I discuss how Islam came to be the sali nt other in the context of the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT). I conclude with a discu sion of the limitations of the 
us/them framework.  
 
OTHERING AND US/THEM BOUNDARIES 
 Othering, or the act of identifying the self in opp sition to something beyond the 
self, does not inherently entail a confrontational relationship. In its psychological 
applications, discerning self from other is a crucial stage in development and the self and 
other are understood as neutral categories. In Sociology, the idea of the benign other is 
conceptualized by Mead as the “generalized other.” 
 In Social Identity theory, us and them are conceptualized in terms of “in-group” 
and “out-group”. Forming these categories is considere  a normal cognitive process that 
simplifies and makes manageable an extremely complex reality. This process draws on 
stereotypes of the out-group, and preference for other members of the in-group. 
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 While in social psychology the importance of the “other” is seen in the 
oppositional construction of the self, I am taking an approach that draws on political 
sociology and postcolonial studies. In this view, the other is not just a neutral 
construction used to define the self, but is an active social construction used to exclude 
and devalue another group. 
 The boundary between self and other may become a sit of conflict when groups 
of people compete for resources; self and other transform into us and them (Yuval-Davis 
2010). Us-versus-them is seen as dichotomous and zero-sum. The boundary between us 
and them is imagined to be solid. This situation is characteristic of conflict and is often 
accompanied by demonization of the other. Us-versus-them dismisses the range of 
possible social relationships in favor of this simplistic approach. 
 Alexander (1992) explores the semiotics of othering in the rhetoric of civil 
society, “When citizens make judgments about who should be included in civil society 
and who should not, about who is a friend and who is an enemy, they draw on a 
systematic, highly elaborated symbolic code” (291). He argues that the world is perceived 
as a dichotomy; on one side are people perceived to be active, autonomous, rational, 
reasonable, calm, sane, and realistic. All others are perceived as passive, dependent, 
irrational, hysterical, excitable, insane, and unrealistic. This symbolic categorization leads 
to the categorization of these others as undeserving of the full benefits of society, “these 
persons deserve to be repressed, not only for the sake of civil society, but for their own 
sakes as well” (292). Alexander’s schema can be quite neatly applied to much of the 
contemporary anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric; his conclusion that due to this system 
of categorization the other “will be [seen as] conspiratorial, deceitful toward others, and 
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calculating in their behavior, conceiving of those outside their group as enemies” (293) 
can clearly be used to understand claims of anti-Islam scholars (see Chapter 3). 
 In this project, I am accepting the argument that us-versus-them is acting as the 
dominant discourse, though I recognize that it is not universally used. As I will explain in 
greater depth later, I am not accepting this simple dichotomy as an accurate 
representation of reality; what I am arguing is that t e belief that the world could be 
understood by a simple binary division into “good” and “evil”, “us” and “them”, has been 
the dominant discourse. 
 The process of distinguishing between us and them is one that many social 
theorists have dealt with under a variety of names. Some, like Huntington (1993), 
embrace processes of othering, while others criticize the essentialist nature of these 
approaches.  
 
Cultural Racism and the “Clash of Civilizations” Model 
 Cultural racism is an attempt to conceptualize the ways in which racism affects 
social groups that are not a “race”. Cultural racism relocates the basis of immutable and 
fundamental conflict from biology to culture. This mode of thought conceptualizes 
culture as consistent, unchanging, and irreversible, “Thoughts and actions of people are 
reduced to and determined by a constructed cultural origin” (Shooman and Spielhaus 
2010: 203). Although cultural racism is often referred to as a “new” form of racism, it is 
not unique to the contemporary period, nor does it replace biological racism; it 
supplements it (Meer and Noorani 2008). 
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 Huntington’s (1993) controversial yet popular “Clash of Civilizations” model 
provides an example of this mode of thinking and an example of the activation of the 
imagined boundary between Islam and the West.  Huntington argued that current and 
future sources of conflict will largely be along the lines of competing “civilizations”. He 
categorized the world largely by religious tradition: Western, Confucian, Japanese, 
Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and African (his order). Huntington 
argued that the differences between civilizations are real and fundamental, and are “less 
mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic 
ones” (27). He argued that civilization (“What are you?”) cannot be changed, suggesting 
that a Muslim literally cannot belong in the “West.” Most research on Muslim American 
identification since 9/11 refutes this claim of incompatibility. I cite Huntington to 




 Although Islam is not itself a race, the concept of racialization can be applied. 
Racialization is the process by which people are cat gorized based on perceived racial 
characteristics and often denigrated based on this categorization. Miles (1989), one of the 
sociologists to reintroduce the concept in the contemporary era writes, 
I therefore employ the concept of racialisation to refer to those instances where 
social relations between people have been structured by the signification of 
human biological characteristics in such a way as to define and construct 
differentiated social collectivities. The concept therefore refers to a process of 
                                                
5 Although the “Clash of Civilizations” model has been thoroughly critiqued, it is widely taught. It was  
part of the curriculum for my BA in International Relations, and an internet search of syllabi in 
International Relations and Affairs show that it still forms a part of the introductory canon.  
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categorization, a representational process of defining an Other (usually, but not 
exclusively) somatically (75). 
 
 Racialization is often tied to discussions of nationalism, nationhood, religion and politics 
(Barot and Bird 2001) and so is clearly relevant to my project here. 
 The use of this conceptualization to gain traction on the experiences of Muslims 
in the West is complex as Islam is not a racial or ethnic identity. The global dispersion of 
Islam from an early period makes the use of phenotypical characteristics to distinguish 
Muslims from non-Muslims difficult. This has not however prevented erroneous 
assumptions that it is possible to identify Muslims solely on external characteristics. 
Individuals of certain national descent, such as South Asians and Arabs, are commonly, 
and often inaccurately, believed to be Muslim. At the same time, Muslims are often 
treated as if they are a cohesive ethnicity,  
It is also important to remember that in the same way that the majority population 
imagine certain ethnic groups as conforming to certain religious faiths, the 
religious groups also may undergo a certain ethnificat on: that is, they are 
imagined to resemble each other in terms of what seem  to be almost a biological 
(pre)determination as much as an ideological one. Ethnification of Islam is 
frequently part of political and media discourse, hlping shape public attitudes 
(Schmidt 2002: 3) 
 
 In popular discourse, Muslims are often identified as having a “brown” phenotype 
and dressing in certain ways. Attire associated with Muslim-ness includes hijab and/or 
abaya for women, a beard, kufi, and/or “traditional” clothes such as thobe or shalwar 
khameez6 for men (see Göle 2003 for a detailed discussion of the role of clothing in 
identifying Muslims). Name is another way in which Muslims are often labeled, 
                                                
6 Hijab is the headscarf worn by some Muslim women; there are many different styles of hijab. In addition 
to covering their hair, women wearing hijab usually dress modestly, covering arms and legs. Abaya is a 
long sleeved, floor length gown or over-robe worn by some Muslim women. Kufi is a cap worn by some 
Muslim men. Thobe is a robe commonly worn by men throughout the Arab world. Shalwar khameez are 
outfits consisting of pants and tunic worn by men and women throughout South Asia.  
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“Muslims are turned into a Muhammad. Like the Cohen regularly featured in anti-
Semitic jokes and songs, the  name Muhammad also often figures into jokes about 
Muslims” (Khosravi 2012: 70). 
 Meer (2008) refers to Muslim identity as a “quasi-ethnic sociological formation” 
(66) based on the intersections between religious and ethnic boundaries. He notes that 
“many British Muslims report a higher level of discrimination and abuse when they 
appear ‘conspicuously Muslim’” (72). This issue gained attention in the United States 
when Juan Williams, an analyst for National Public Radio (NPR) made the comment, 
“But when I get on the plane, I got to tell you, if I see people who are in Muslim garb and 
I think, you know, they are identifying themselves fir t and foremost as Muslims, I get 
worried. I get nervous” (Folkenflik 2010). The focus on a “Muslim” appearance can lead 
to misidentification, and when combined with violent processes of othering, have tragic 
results as in the fatal shooting of Balbir Singh Sodhi on September 15, 2001. An Indian 
Sikh, Sodhi was mistaken for a Muslim and killed in retaliation for 9/11.   
Several of my respondents identify themselves as “brown.” “Brown” is a racial 
categorization used by many groups, including South Asians, Arabs, Hispanics and others 
who do not fit well into the black/white racial dichotomy common in the United States. 
The term is used by some and rejected by others. The use of the conceptualization of 
“brown” in South Asian and Arab communities is supported both by academic literature 
and by my own experiences working and living with these communities. It is not a 
concept embraced by every member, but it is a concept that is generally understood to 
capture the distinct experience of being what Kibria (1996) terms “ambiguous non-
whites”. “Brown” may have specific sub-group meanings (for example, see Frost’s 
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(2010) discussion of “brown” masculinity among Punjabi youth in British Columbia), but 
the general conceptualization refers to the distinctness of a group that is seen as neither 
white nor black. For both South Asians and Arabs in the United States, debates about 
their race have a long history. Race of immigrants i  the early twentieth century was 
often a matter requiring a legal decision as naturalization required the applicant to be 
white or African. While most groups were ruled on as a whole, South Asians and Arabs 
often faced rulings that varied from case to case (Morning 2001). While South Asians 
have long been seen as an “other” falling between th  categories of white and black, 
Arabs were often perceived as white in the early twentieth century. However, since the 
mid-1970s, they have increasingly been perceived as non-white. Since 9/11, being 
Muslim has become associated with being “brown”. Patel (2005) argues that “Following 
September 11, mainstream media, perpetrators of hate violence and speech, and many 
activists began thinking of ‘Muslim-looking’ Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians as a 
single racial group” (63). 
 Regardless of the complexity of using the term “racialization” when dealing with 
a non-racial group, it is clear that the process of othering affecting Muslims parallels the 
racialization of other groups. Byng (2008) argues that Muslim religious identity came to 
“mimic the inequality of race identity via essentialist images of Islam, government 
policies, and experiences of discrimination” (659). She continues, “Even though Muslim 
is a religious label and not a racial one, since 9/11 Muslim American identity has been 
restructured to reflect the systemic inequality that is readily associated with racial 
minorities” (662).  
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ORIENTALISM: ISLAM AS “OTHER” 
 The East, and Islam in particular, have long formed an “other” for the West, a 
boundary that was reinvigorated following 9/11. Said (1978), in his seminal examination 
of othering of the Orient, points to the hostility of this division,  
[the] habit of deploying large generalizations by which reality is divided 
into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each 
category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative 
interpretation. Underlying these categories is the rigidly binomial 
opposition of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs,’ with the former always encroaching upon 
the latter (227)  
 
Said used the term “Orientalism” to describe this emphasis on dichotomous 
categorization of the world into East and West and the accompanying devaluation and 
denigration of the East.  
 The boundary distinguishing Judeo-Christian “Americans” from the Muslim 
“other” and casting this as an us-versus-them equation has a long history and was easily 
accessible following 9/11. Said (1981) refers to this as “subliminal cultural 
consciousness” about Islam (6).The stereotypes of Muslims and Middle Easterners that 
frame American understandings of the current conflicts can be traced to their 
development in the Middle Ages. Since its beginning in the seventh century, Islam was 
perceived as a threat to predominately Christian Europe. Islam was seen as a false 
religion and the superior military might of the Islamic empire posed a very real threat to 
Europe. From its earliest encounters, the West viewed Islam as an existential threat. 
Centuries of warfare honed these negative narratives and embedded them deep within 
western thought. Karim (2000) locates them in the works of Beethoven, Dante, Mozart, 
Shakespeare, and Voltaire and argues that as these classics are revisited in each 
generation, they “[sustain] a world view in which ‘Mohammadens’ are essentially 
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gripped by violence, lust, greed, and barbarism” (2). Daniel (1960) explores the 
development of Christian European approaches to Islam in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, arguing that contemporary approaches to Islam are heir to this legacy; “the 
style of the day changes, but the themes are perennial” (17). These themes developed 
great internal coherence in their representation and understanding of the Muslim “other” 
and explicitly posed Christendom in opposition to the Islamic world. Western images and 
understandings of Islam present it as monolithic, static, and antithetical to western liberal 
values (Karim 2000). This long standing sense of con lict and threat is often latent; 
however, 9/11 crystallized American fears of Islam nd made many Americans feel 
vulnerable to an Islamic threat (Gottschalk and Greenb rg 2008). 
 
OTHERING IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR 
 In times of conflict and war, processes of othering a d identification of 
boundaries between “us” and “them” are often used to frame the enemy. September 11 
and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the identification of al-Qaeda 
as the primary enemy made this Islam/West boundary s lient. 
 The relationship between othering and the social construction of the enemy is 
well-established (for example see Dower’s (1986) account of this in World War II). 
According to Schmitt ([1927] 1976), the enemy must be other, “existentially something 
different and alien” (27). The enemy is defined in contrast to “us” and conceived of as 
homogenous and static with an intrinsic and immutably evil nature.  
 The other/enemy is often dehumanized. According to Dower (1986), during 
World War II, the Japanese were labeled as other, bordering on being another species. 
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Imagery of apes, lesser men, primitives, children, and madmen were used to describe the 
Japanese. Dower argues that these images were not unique to this situation. He notes that 
after World War II, these same ways of thinking were attached to new enemies as they 
arose including Soviets, Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese. I extend this argument and 
claim that they have been lately applied to the Muslim “enemy”.  
 Similarly, Alexander (1992) observes a long history f othering enemies,   
For most members of a national community, great natio l wars clearly demarcate 
the good and the bad. The nation’s soldiers are takn to be courageous 
embodiments of the discourse of liberty; the foreign nations and soldiers who 
oppose them are deemed to represent some potent combination of the 
counterdemocratic code. In the course of American history, this negative code 
has, in fact, been extended to a vast and variegated roup, to the British, native 
peoples, pirates, the South and the North, Africans, old European nations, fascists, 
Communists, Germans, and Japanese (298). 
 
He argues that othering the enemy is necessary in order to engage in the attempt to kill 
the enemy in combat,  
Identification in terms of the discourse of repression is essential if vengeful 
combat is to be pursued. Once this polluting discourse is applied, it becomes 
impossible for good people to treat and reason withthose on the other side. If 
one’s opponents are beyond reason, deceived by leaders who operate in secret, the 
only option is to read them out of the human race (298).  
 
 During times of conflict, othering of the group tha  is identified with the enemy 
can lead to fears of the “enemy within”. The loyalt of those who look like “them” is 
questioned and they may be perceived to compose a fifth column. For example, Malik 
(2009) summarizes literature finding that in European anti-Muslim discourse, Muslims 
are seen as “incapable of loyalty to liberal democrati  states” (207). This suspicion can 
lead to formal charges of disloyalty based on little more than identity. For example in 
2004, American Muslim Brandon Mayfield was arrested in connection with the Madrid 
train bombing. Evidence used against him included a partial fingerprint that was not a 
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match to his, and his children’s Spanish homework (Associated Press 2004). Suspicion 
and distrust can also lead to violence against members of the stigmatized group (see Tilly 
2003 for a discussion of processes by which us/them boundaries become sites of 
violence).  
 
PERCEIVING A THREAT: HOW ISLAM CAME TO BE THE ENEMY 
 
 The official rhetoric of GWOT has consistently avoided defining the enemy as 
Muslim. In the speech that launched the war, President Bush said  
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We 
respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, 
and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its 
teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name 
of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their 
own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is 
not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy 
is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them 
(Bush 2001). 
 
While the explicit singling out of the Arab and Muslim communities signaled that 
they were “other”, these groups were officially disas ociated from the enemy. How then 
did this “other” come to be perceived as the enemy?  
The conceptualization of these groups as distinct, as other, has been based on 
competition and conflict since the middle ages. Theframework for understanding Islam 
as a potentially violent and aggressive threat to the West was pre-existent, and provided 
an easy, natural-seeming, pattern of thought to fall into. 
Understanding Muslims as a threatening “them” was not the only way in which 
American society reacted to 9/11. While there were expressions of anger and violence 
against Muslims, there were also outpourings of support, friendship, and dialogue. 
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Reality is complex, and it is grossly oversimplifying matters to suggest that there was 
only one way in which Muslims and non-Muslims interacted following 9/11. What I am 
arguing is that the idea of us-versus-them was ascendant. In attempting to deal with a 
complex conflict centered in a region of the world unfamiliar to many Americans, 
involving individuals of a faith with which most Americans had no personal contact, it 
was easy to accept the simplifying dichotomy of us/them. Us-versus-them became the 
dominant discourse. There is a long historical tradition of using this frame to understand 
Islam, and as I will show, the media discourse relied on this same frame. Following 
Foucault (1980), I recognize that there were many competing discourses for 
understanding 9/11 and the GWOT, and these discourses are formed throughout society 
(politicians, media, film, literature, individual interactions); however, one particular 
discourse, that of us-versus-them, became dominant.  
 
Ambiguous Enemy 
 The official rhetoric was notoriously vague in naming an enemy against which 
American military might and public opinion could berought to bear. Without a clearly 
defined enemy but given the demographic characteristics of the hijackers and the 
populations of the countries invaded, existing frameworks for understanding the Muslim 
other provided an easy way to frame the conflict.  
 The Bush administration often used vague language. Th  enemy was repeatedly 
referred to as “evil doers” or “evil ones”. It was not until September 20, 2001 that 
President Bush explicitly identified the enemy as the networks of terrorists identified as 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Pipes (2002) argues that this ambiguity posed a problem, “Nor 
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are generals the only ones who need to know whom they are fighting and what they are 
fighting for; so do others in government, so do foreign friends and enemies alike, and so, 
of course, do the American people” (245). There wasa social need for a tangible enemy.  
 At the same time that the official rhetoric framed the enemy in vague terms, the 
actions that were being taken by the government and military could be seen to be 
targeting specific populations; populations that centuries of othering had prepared 
Americans to see as monolithic and dangerous. Policies requiring the registration of men 
from countries as diverse as Oman and Somalia7, the detention of over a thousand 
Muslims, monitoring of mosques by the FBI, watch lists full of Muslim names, and 
military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq provided a way to understand who the enemy 
was. This understanding built on a historical framework that imagined these 
geographically, racially, and culturally different groups to be primarily identifiable by a 
shared label: Muslim. 
 
Media Coverage of 9/11 
 President Bush’s famed statement “You are either with us, or you are with the 
terrorists” posed an us-versus-them frame that paralleled the dominant frame being used 
in the media to cover 9/11. Unlike Bush’s speech which distinguished terrorist from 
Muslim, the media  
has generally constructed a polarized world in which anyone with the 
slightest connection to Islam comes under suspicion. When such 
frameworks are operative, Muslim Americans – even those with deep 
roots in the USA – are excluded from the collective Self. Despite the 
                                                
7 Men over age 16 who were nationals or citizens of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen 
were required to register at INS in person, and report back annually thereafter. The program was ended in 
April 2011.  
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appearances of some print media articles and broadcast items that address 
the considerable differences in views held by Muslim  on terrorism and 
relations with the West, the dominant discourses overwhelmingly present 
most followers of Islam as a threat (Karim 2006:117). 
 
 The news media had to scramble to make sense of 9/11 for the viewing public. In 
dealing with this unscripted event, the media tended to draw on existing cognitive models 
and themes, “Even though the events were extraordinary, their reporting – following the 
initial period of disorientation – was eventually put in frames that had been in place to 
cover such issues as violence, terrorism and Muslims” (Karim 2006:125).  
 Karim (2006) focuses on the single story told about 9/11 across the media. In the 
aftermath, the emphasis was on security matters and larger context was eschewed in favor 
of the hunt for “Islamic terrorists.” Although there were alternative perspectives, they 
were largely drowned out by the ubiquity of the dominant discourse narrating a story of 
good (self) versus evil (other). This frame simplified complex events, making it appear 
that the events could be understood purely because “they” were not like “us”. 
 
EVIDENCE OF ACTIVATION OF US-VERSUS-THEM BOUNDARY  
The activation of an us-versus-them boundary following 9/11 posed Muslims as 
“other” and enemy and subject to sanctions including stares, discrimination, verbal 
harassment, and even physical violence. FBI Hate crime statistics show a dramatic 
increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes in 2001. From about 30 incidents per year in the late 
1990s to a high of 481 in 2001; hate crimes have declined since, but remain about three 
times what they were prior to 9/11 (see Figure 1). The Council on American-Islamic 
Relations (CAIR) issues annual Civil Rights Reports which also show evidence of anti-
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Islamic prejudice. Cases documented by CAIR include vandalism of mosques, arson, 
beatings, and murder. 
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Studies of Muslim youth following 9/11 provide a window into life at the 
boundary of us and them. Peek (2003) interviewed 68 Muslim college and university 
students in New York City following 9/11. Her respondents report negative responses 
ranging “from stares and ‘nasty looks’ to verbal harassment and even physical assault” 
(275). Ewing and Hoyler (2008) interviewed 19 South Asian Muslim youths in North 
Carolina following 9/11. Their respondents reported feelings of marginalization and 
politization of their identities as Americans and Muslims. They note that the atmosphere 
following 9/11 and the discourse surrounding the GWOT “deprived most of the youth we 
met of a sense of full cultural citizenship as Muslim  came to be positioned more 
explicitly as outsiders” (85). 
 A respondent from Peek’s study echoes this sentime,   
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When they say ‘America Unites’, they did not mean us. They did not 
mean Muslims. At every moment when they said, ‘America must unite’, 
they did not mean us (282). 
 
 Both Peek (2003) and Ewing and Hoyler (2008) note that even though physical 
violence was rare, the knowledge that such violence existed shaped the experiences and 
perceptions of their respondents. The violence that did occur was highly visible,  
The message of the anti-Muslim violence seemed clear: Muslims are not 
‘real’ Americans. […] To many young Muslims, anti-Muslim violence 
conveyed the message that they could not be both Muslim and American 
and that they would never be considered as such (Ewing and Hoyler 
2008:85).  
 
In addition to violence, policies such as increased scrutiny at airports were experienced as 
a form of symbolic violence. Even when second-hand, the perceived humiliation and ill-
treatment of family and community members shaped perce tions of the atmosphere. 
These stories and experiences transformed abstract con epts of citizenship and belonging 
into an “immediate, visceral experience” (Ewing and Hoyler 2008:86). Being a victim of 
harassment or violence personally was not necessary to feel excluded, othered, and 
frightened.  
  
LIMITATIONS OF US-VS-THEM APPROACH 
 Snow and Su (2011) note the danger of relying too heavily on a framework of 
othering to explain group conflict. Reducing conflict to the relatively simple idea of us-
versus-them may be greatly over-simplifying matters. Snow and Su observe that while 
dehumanization is a necessary condition for mass violence it is not a sufficient condition. 
This is likely true in the case I am studying as well. Othering of Muslims sparks into anti-
Islamic and anti-Muslim violence and exclusion only with additional conditions.  
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 Even the concept of us-versus-them is potentially ver  complex. Pintak (2006) 
provides a nice discussion of the complexity present even in this most simple 
conceptualization of us and them and of the shifting nature of this boundary,  
This ‘good versus evil’ dichotomy [found throughout American foreign 
policy] is an extension of the more elemental Us and Them comparison. 
As human beings, we measure ourselves against the Other. […] I am 
American, she is Russian. It is true of individuals, of communities, of 
racial and ethnic groups, of nations and of entire peoples […] The 
boundaries between Us and Them are constantly shifting, as with siblings 
who bicker incessantly but instantly unite in the face of a challenge from 
outside the family. Former president Ronald Reagan joki gly used to say 
that all it would take for the Arabs and Israelis to set aside their 
differences was an alien invasion (Pintak 2006:6). 
 
Salience of Identity and Claims of Mutual Exclusivity 
 In using us/them frameworks to approach this study I am not arguing that this is a 
true lived dichotomization, rather that there is an expectation that the categories of 
“Muslim” and “American” are incompatible and must be selected between. Although 
individual Muslims in the United States may find the identities compatible, the 
expectation that they should not shapes situations where it is assumed that they must pick 
between two mutually exclusive identities. 
 Sirin and Fine (2008) conducted a multiple-methods study of how Muslim 
American youth negotiate identity following 9/11. They found that the us-versus-them 
framework common in the U.S. following 9/11 made Muslim identities salient; “In the 
fall of 2001, these young people and their families w re ejected from the national ‘we’” 
(7). However, they find that the identities of “American” and “Muslim” are not mutually 
exclusive for most of these youths,  
Contrary to what many have predicted, Muslims in ths country have not ‘given 
up’ their American identity for the sake of their Muslim identity, despite the many 
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pressures from Muslim fundamentalists and some Western intellectuals, who 




 In this chapter, I have discussed sociological conceptualizations of othering. I 
have shown the history of othering Muslims in the Wst. I have discussed how conflict 
can (re)activate boundaries and I have explored the path by which Muslims became an 
everyday “other” following 9/11. Finally, I provide evidence that this boundary forms a 
dominant discourse with real effects on the lived experiences of Muslims and those 
perceived to be Muslim. I have also outlined some of the limitations of relying primarily 
on this framework. Among other limitations, there is ample evidence that while this 
conceptualization forms a dominant discourse in contemporary American society, it does 
not reflect the lived the experiences of Muslim Americans.  
 




CHAPTER 3: DIVERSITY IN THE MILITARY 
 
 The U.S. military moved relatively quickly from practices of racial exclusion to 
racial inclusion. In World War II, there was a shift from exclusion of racial minorities to 
segregated inclusion. During this period the military utilized racially segregated units. 
Segregation was seen as necessary to maintain unit cohesion. By the end of World War 
II, discussions about integration were underway. “Project Clear”, a study on attitudes 
towards racial integration, was conducted during the Korean War. It found that integrated 
units were equally or more effective than segregated units and that unfavorable racial 
incidents were rare. Project Clear and subsequent studie  argued that racial integration 
would increase military effectiveness and recommended an end to segregation. By the 
Vietnam War, all branches of the U.S. armed forces w re racially integrated. With the 
end of conscription in 1973, the proportion of minor ties increased. As white men opted 
out of the now voluntary service, military officials worked to create more enticing 
working conditions, ultimately attracting many minorities who felt the military offered 
them more opportunity than the civilian labor force. This shifted military race relations 
policy towards a focus on equality of opportunity. This focus remains (Moore 2003b).  
In this chapter I will discuss characteristics of the U.S. military that may facilitate 
integration, including hierarchical structure, formal commitment to equal opportunity, 
cohesion, and contact. I will then consider closure in the military and will address 
specific examples of anti-Islam rhetoric in the U.S. military. I will conclude with a 
discussion of leadership.  
 




MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS PROMOTING INTEGRATION 
The military has been able to dramatically change its race relations in a relatively 
short time span because of some of its unique charateristics. In this section I will 
consider the role of the hierarchical structure of the military, commitment to equal 
opportunity policies, cohesion, and contact in facilitat ng integration in the U.S. military.  
In many ways, racial integration of the military was successful because it 
occurred under specific military conditions. What makes the military remarkable 
is not its policy of racial equality, which is found in every institution in the United 
States, but its ability, through its organizational structure, to enforce this policy. 
Because of its formal bureaucratic structure, the military is governed less by the 
subjective views of its leaders and more by institutional policies that reflect the 
laws of civilian society (Moore 2003b:244). 
 
Integration began under conditions of conscription. Rapid integration was 
possible because the military was already in the business of coercing service members 
from diverse backgrounds to work and live together. Bogart (1969) points out that the 
service member was already “receptive to a drastic reshaping of his values” (15). Service 
members were also separated from civilian society during their service, facilitating rapid 
integration. Bogart (1969) attributes the success of integration to the Army being a 
“closed” society; soldiers experiencing the changing policies were separated from social 
networks at home, and did not have to take into accunt the expectations, opinions, or 
pressures of family, friends, and neighbors in interacting with diverse colleagues. The 
coercive nature of military service and the emphasis on hierarchy also allowed the 
military to enforce behavioral change and compliance. Additionally, the military is an 
authoritarian system which has power to constrain the behavior of members.  




The U.S. military has also officially embraced policies of equal opportunity. 
Bogart (1969) refers to the army as the “great leveler” and both he and Moskos and 
Butler (1996) point to unique aspects of military service, such as pay by rank, uniformity 
of dress, code of discipline, common duties, shared facilities, and even title (“soldier”) as 
factors which neutralize differences among service members.  
In their study of multinational forces, Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari (1999) argue 
that the military instills a shared worldview and a common military culture in its 
members. This can create a sense of a military “in-group” that overrides individual 
differences. This relates to ideas of cohesion. There are two types of cohesion: social 
cohesion and task cohesion. Social Cohesion is a product of homogeneity, and is based 
on the idea that units where members are like each other and would voluntarily spend 
time with each other are stronger and more effectiv. As Harries-Jenkins and Dandecker 
(1994) explain it, this perspective assumes trust and commitment “to be most evident in 
‘a mate who is like I am’” (199). Emphasis on social ohesion leads to the use of 
exclusionary barriers to maintain homogenous units.  
Task Cohesion, on the other hand, is group unity that is achieved when 
individuals are able to work together to successfully accomplish shared goals. Under 
these conditions, group members develop trust and respect for the abilities of each other. 
Whether or not group members are similar or personally like each other is irrelevant in 
this conceptualization; differences are overcome in the pursuit of a common goal, and 
with the achievement of this goal, group ties strengthen. This conceptualization is used in 
arguments in favor of diversity.  




 Mullen and Cooper (1994) argue that it is task cohesion rather than social 
cohesion that is relevant for group effectiveness. Moreover, they argue that cohesion may 
be the result of group success rather than the conventional assumption that cohesion leads 
to success. In support of this is the finding that integration (race, gender, sexuality) is 
rarely observed to have direct negative effects on effectiveness (Segal and Bourg 2002).  
 
The Contact Hypothesis 
At the same time that the military enforces rules against overt racism and other 
exclusionary practices, the military brings together diverse populations and creates 
situations where individuals from diverse backgrounds must rely on each. This connects 
to the contact hypothesis. 
First articulated by Allport (1954), the contact hypothesis considers the role of 
contact between individuals with different backgrounds in breaking down stereotypes and 
habits of prejudice. Since prejudice and group conflict is often based on stereotyping, the 
opportunity to communicate with members of the opposing group can lead to greater 
appreciation and understanding of alternative perspectives and experiences, and thereby 
diminish prejudice. Allport argues that contact alone is not enough, but that certain 
conditions must be met to transform interactions into acceptance. Casual contact – 
passing on the street or in the store, for example, do s not break down stereotypes, but 
may instead strengthen them if adverse mental associations are reinforced. On the other 
hand, in-depth contact under certain conditions has t e potential to lessen prejudice. This 
can be achieved through education, but direct experience is better, “Contacts that bring 
knowledge and acquaintance are likely to engender sounder beliefs concerning minority 
group, and for this reason contribute to the reduction of prejudice” (268). Allport argues 




that as the “other” comes to be seen as a complex human being through in-depth contact, 
prejudices based on simplistic and inaccurate conceptualizations break down. Being 
around people different than you is a start, but it is not enough according to Allport, who 
argues “The nub of the matter seems to be the contat must reach below the surface in 
order to be effective in altering prejudice.  Only the type of contact the lead people to do 
things together is likely to result in changed attitudes” (276).  
In addition to being meaningful contact and not jusdiversity for the sake of 
diversity, in order to break down prejudice, contact must occur between individuals of 
similar status and preferably with institutional support, 
Prejudice (unless deeply rooted in the character structure of the individual) may 
be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the 
pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is 
sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere), and 
provided it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and 
common humanity between members of the two groups (281). 
 
The racial integration of the military was central in Allport’s original formulation 
and the contact hypothesis remains a valuable frame for examining diversity in the 
military. The criteria are met in the military where service members often work in diverse 
groups towards shared goals, and where regulations and/or leadership can be used to 
officially promote integration.  
The role of intergroup contact is clear in Bogart’s (1969) discussion of the 
findings of Project Clear. It was found that both wite and black soldiers who had served 
in an integrated units were much more favorable to the idea of integration than were 
those who had served in only segregated units. One of the principle findings was that 
attitudes towards integration were shaped by experiences serving in integrated units,  




Men learn to accept integration. As it is experienced, attitudes become 
more favorable. Thus the probable success of any new att mpt at 
integration may be gauged not in terms of what attiudes men hold at 
present, but in terms of what attitudes they are lik ly to hold under the 
impact of their new experience (183). 
 
 
MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS PROMOTING CLOSURE AND EXCLUSION 
 While there are aspects of military service that have the potential to increase 
inclusion, it is important to point out that the military is also an institution that practices 
closure and exclusion both formally and informally. For example, the military has 
historically been, and remains, a masculine institution. The military is a unique social 
institution in that it can legally disqualify applicants from certain jobs based solely on 
gender, and until recently, sexuality. Exclusionary boundaries have historically been 
maintained through an appeal to cohesion; that is, by claiming that if the excluded group 
were allowed to participate, service members would be less likely to work well together 
leading to a decrease in military effectiveness (Segal and Kestnbaum 2002).  
Another common argument used to maintain barriers against diversity appeals to 
ideas about physical difference. For African Americans these concerns centered on 
hygiene, inherent characteristics, and sexual proclivities (Bogart 1969). In the debate on 
the integration of women in combat, differences in physical strength between men and 
women are used to suggest women would be less effective in combat. Women’s 
reproductive capabilities, including pregnancy and menstruation are also raised as 
reasons women are not acceptable in combat.  
In addition to formal policies of closure, which are often based on erroneous 
conceptualizations of cohesion and stereotypes about physical differences, the culture of 




the military can be exclusive. Informal sanctions may be used against members seen as 
“inappropriate”. For example, harassment of women service members. Miller (1997) 
argues that sexual harassment is a way members of the dominant group (men) express 
discontent with the increased participation of women. Miller finds tactics include 
resisting the authority of women, scrutiny, gossip, abotage, and indirect threats (e.g., that 
other men will rape her). In my sample the most common expressions of resistance to 
inclusion were feeling under scrutiny and the spread of rumors and gossip about the 
Muslim service members. 
Increased efforts at inclusiveness are likely to face resistance as service members 
adapt to the changes. Gropman (2006) reminds us that raci l friction, and even race riots, 
have occurred in the military. Moskos and Butler (1996) discuss racial complaints, which 
often involve racial slurs and slights, as well as more difficult to resolve perceptions of 
inequality in evaluations, promotions, and assignmets. However, when formal policy 
and informal culture meet, integration can occur successfully, even in this highly 
traditional institution. While gender remains a contested domain in military service, the 
end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the acceptance of openly homosexual service 
members in the U.S. military has been notably unevetful. 
 
VIEWS OF ISLAM IN THE MILITARY 
 The context of the Global War on Terror shapes the relevance of Islam to the U.S. 
military. The U.S. military has been in Afghanistan si ce 2001. Afghanistan is 
predominately Muslim and is well known for being contr lled from 1996 to 2001 by the 
Taliban, a radically fundamentalist Islamist group. The U.S. military entered Afghanistan 
in pursuit of al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization claiming an Islamic foundation. Given 




these conditions, it is inevitable that Islam become a salient military topic. With the 
invasion of Iraq, an Arab country with a population 97 percent Muslim, the centrality of 
Islam to the military missions of the United States r mained. The emphasis in these 
conflicts on “winning hearts and minds” has also highlighted issues of religious 
accommodation, for example the increased use of women soldiers to facilitate searching 
and communicating with Afghan and Iraqi women. For these reasons Islam is a part of 
military education/training and how it is depicted is likely to shape the atmosphere, 
especially since the general American population knows little about Islam. Education and 
attitudes vary and existence or absence of certain bel efs by a given leader explains some 
of the variation in the experiences of my respondents.  
 In addition to the relevance of Islam to contemporary military missions, the role 
of Muslims in the U.S. military has been made prominent by the acts of violence 
committed by a few Muslim service members. There are th ee cases that have been well 
publicized and have prompted heated debate about the military service of Muslims.  
Chronologically, the first occurred on March 23, 2003 when Army Sergeant 
Hasan Akbar threw grenades into the tents of sleeping soldiers in Kuwait killing two 
officers. The second, and best known, incident occurred on November 5, 2009 when 
Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hassan opened fire at Fort Hood killing 13 people. 
Most recently, on July 27, 2011, Army Private Naser Abdo was arrested outside Fort 
Hood. At the time of his arrest he was staying in amotel room that contained a handgun, 
directions for building a bomb from an al-Qaeda publication, and the supplies to build a 
bomb.  




In addition to these cases where the service member is undoubtedly guilty of 
committing violence, there have been several other cases where accusations were 
publically made against Muslim service members that were later dismissed. For example, 
Army Chaplain James Yee, a Muslim chaplain working at Guantanamo Bay, was arrested 
on September 10, 2003 and charged with sedition and espionage. Yee was held for 76 
days before all charges were dropped in March 2004. He subsequently received an 
Article 158 for adultery and storage of pornography on a governm nt computer. He 
denies all the charges (Yee 2005).  
Hakim, who I will introduce fully in Chapter 8, brought up the case of Chaplain 
Yee in our discussion,  
it does bother me when I see [Yee’s] case being utilized as an example. That is an 
injustice to do that without giving the full story and conclusion as to yeah he was 
found not guilty of any of [the charges]. So we’ve had these incidences in the 
military by certain individuals but when you contrast […] that with tens of 
thousands of Muslims who have served honorably and with distinction, you know 
we have Muslim soldiers who [...] have died in the lin of duty.  Some of them are 
buried at Arlington cemetery. And so their legacy and what they’ve done cannot 
be dismissed because of a few who have done just the opposite.  
 
Given the particular context of the military in relation to Islam, it is useful to 
consider how military education approaches Islam. As with many forms of education, 
what is taught depends on the particular instructor. Systematically assessing the attitudes 
and content of military education as it relates to Islam is beyond the scope of this project; 
however, media reports do indicate that at least some instructors take a very us/them 
approach to the topic. Additionally, two of my respondents (Dani and Omar in Chapter 6) 
made troubling assertions about the absence of Islam in language and culture training.  
                                                
8 Article 15 is a non-judicial punishment that is dipensed by one’s commanding officer for minor 
disciplinary offenses.  




 Among those who write and teach about Islam there are, broadly speaking, two 
camps. One side, exemplified by Karen Armstrong, presents a generally positive view of 
Islam and considers Islam to be a religion equivalent in scope and effect to other 
religions. At the other extreme are authors such as Daniel Pipes, who among other 
positions has taught at the U.S. Naval War College, who preach a doomsday scenario of 
an Islamic conspiracy to destroy the West. The lattr camp often begins their discussion 
in terms of Islamism (a political movement), but quickly devolve into an association of 
all Muslims with fundamentalism, violence, and terrorism. This perspective takes the 
stance that Islam poses an existential threat; Pipes (2002) writes, “The preservation of our 
existing order can no longer be taken for granted; i  needs to be fought for” (125). The 
form of this threat is often proposed to be “creeping sharia,” the idea that religious 
accommodation and multiculturalism will lead directly and inexorably to a world in 
which “sharia law” dictates the behavior of both Muslims and non-Muslims. This 
perspective is also marked by the belief that there is no such thing as a “moderate 
Muslim”, that all Muslims are suspect, and that profiling is a justified and effective 
technique to combat terrorism. Pipes (2002) writes, “All Muslims, unfortunately are 
suspect” (140). Perhaps most troubling is the assertion f om this camp that Muslims 
regularly practice taqiyyah, a form of deception believed by this group to be pervasive.9 
This allows them to dismiss any Muslim who speaks against them based on the 
assumption that they are lying.  
                                                
9 In Islamic jurisprudence, taqiyyah is the practice of dissimulating about religious beliefs under conditions 
of extreme duress, such as when revealing your religion could result in your death. 




 This viewpoint can be found among both military educators and analysts. Mark 
Silinsky10 follows very clearly in Pipes footsteps and identifies as a “28-year veteran of 
the defense intelligence community.” He is quite opn about his fear and loathing of 
Islam, writing “I make no apologies or qualifications for my article’s thesis that Islam 
presents a danger to the US Armed Forces like none other” (Silinsky 2010a). He also 
argues that Islam should not be understood as a religion on par with Christianity or 
Judaism, and frequently publishes such inaccurate and inflammatory statements as,  
Much of Islam is predicated on violence, celebrates violence, and demands 
violence against non-Muslims. Verses in the holy Islamic text drip with the blood 
of beheadings, amputations, eye gouging, and mutilation (Silinksy 2010b). 
 
Attitudes such as this are at a minimum present in military intelligence and analysis.  
In mid-2012, a curriculum used to educate military service members about Islam 
was released by Danger Room that demonstrated that such ideology can also be found 
among those providing the training on Islam. In April 2012, the Pentagon suspended a 
course, “Perspective on Islam and Islamic Relations” at the Joint Forces Staff College in 
Norfolk, VA after material used by the instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Dooley, 
became public. The course has been offered since 2004 and about 800 students have 
taken it (Jelinek and Burns 2012). The presentation in question used an explicit us-
versus-them framework, “Your oath as a professional soldier forces you to pick a side 
here” reads text following a diagram that visually poses the U.S. Constitution and Sharia 
in opposition (5). He claims that “Islam has already declared war on the West” (7), and 
proposes “Total War” as an appropriate response. In a proposed message from 
STRATCOM he writes,  
                                                
10 Silinsky came to my attention when he was slated to present a paper on a panel with me at the Inter-
University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) biennial conference in Chicago in October 2011. 
He did not show up. 




Islam, though it may describe itself as an ideology f peace, as a means of 
‘Taqiya’ or deception, is not a religion of tolerance. [...] it is clear that Islam 
remains an ideology and system of governance that demands the extermination of 
anyone who does not subscribe to each and every one of its tenants [sic]. […] 
Whether the United States chooses to declare war or not is no longer a relevant 
question. The fact that the US, and the western world in general, are in a fight for 
our very survival is a matter now intuitively obvious to any who have observed 
the basic, undisputed elements of Islam. […] It is therefore time for the United 
States to make our true intentions clear. This barbaric ideology will no longer be 
tolerated. Islam must change or we will facilitate its self-destruction. Let it be 
known that the United States remains, and will foreve  be, a beacon of freedom, 
self determination, hope, and representative democracy. The American people 
will not be converted. We will not submit. We will not be intimidated, and we 
will not be driven from this earth (28). 
 
 This curriculum clearly draws on the tradition of writers such as Pipes. It also 
clearly draws on an us/them frame, among other things neatly erasing the millions of 
Muslim Americans and setting (implicitly non-Muslim) Americans in a dichotomy with 
Muslims with the claim “The American people […] will not submit.” I am not claiming 
that all members of the military embrace this type of xtreme ideology. However, this is 
evidence that this approach to Islam can be found in the military, as in civilian society. I 
introduce this material to illustrate the way in which specific unit context matters. Since 
curriculum like this is not standardized in the military, only some units will be subject to 
this attitude. The presence of this approach within t e education of the unit or of 
leadership has the potential to dramatically affect the experiences of some Muslim 
service members.  
 
IMPORTANCE OF DIVERSITY 
Diversity has several benefits for the U.S. military. Diversity is crucial for the 
social legitimacy of the U.S. military. As a powerful social institution that controls the 
legitimate uses of violence, civilian society prefes a military that resembles the society 




as a whole. In the U.S., this means a diverse force. While the military led civilian society 
in racial integration, it has lagged behind civilian society with respect to gender and 
sexuality integration and the heated debates about this opic demonstrate the importance 
of diversity in maintaining social legitimacy (Segal and Bourg 2002). 
In purely practical terms, successful integration of diverse personnel can increase 
performance. Throughout history, the U.S. military has recruited minority populations to 
meet personnel needs, the ability to integrate these n w populations into the military is 
crucial for military effectiveness. In addition to helping meet personnel needs, diversity is 
also a powerful asset in the globalized marketplace. Diversity brings new perspectives 
and approaches. As an institution greatly involved in international operations, the U.S. 
military can benefit from reservoirs of cultural competence that are maintained in a 
diverse force.  
Cultural competence is the ability to effectively work with individuals and groups 
from other cultures, and the importance of this skill et is increasingly being realized in 
contemporary military missions. Cultural competence may refer to in-depth experience 
with a specific culture or a broader adaptability that allows one to move between multiple 
cultures. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have required U.S. troops to work in 
close proximity with non-western civilian populations. The nature of these operations and 
the emphasis on “winning hearts and minds” requires a nuanced understanding of cultural 
differences.  
Figuring out how to address cultural competence has been an ongoing challenge 
for the military. Healey (2008) notes that military cultural training commonly includes a 
checklist of do’s and don’ts, some phrases of Arabic, and a simplified historical 




overview. This level of preparation is unlikely to be of much use, “This level of cultural 
awareness training may be enough to keep a Marine o soldier out of jail in a foreign 
land, but it does little to increase the likelihood of accomplishing the military mission” 
(Healey 2008:12). For example, in February 2012, American troops burned a store of 
Qur’ans at Bagram air base in Afghanistan, triggering violent riots and attacks on U.S. 
troops. These soldiers had been provided with a list of “don’ts” for handling the Qur’an 
but nothing was mentioned about burning it. This example demonstrates the weakness of 
training that tries to distill culture into a list of rules. Montgomery McFate, an 
anthropologist who has worked with the U.S. Department of Defense explains, “It makes 
culture into a set of arbitrary rules. You don’t understand why […] The Bible is not 
considered itself a holy object, and unless you’d grown up in a religious tradition where 
that was true, you wouldn’t understand the way that Muslims feel about the Koran” (Qtd 
in Duncan 2012). 
Language and culture skills are not inherently tiedo ethnic or religious identity. 
Non-Muslims are capable of learning languages and cultures associated with Islam, just 
as many Muslims have no linguistic or cultural fluency in these areas. However, within 
the current educational and social culture of the United States, many of these skills are 
concentrated in this community. In 2009, 35,083 students studied Arabic at 466 
institutions of higher education in the United States. Of these enrollments only 13.6 
percent were advanced enrollments. To put this in perspective, Arabic enrollments 
account for only 2 percent of all foreign language enrollments. Other languages relevant 
to the current military missions are even less accessible in the United States. In 2009, 974 
students studied Urdu, while only 114 students studied Pashtu (Furman et al 2010). 




Interest in these regions and languages are increasing, but implementing academic 
programs takes time, and a commitment to achieving linguistic and cultural fluency 
requires years of study. As these programs develop, much of the needed language and 
culture skill must be sought among those who learned from family and community.  
 
ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 
 Leadership involves using social influence to get a group of people to accomplish 
a given goal. Leadership can be accomplished throug different means. Lucas and Segal 
(2011) identify a difference between leading with power and leading with status. Power 
relies on formal position, and the ability of the leader to impose punishments or grant 
rewards. Leading with power can lead to resentment and it may be resisted. Status, on the 
other hand, is a position based on respect. Leading with status is less likely to breed 
resistance and resentment and is more likely to lead to changes in behavior.  
 In their study of American soldiers in World War II, Stouffer et al found similar 
value placed on respecting and trusting leaders. They found that forward units had more 
favorable attitudes about their officers than rear units. For units on the front lines, 
leadership was daily demonstrated through shared risk-taking, while for those in the rear, 
authority was based on the formal military hierarchy rather than a sense of personal 
respect or loyalty.  
Leadership is a central component of U.S. military culture, and plays a crucial 
role in the success or failure of efforts to integrate diversity in the force, “The degree to 
which the organization accomplishes successful integra ion of previously excluded 
groups is a function of leadership commitment to that integration at all levels” (Segal and 
Bourg 2002:713). 




Leaders shape both behavior and atmosphere of the unit as it relates to diversity, 
tolerance, and integration. Leaders serve as role mdels, shaping the behavior of other 
members. They also directly shape behavior through the enforcement (or non-
enforcement) of anti-discrimination and equal opportunity policies. Elron et al (1999) 
include institutional support through supportive lead rship to be part of the recipe for 
successful multinational operations. 
 
“Diversity Leadership” 
The Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) is invested in 
developing “diversity leadership” in the U.S. military because of the advantages of 
institutional diversity. While diversity can be beneficial, they note that it must be 
effectively managed through strong leaders in order to produce positive effects.  
 The MLDC (2010) sees effective diversity leadership as leadership which is able 
to overcome the differences among service members and get everyone working towards 
the same goals. Under these conditions, the increased innovation, creativity, and 
differences in perspective and skills associated with diversity can be effectively utilized. 
When diversity is left unmanaged, existing social categorizations can overpower the 
shared military aims, and lead to splintering, “Lead rs also influence whether and how 
diversity creates social identities that are either relevant to work or not, such as in-
groups/out-groups, self-categorization, and perspective” (3). This seems to be what 
happened in the cases I will present in Chapter 7. Rather than foster a strong sense of unit 
inclusion, leaders in these units privileged existing us/them identities, which led to a 
fragmentation of the unit and the exclusion of Muslim (and other) service members. 




 According to MLDC, successful diversity leadership as more to do with having a 
specific perspective – consideration of how diversity affects the mission – than with 
specific leadership practices. However, they address some broad goals of leadership 
invested in diversity. Leaders who value diversity will instill a sense of identity based on 
mission rather than other social categories and will actively manage diversity to avoid 
formation of identities based on social rather than military characteristics, “unmanaged 
diversity increases conflict and decreases communication” (3). This involves leaders 
being proactive in managing diversity-related conflicts and being fair in their use of 
rewards and punishments. They must both model inclusion and enforce formal policies.  
 Another element of good diversity leadership is facilit ting effective 
communication. One of the aspects of diversity is difference in perspective. Effective 
leaders must learn how to communicate with subordinates who may have a different 
perspective. This may include learning to listen to subordinates and also awareness of 
different perspectives. Successful diversity leaders must also learn to operate beyond 
assumptions and stereotypes. In line with the literature on task cohesion, to effectively 
leverage diversity leadership must provide the tools t  do the job. A lack of resources can 
lead to disintegration of cohesion as individuals default to existing divisions in the 
scramble for scarce resources, rewards, or to avoid punishment. Finally, leadership must 
establish personal and professional credibility, “When people are asked to work with and 
for people who are not like them, leaders need to cons iously build confidence in their 
leadership” (4).  
In Reed and Bullis’ (2009) investigation of what they term “destructive 
leadership,” they find evidence of widespread “interpersonal behaviors by those in 




leadership positions that negatively impact followers” (6). This “dark side” (Conger 
1990) of leadership can negatively affect service members, just as high quality leadership 
will tend to positively affect service members. From a diversity perspective, bad 
leadership will be leadership that is blind to diversity issues and/or leadership that relies 
on assumptions and stereotypes about minority groups. These flaws seem to characterize 
the narratives of those respondents who had negative experiences.  
 
CONCLUSION 
While times of war can strengthen us/them boundaries and intensify 
processes of othering, they can also provide opportunities for minority group 
members. The military, due its hierarchical structure, commitment to equal 
opportunity policies, and contact, can be a space of inclusion and opportunity. 
Leadership is crucial in this process, and the quality of leadership often defines 
the success of integration. 
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CHAPTER 4: CITIZENSHIP 
 
For Japanese Americans during World War II, military service and citizenship 
were closely linked. I began this project expecting o find something similar with Muslim 
service members; however, this was not supported by my data. However, although the 
connection between military service and citizenship was not straightforward, themes of 
patriotism and a sense of being American flowed through my respondents’ narratives. 
Citizenship is a relevant frame shaping the experiences of my respondents, though it 
takes a subtler form than I anticipated. The connection between citizenship and military 
service has largely been conceptualized as a direct relationship with military service 
leading to increased citizenship. I expand this conceptualization and argue that in 
addition to this relationship, citizenship – feeling that one is a member of the nation – can 
lead to military participation.  
In this chapter I provide a brief overview of the lit rature on the connection 
between military service and citizenship with an emphasis on the experiences of Japanese 
Americans. I then introduce the Institutional/Occupational model, using ideas of 
institutional motivation to highlight the connection between citizenship and military 
service. I then consider conceptualizations of informal citizenship focusing on the ways 
citizenship is enacted in everyday social interactions. I connect this to the idea of 
“hyphenated selves” and explore the role of “bridge builder” that several of my 
respondents take on. 
 
Chapter 4: Citizenship  M. Sandhoff 
 47 
 
MILITARY SERVICE AND CITIZENSHIP 
In the United States, there has long been a recognized connection between 
military service and citizenship rights. This relationship has been theorized in two 
different forms. On one hand, military service, especially during times of war, can lead to 
increased citizenship rights. On the other hand, the right to serve in the military can be 
understood as an indicator of citizenship. Krebs (2006) articulates these related 
conceptualizations, “Participation in the armed forces has, at least in the nation-state 
system, been depicted as a sign of one’s full membership in the political community as 
well as evidence of one’s worthiness for membership” (17). Being allowed to serve 
indicates you are seen as belonging while serving ca  prove your worthiness to belong.  
 The role of military service as a signifier of inclusion can be seen in the 
reluctance to include minority groups in the military. Burk (1995) argues that for African 
Americans and women, exclusion from military service was connected to a reluctance to 
recognize them as full citizens. Segal and Hansen (1992) consider the debate about 
greater inclusion of women in the military and note a change in rhetoric from one based 
on military effectiveness to a discourse of citizenship rights and responsibilities. A 
similar transition is evident in the debates about the military service of open 
homosexuals. In the United States, military service has been contested for African 
Americans, Native Americans, women, and homosexuals, among others (Krebs 2006). 
Being included in the military is a powerful indicator that you are seen as member of the 
nation.  
Military service has also been used to make citizenship claims. Military services, 
and the risks it entails, are seen in this conceptualization as ways to prove loyalty and 
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worthiness of being considered a full citizen. In 1862, Congress first passed legislation 
granting expedited naturalization for immigrants who served in the U.S. military. After 
World War I, because only whites and individuals of African descent were eligible for 
naturalization, Asian veterans were often denied this benefit. However, military service 
ultimately won out, and the passage of the Nye-Lea Act in 1935 allowed Asian veterans 
to be naturalized almost 20 years before racial qualification for citizenship was repealed. 
Slayer (2004) argues that the “hyperpatriotic” atmosphere of World War I allowed men 
to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States as “military service became the ultimate 
test of a man’s Americanness” (848).  
During World War II, the Japanese in America were subject to the intensification 
of long-standing us/them boundaries with the onset of military hostilities between the 
United States and Japan. This historical example illustrates both aspects of the connection 
between military service and citizenship. 
 
Japanese Americans in World War II 
 Japanese Americans successfully used military service in World War II to 
renegotiate their position in society from suspected enemy to model minority. Early in the 
war, they faced extreme policies resulting from the activation of us/them boundaries and 
their identification with the enemy. However, exemplary military service and sacrifice 
was used to successfully incorporate them into the nation.  
 Already unpopular for the economic challenge they posed to the white population, 
with the onset of the war, public perception of Japanese Americans worsened. Japanese 
Americans were stigmatized for belonging to the same ethnicity as the enemy. They 
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became targets for the desire for revenge and fearsduring early Japanese victories in the 
war, “the Nisei11 were now being socially constructed as belonging to another human 
species, incapable of being loyal citizens of the United States” (Moore 2003a:8). In 
response many Nisei emphasized their American citizenship. 
 On February 19, 1942 President Roosevelt signed Excutive Order 9066 which 
granted the War Department control of enemy aliens and the distinction between citizen 
and alien lost meaning (Shibutani 1978). Japanese Am ricans on the west coast were 
evacuated and interned.  Hawaiian Japanese did not face mass evacuation although 
representatives of the Japanese government, Shinto and Buddhist priests and priestesses, 
language teachers, and fisherman were detained (Moore 2003a). Following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor in 1941, there was no immediate policy regarding Japanese American 
soldiers and commanding officers acted on their owndiscretion; while some Nisei were 
allowed to continue with their regular duties, many were disarmed, reassigned, 
transferred, or discharged (Shibutani 1978).  
 In June 1942 the War Department and Selective Service System reclassified all 
Nisei as 4-C, “aliens ineligible for military service” and stopped their induction (Moore 
2003a; Shibutani 1978). Then, in January 1943, the War Department announced they 
were seeking volunteers for the formation of a special combat team12 of Japanese 
Americans. At the time, the military was segregated into white and black units; fitting 
poorly into this dichotomy, Japanese American soldiers could have been integrated into 
                                                
11 Nisei refers to second generation Japanese Americans. These are individuals who were born in the 
United States to parents who immigrated from Japan. 
12 There were two all-Nisei units: the 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The 
100th was based on an existing Hawaiian National Guard unit, and its exemplary performance during 
training led to the formation of the 442nd. Eventually the 100th was absorbed by the 442nd. The 442nd served 
in the European theater. 
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existing units (and some did serve as interpreters and in intelligence positions in white 
combat units). The creation of an all-Nisei unit was seen by the U.S. Army as a means by 
which Japanese Americans could demonstrate their loyalty. Part of the rationale for 
forming a segregated unit was that a separate unit’s performance would be noticed and 
could serve to refute the charges of disloyalty while the service of individual Nisei 
scattered throughout the Army would be more difficult to measure (Shibutani 1978). 
Members of the units made deliberate efforts to present themselves favorably including 
wearing proper uniform at all times, meticulous atten ion to military courtesy, eschewing 
the use of Japanese, regular and repeated blood donations, and buying war bonds. 
Masaoka worked during the war as a publicist for the 442nd, interviewing Nisei soldiers 
and sending stories back for distribution in United States. He reports, 
In all I wrote more than 2,000 stories, with many of the interviews being 
conducted under combat conditions. ‘Why are you out here fighting for 
your country?’ I would ask these men. In other outfits he reply might be a 
wisecrack, like ‘The draft board got me before I could get away.’ With the 
Nisei the invariable answer was: ‘Because we want to prove ourselves as 
Americans’ (164-5). 
 
 In April 1943 Nisei women were officially allowed to volunteer for the Women’s 
Army Corps (WAC).13 They were not racially segregated. Moore (2003a) finds that the 
Nisei women volunteering for WAC service “felt a great need to show loyalty to the 
United States” (27) and joined the military to prove they were Americans. She identifies 
the treatment of Japanese Americans as a driving force, inspiring “super-patriotism” 
among the Nisei. Some of Moore’s respondent’s identfi d the military service of Nisei as 
instrumental in the establishment of full citizenship rights for Japanese Americans, and 
                                                
13 Nisei women from Hawaii were not recruited until October 1944. Nisei women were never permitted to 
serve in the Navy or Air Force Women’s services (Moore 2003a) 
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most saw it as contributing to personal upward social mobility. Recruitment of Nisei 
women drew explicitly on the connection between military service and citizenship; a 
recruiting press release quoted in Moore (2003a) read:  
All Americans, whatever their ancestry, must remembr that they will be judged 
in the future by the part they play now. If we shirk our plain duty to our country in 
a time of its greatest need, we must be prepared to have our loyalty questioned. 
Indeed, I think it should be questioned (97). 
 
 According to Masaoka (1987), reestablishing the draft for Nisei men was seen as 
crucial to the claiming of citizenship rights for Japanese Americans. In a speech for the 
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) he proclaimed  
let me ask you to think of your future—and that of y ur children’s 
children. When the war is won, and we attempt to find our way back into 
normal society, one question which we cannot avoid will be, ‘Say, Buddy, 
what did you do in the war?’ If we cannot answer that we, with them, 
fought for the victory which is ours, our chance for success and 
acceptance will be small. We need Selective Service, the least we can do 
is to ask for it. […] I call for a resolution to the President and the Army of 
the United States asking for a reclassification of the draft status of the 
American-born Japanese so that we shall be accorded the same privilege 
of serving our country in the armed forces as that gr nted to every other 
American citizen (120-121).  
 
In January 1944, the War Department reinstated the raft of Japanese American men and 
classified them as 1-A, “immediately eligible for conscription” (Moore 2003a; Shibutani 
1978).14 The All-Nisei units served admirably in the war and received favorable media 
coverage (Moore 2003a). The all-Nisei units received many military awards, including 
                                                
14 By the time the draft was reinstated for Nisei men, many felt that the claim for Nisei rights had alre dy 
been successfully made, and often lacked the zeal of the earlier volunteers. Shibutani (1978), for example, 
provides an in-depth consideration of the breakdown f Company K, an all-Nisei unit formed near the end 
of the war that was most notable for widespread absenteeism, insubordination, and violence. While strong 
primary groups among Nisei units earlier in the waremphasized proving the loyalty and competence of the 
Nisei, strong primary group ties became the cause for inefficiency in Company K where informal group 
norms emphasizing protest overruled formal norms of military discipline. 
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9,486 Purple Hearts (Masaoka 1987). Their successful military service led to a 
reassessment of Nisei in mainstream society and they became popular heroes (Shibutani 
1978). As the Nisei units demonstrated their dedication in fighting overseas, the media 
was eager to follow their exploits. By 1945 Shibutani reports that Japanese American 
families in the United States were greeted by white neighbors with inquiries about “your 
boys in Italy” and employment and housing became notably easier to obtain. Shibutani 
argues that the unexpected achievements of the units were the impetus for the stereotype 
of Japanese Americans as an overachieving, model minority group.  
For Japanese American during World War II, military service was used to directly 
claim citizenship. Excluded from conscription, military service itself was a form of 
citizenship that had to be fought for. Some fought for their right to serve in the military, 
and ultimately the military service of a select group of Japanese Americans became a 
stepping stone by which the entire community made claims of national belonging. In this 
case the connection between military service and citizenship was clear and direct. 
Members of this community used the sacrifices of military service to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the United States and so make citizenship claims.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL MOTIVATIONS 
This direct connection between military service andcitizenship did not 
characterize the narratives of my respondents; instead military service takes the form of 
an expression of informal everyday citizenship. While Japanese Americans had to fight 
for their right to serve, all of my respondents take their right to serve for granted. Military 
service is not a fight to prove themselves as Americans. However, for many, military 
service is an organic expression of their sense of belonging. My respondents don’t serve 
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to prove their American-ness, they serve because they feel American. Rather than using a 
model of military service and citizenship directed owards minority groups, this finding 
fits best in a more general model: Institutional/Occupational.  
 One way to demonstrate the connection many of my respondents made between 
feeling American and their military service is through the Institutional/Occupational 
model. Since 1973, the United States has relied on recruits and volunteers rather than 
conscripts to meet the personnel demands of the armd forces. With this dramatic change 
in accession policy, military sociologists began to investigate what motivated young 
adults to choose to serve in the military. The literature developed a varied, but relatively 
consistent, list of motivations. These include economic considerations such as pay, job 
skills, job security, educational opportunities and money for education; service motives 
such as a desire to serve the country; an interest in self-improvement and discipline; a 
chance to escape local economic or social problems and get a new start to life; 
opportunities for travel and adventure; and equality of opportunity (especially for women 
and minorities) (Eighmey 2006).  
 A popular way to conceptualize motivations is using the Institutional/ 
Occupational (I/O) Model. Charles Moskos first proposed the I/O model in 1977 arguing 
that the U.S. military had undergone an organization l shift from institutional to 
occupational driven by the end of conscription and the decision to use the dynamic of the 
labor market to recruit the force. The institutional military was conceptualized as one 
“legitimated in terms of values and norms, that is, a purpose transcending individual self-
interest in favor of a presumed higher good” (Moskos 1988:16), whereas the occupational 
organization is “legitimated in terms of the marketplace. Supply and demand, rather than 
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normative considerations, are paramount” (Moskos 1988:17). When applied to 
motivation to serve, it suggests that in the institutional organization individuals serve out 
of a sense of duty and honor while in the occupation l rganization, motivation was 
governed by self-interest and market dynamics.  
This notion of institutional service describes the motivations expressed by many 
of my respondents. In expressing institutional motivations rather than seeing military 
service as something which can be bartered for greater citizenship rights, my respondents 
are implicitly expressing a sense of belonging. To feel institutional commitments to the 
nation-state suggests a sense of belonging. Military se vice for these respondents may be 
an expression of loyalty and citizenship, but it isnot being used to make a claim for 
recognition of this loyalty and citizenship.   
 
EVERYDAY CITIZENSHIP 
While the institutional/occupational model is a model with general applicability, 
the specific context of us/them does still shape some f the ways in which my 
respondents express citizenship through their military service. Most notably, while my 
respondents see military service and an organic expression of their sense of being 
American, they often have to engage with others whoquestion their American-ness and 
negotiate a space where they can be both American and Muslim. This connects to 
articulations of informal citizenship. 
While formal citizenship is a straightforward concept defined by naturalization, 
informal citizenship is more complex. No legal document defines this status; no 
certificate is issued for achieving this (Glazer 1996). Glenn (2011), in her Presidential 
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Address to the American Sociological Association addresses this, “Citizenship is not just 
a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging, which requires recognition by 
other members of the community” (3).  Informal citizenship is a lived experience that 
transcends legal citizenship and which is negotiated in everyday interactions, “belonging 
is enacted and constituted in quotidian practices of inclusion and exclusion” (Siu 2001:9). 
Glenn (2011) also emphasizes the everyday and negotiated nature of citizenship,  
Sociology’s special strength may lie in its focus on the social processes by which 
citizenship and its boundaries are formed. In particular, sociologists can highlight 
how citizenship is constructed through face-to-face int ractions and through 
place-specific practices that occur within larger structural contexts (2). 
 
Citizenship is an everyday process. It occurs in the interactions between people. It 
involves presenting yourself as a full member of the collective, and being accepted as 
one.  
 For my respondents, the military is a place where some of these everyday 
negotiations takes place. They see themselves as full Americans, but must occasionally 
negotiate with others who see them as necessarily div de  people, torn between being 
Muslim and being American. The expression of citizenship in this case involves 
questions of difference and belonging. Rosaldo and Flores (1994) elaborate, “Cultural 
citizenship refers to the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native 
language) with respect to the norms of the dominant tional community, without 
compromising one’s right to belong” (57). By wearing military uniforms and identifying 
as Muslims, my respondents are examples of this. They are both different and the same. 
They literally take on a uniform of the nation while maintaining aspects of identity that 
distinguish them as “other.” 
 




As I outlined in Chapter 2, my respondents are negotiating power structures that 
have a tendency to see them as necessarily divided. The context of us/them argues that 
unless they give up their religious identities, these individuals cannot be full Americans. 
Military service is not used explicitly as a way to fight against these ideas, but it is an 
expression of American Muslim self. Through their mlitary service, an everyday act, my 
respondents are performing authentic selves that embrace both American-ness and 
Muslim-ness. Particularly powerful, this performance seems to be largely unconscious. 
Military service for these respondents is not an act of protest or an intentional claim on 
formal or informal citizenship. My respondents are not serving in order to be recognized 
as Americans. But in serving, and in expressing commit ents to service and duty, they 
present selves that belie conceptualizations of the mutual exclusivity of Muslim and 
American identities. My respondents are Muslim and American. There is no need to 
select between these two identities. They do not serve in the military despite their 
Muslim-ness, or in an attempt to claim American-ness. They demonstrate the integration 
of these identities. 
 Sirin and Fine (2008) use the concept “hyphenated selves” to describe the way in 
which American Muslims see themselves as cohesive sel , not torn between mutually 
exclusive identities. The conceptualization of hyphenated selves allows for the 
recognition of multiple identities and may be joined or separated in an individual,  
we argue for the notion of hyphenated selves in order to understand how youths 
create and enact their identities when political or social conditions place them in 
tension. We use this idea to help us think about how y uth negotiate, embody, and 
narrate their multiple selves, at the hyphen, in a fractured world, nation, 
community, home, or school (123). 
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They elaborate, “we now consider the hyphen as the pivotal psychological hinge where 
identities cast 'in tension' are at once joined and separated” (195). In this 
conceptualization, the identities of Muslim and American are not necessarily separate, the 
“hyphen” allows flexibility in the way these identities are experienced and expressed.  
It is this “hyphenated self” that many of my responde ts are expressing when they 
combine practices and values associated with their Muslim identity with the patriotism, 
sacrifice, and institutional aspects of military service. As with many of the adolescents in 
Sirin and Fine’s study, the respondents in my sample don’t try to hide their identity, for 
example, none of my respondents changed their name or used an Americanized 
nickname. My respondents publically assert their Muslim identity to varying degrees. 
Some openly practice and formally request religious accommodation, others practice 
privately. However, even for those who restrict their practice, this is related to personal 
inclinations, not an intentional attempt to down play their Muslim-ness.  
Despite the pressure to prioritize between identities driven by activation of the 
us/them boundary, for my respondents, as for many American Muslims, there is nothing 
to choose between. The identities of Muslim and American are not experienced as being 
in opposition. Sirin and Fine observe,  
we found strong empirical evidence that Muslim American youth indeed develop 
strong commitments to both their Muslim identities and their American identities. 
This finding fundamentally challenges the dominant 'incompatibility' hypothesis, 
which proposes the Muslim and 'American' cultures ar  mutually exclusive (149). 
 
As members of the military who claim both identities simultaneously, my 
respondents are demonstrating the commitment of multiple identities. By expressing this 
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complexity, they are negotiating recognition of their citizenship in everyday way, not 




 While my respondents see no conflict between their id ntities, they occasionally 
find themselves in situations where they must actively defend this. This often takes the 
form of engaging in dialogue or educating those around them who assume that being 
Muslim and American is incompatible. These everyday interactions become places where 
citizenship is negotiated and claimed.  
 Some of my respondents take on the role of “bridge builders”. This is a role 
identified by Sirin and Fine who find that one response to being othered and having 
integrated identity questioned is to actively engage in dialogue and education,  
 
For Muslim Americans, civic engagement is a way not only to deal with the 
current crisis but also to claim their rightful position as fully engaged members of 
the mainstream U.S. society. Besides the frustration, pessimism, and anger, the 
young men and women also see Muslim Americans as critical bridge builders 
both between their community and the mainstream society and between the 
Muslim world and the West (111) 
 
For these respondents, dialogue is not just something at is engaged in as needed, but it 
comes to be seen as a distinct role. The intersubjective work of negotiating citizenship 
becomes an important part of the military service of these respondents. As Sirin and Fine 
put it, “they know that if anything is going to change, it will be because they have spoken 
up” (170). 
In interaction, distinctions between us/them can be reinforced or they can be 
challenged, weakened, and perhaps even crumble, ther for  engaging in dialogue is a 
form of citizenship work. My respondents are engaging in this work inside a social 
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institution that is powerfully connected with ideas of the nation. My respondents who 
take on the role of bridge builders engage in this work in at least three directions: with 
non-Muslim service members, with Muslim locals, and with other American Muslims.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  There is a well-established connection between military service and 
citizenship. This was quite clearly used by Japanese Americans during World War 
II. However, the narratives of my respondents do not take this form. For my 
respondents, military service is not about claiming citizenship rights, but is an 
expression of citizenship. I explored this idea using the frame of institutional 
motivations to serve. That these motivations are at the core of so many narratives 
speaks to this expression of citizenship. My respondents by and large feel deeply 
American (regardless of how others might view them), and military service is an 
organic expression of this.  
 In addition to seeing military service an expression of belonging, my 
respondents also demonstrate the idea of “hyphenated identities” and some 
actively negotiate a space for themselves in the military as both Americans and 
Muslims. They actively challenge conceptualizations that suggest they must 
choose between these identities, and embrace both using dialogue and other social 
interactions to negotiate citizenship. As a part of this, some take on the role of 
“bridge builder” and use their multiple identities to engage with diverse clients 
including U.S. service members, Muslim locals in other countries, and other 
American Muslims.  
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Although these frames are useful for contextualizing the experiences of my 
respondents, they are limited by the nature of my sample. There are many different ways 
to experience “living at the hyphen”. By the nature of my project, I did not recruit from 
populations that are hiding or rejecting their Muslim-ness. In responding to my 
announcement, my respondents are in a small way performing this hyphenated identity. 
Yes, they are willing to participate in a study on “Muslim Veterans”. My use of this 
frame of citizenship then is not generalizable to the population of Muslim American 
service members, but it remains valuable because it provides traction on the narratives I 
present here.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
My research question lends itself to a qualitative approach, which I have taken in 
this project. Exploration of varied experiences is not a topic that can be easily captured by 
close-ended survey questions. As I will show in the data analysis, the experiences of my 
respondents varied greatly. It would be very difficult to capture the complexity and 
subtlety of these issues with standardized multiple choice questions.  
 As one of the first projects on this population, a certain amount of exploratory 
work is also necessary. In this project I am exploring the experiences of individuals as 
they relate to a bounded set of sociological concepts. This is not hypothesis testing in the 
classical sense. Qualitative methods are well suited to this project because they allow 
researcher and respondents flexibility to discuss topics as they arise. The lack of 
generalizability that results from the use of a small sample is not a barrier to the goals of 
this project because I am seeking to identify themes and motifs relating to processes of 
othering and institutional diversity, rather than test specific hypotheses with the goal of 
confirming or refuting them. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 In times of conflict, definitions of the enemy using the same terms as those used 
to characterize the stigmatized minority group intensify the us/them boundary and may 
make it a site of violence. The military-civilian boundary is permeable, so it is expected 
that us/them discourses will be found in the military; however, the military has a history 
of providing a more level playing field for some minorities and due to the emphasis on 
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discipline and loyalty may provide protections against othering of members. This is 
supported by my data.  
 Under conditions of othering, members of the stigmatized minority group may use 
military service to make claims of national belonging and to mitigate processes of 
othering. This conceptualization was not supported by my data. My respondents are 
confident in their rights and military service becomes a way for them to perform 
complete selves. Rather than see themselves as favoring Muslim or American identity, 
military service is an opportunity for them to be American Muslims.  
 
ALTERNATIVE FRAMES 
 Although I treat Muslims as a unique group in this project, it is possible that a 
more general frame would be better suited. In this section I consider a number of 




Rather than it being the label “Muslim” that matters, ethnicity may be the most 
salient characteristic shaping the experiences of this group. Perhaps it is being “brown” 
that matters rather than being Muslim. I do not fully address this possibility in this 
project. As I was not able to recruit any black Muslim  to participate in this study, I 
cannot address if the label Muslim transcends racial categories. My respondents are 
ethnically diverse; however, most of them could be read similarly. My sample does 
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include three white Muslims. Their experiences are not substantially different from those 
of my other respondents, lending support to the frame I use.  
In addition to a more diverse sample, the question of whether religious or ethnic 
identity is more salient could be addressed by using a sample of respondents of similar 
ethnic background but different religions. For example, are the experiences of South 
Asian Buddhist, Christian, or Hindu service members different or similar to the 
experiences of South Asian Muslim service members? This is beyond the scope of this 
project.  
 
Immigrants in the Military 
Another possible frame is that of immigrant military service. The American 
Muslim community is largely foreign born. Perhaps Muslims’ military service is not 
shaped by being Muslim but rather by the experience of being immigrants. Immigrants 
have served in the U.S. military since its inception and the military has provided a way to 
“become American”, both legally and culturally. Legal Permanent Residents are eligible 
to enlist in the military, though citizenship is necessary for a commission or to serve as a 
warrant officer. As of June 2010, there were 16,500 non-citizens serving in the military, 
composing about 1.4 percent of the enlisted force (Department of Defense 2010). 
 
Religious Minorities in the Military 
 Another possible frame for considering the service of Muslims is the military 
service of other religious minorities. Perhaps it i not being Muslim specifically that 
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matters, but being a member of a minority religion. However, given the role of Islam in 
the current conflicts, this approach seems likely to bring us back to the us/them frame.  
 
No Difference from General Military Population 
 It is also possible that Muslims in the military can best be understood through 
existing lenses based largely on the white, heterosexual, male experience. That is, there is 
no difference between their experience and that of the general military population. This 
of course allows for a great deal of variance. While I did find evidence of the existence of 
us/them boundaries, this often had little effect on he experiences of my respondents 
making this a relevant frame. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 As one of the first studies of its kind, this project seeks to document the 
experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military. The central question this project 
explores is: What are the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military? In 
answering this question, I address several sub-questions. I first ask whether the us/them 
atmosphere that characterizes civilian discourse about Muslim Americans in present in 
the military, and I find that it is. Having established the permeability of the military-
civilian boundary, I then ask how this atmosphere aff cts the experiences of Muslim 
service members. I find that for many, it has little effect. I connect this to the history of 
racial integration in the U.S. military, arguing tha  characteristics of the military, 
including an emphasis on policies of equal opportunity, the ability to compel certain 
behaviors, and the nature of military service, which promotes close contact among 
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diverse individuals, mitigates some of the negatives effects of being othered. However, I 
also find that in some units, the us/them discourse in exacerbated creating atmospheres of 
distrust and suspicion which leads to negative outcomes. Having established this 
dichotomy of effects, I examine the role of leadership on these outcomes, arguing that 
leadership is a crucial factor that shapes whether units become inclusive or exclusive.  
Finally, I ask if Muslim service members are using their military service as a way to 
negotiate this us/them atmosphere by using it to make citizenship claims as Japanese 
American veterans did during World War II. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
 The population of Muslim service members and veterans is small, and there is no 
comprehensive tally of the population. Given the small size and the impossibility of 
accessing a comprehensive accounting of this population, my sample is constructed non-
randomly. I use a purposive convenience sample. My sample is drawn from a specific 
group, Muslims who have served in the military, butwithin this group my sample is 
composed of those who heard of my study and volunteered to participate. I will discuss 
some of the barriers to finding respondents later in this chapter.  
 To be in the sample, respondents had to self-identify as Muslim and have served 
for any length of time in the U.S. armed forces since September 2001. I did not limit the 
sample by branch, and I accepted respondents who served in the National Guard and 
Reserves as both have played an active role in the GWOT. My sample includes both 
veterans and current service members.  
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I acknowledge that the label “Muslim” encompasses a very diverse population. 
Muslims in the United States come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds, are 
of various socio-economic classes, and have diverse personal and family backgrounds 
and characteristics. While it is not useful to speak of one homogenous “Muslim 
perspective”, in this project I am interested in common challenges associated with this 
shared identity. As with sociological research on any social group, I recognize the 
diversity within the group but focus on shared identity in order to draw meaningful 
conclusions about social groups, institutions, and processes. 
I conducted interviews from June 2010 through December 2011 (18 months). In 
total I spoke with 15 respondents. My sample provides valuable information about this 
understudied population. This study was designed as a qualitative exploration of 
theoretical issues of citizenship, belonging, and military service within a particular 
historical moment. As such, the emphasis is on exploring experiences and looking for 
emerging patterns and processes. In this type of study, frequencies and statistical tests 
provide little leverage on the research questions.  
 When approaching a qualitative study, the guiding principle in sampling should 
be saturation. Saturation occurs when new data no longer provide new insight into the 
research topic (For example see Mason 2010). On some t pics I believe that saturation 
was achieved or nearly achieved. On topics such as motivation to join the military, little 
new information was being uncovered by the last interviews. However, on other topics, 
such as experiences in the military, saturation was not achieved and each new interview 
brought new insight to the topic. I acknowledge this weakness, which was unavoidable 
due to limitations preventing using saturation as the primary guideline. As a Ph.D. 
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dissertation, there were time and funding limits which dictated that at some point data 
collection must be halted so analysis could begin (Mason 2010 discusses the limitations 
of “funded work”, a concept he applies to Ph.D. research). More constraining however, 
was the difficulty locating respondents, which I will d scuss more fully in the next 
section. Although not ideal, this is the context in which this projected developed. As 
Strauss and Corbin (1998 [1990]) note, “Sometimes th  researcher has no choice and 
must settle for a theoretical scheme that is less dveloped than desired” (292). 
Despite these limitations, I do believe that the data I have is of high quality. There 
are benefits to a small sample size. With only 15 interviews I am highly familiar with all 
of my data and was able to keep the entire field in mi d while interviewing, coding, and 
analyzing. I believe that this improved flexibility during interviews and facilitated the 
development of codes and recognition of themes and p tterns.   
 
Finding Respondents 
 The original plan was to draw a snowball sample; however, this process did not 
work. Respondents were identified via personal contacts, social networking websites 
(e.g., Facebook), flyers (Appendix A), email listservs, and word of mouth. Respondents 
were asked to contact the researcher directly if they wished to participate. I worked with 
religious networks, military networks, and academic networks.  
 Religious communities I contacted included Muslim student groups at colleges 
and universities and local religious institutions. I also used personal contacts within 
several geographically disparate Muslim communities to disseminate information about 
this study. I attempted to contact 33 Muslim Student Associations (MSAs) of which three 
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confirmed that they had sent my announcement out to their listserv. I repeatedly tried to 
contact the American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council, but consistent 
with the experiences of Hansen (personal communication), who wrote his dissertation on 
religious diversity in the U.S. military, I never received any response. I joined two 
relevant Facebook groups targeting Muslim service members and veterans. I attempted to 
find respondents in these groups by contacting the administrators, posting to the wall, and 
sending unsolicited messages to group members. I ditributed flyers on campus, 
including in the campus musallah (Islamic prayer room). I also posted flyers at onelocal 
mosque. Mosques and Islamic centers posed a particul  challenge in seeking out 
respondents because while some mosques are very welcoming to the idea of military 
service of members, others are strongly opposed to it. As such, I did not pursue contacts 
with mosques beyond this one, relying instead on personal contacts within various 
communities to help me disseminate my announcement.  
On the military side, I emailed student veterans groups around the country. I 
attempted to contact 33 groups of which three confirmed that they had sent my 
announcement to their listserv. The similarity in numbers with the MSAs is purely 
coincidental. I received one very negative response from an individual listed as the point 
of contact for the student veterans’ organization at a west coast university that was both 
disturbing and spoke to the tension that may be exprienced by members of the 
population I am considering. I also utilized contacts through the Socy 869 group15 to 
disseminate information about this project in military networks, and pursed contacts at 
the Naval Academy, with Equal Opportunity officers, and linguists within the military.  I 
also attempted to get in touch with the military chaplaincy. Over the course of this study I 
                                                
15 Socy 869 is a working group of students and faculty in military sociology. 
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was given the contact information for three Muslim military chaplains. Those that 
responded were busy and unable to provide me with any assistance. On the advice of 
personal contacts, I tried to contact the chapel at Ft. Meade (a local base) which lists 
Islamic services on their public website. The Chapel dir cted me to Public Affairs who 
did not respond to any of my multiple phone calls.  
 I also sent my announcement out to several academic listservs. These included the 
Sociology of Islam listserv, the Peace, War, and Social Conflict section of the American 
Sociological Association, and The Society for Military Psychology listserv. I also 
presented my research at various stages at four diffe ent conferences where I included a 
plea for help finding respondents. These conferences were Eastern Sociological Society 
(ESS) in February 2011, American Sociological Association (ASA) in August 2011, 
Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) in October 2011, and 
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) in December 2011.  
 In my original proposal for this project, I anticipated that my sample would 
largely be based on snowballing. I anticipated thatonce preliminary respondents were 
identified, I would be able to seek their advice and recommendations on finding more 
respondents. This method was not effective. Consistently respondents reported either 
knowing no other Muslim service members or having lost contact with those few they did 
know. I found that there appeared to be an absence of a social network among Muslim 
service members (or the network is deeply submerged and inaccessible to researchers 
given the time and travel constraints of my project). Figure 2 details the network (or lack 
thereof) among my respondents. Very few of my respondents knew each other and there 
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was very little successful snowballing. There were only three situations where one 
respondent referred me to another respondent.  
 
Also important seems to be a personal connection of some kind. Only four of my 
respondents agreed to participate based only on an em il or flyer. The other 11 
respondents were recruited through personal contact, either by the researcher or a third 
party. In addition to the three cases where a respondent referred me to another person 
who agreed to participate, in two cases I personally met the respondent in the course of 
this project and recruited them. Another two respondents agreed to participate after being 
contacted by a third party who saw my announcement on an email listserv. The 
remaining four respondents were found through personal connections. In two cases only 
one link was required; I contacted a friend or acquintance and they contacted the 
respondent on my behalf.  In two more cases there was at least one additional link; my 
personal contact contacted a third party (not known personally to me), who contacted the 
respondent. In one interview resulting from a personal contact, the respondent was 
Chapter 5: Research Design   
 71 
 
curious about my connection to the person through whom we had gotten in touch. Being 
able to demonstrate that I knew the intermediaries per onally (having attended a religious 
celebration at their home) seemed important. Other respondents responded to initial 
contact skeptically until I could demonstrate a chain of connection (so-and-so 
recommended that I get in touch with you); this did not guarantee an interview, but it 
seemed to improve my chances.  
 
Non-Response 
 A concern when developing any sample is non-response; that is, is there 
systematic bias due to people with certain characteistics or experiences choosing not to 
participate. Due to the nature of how I collected my sample, I cannot provide empirical 
data on the rate of non-response. I have no way of kn wing how many people with the 
requisite characteristics saw the announcement but choose not to contact me. I can 
however outline potential respondents who did contact me but ultimately refused to 
participate, or otherwise never completed an interview. 
In total I was contacted by six potential respondents who did not complete 
interviews. Three of these actively declined to participate. One cited concern about the 
permissibility of participating, another told me tha  his commanding officer had 
instructed him not to participate, and the third dinot have time. The rest simply could 
not be reached after initial contact. In addition, I heard back from two personal contacts 
who said that they passed on word to potential respondents who were not willing to 
participate. Additionally, I spoke with one responde t who reported that he had received 
my announcement but had decided not to participate, but changed his mind when he saw 
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me present on my preliminary findings at a conference. This large number of refusals that 
I know about, combined with concerns voiced by some respondents and other 
researchers, leads me to believe that there are severe barriers to access to this population. 
There are two important populations that are missing from my sample. One is 
African-Americans. Although African-Americans are estimated to comprise almost half 
of Muslims in the military (Elliott 2006), there are none in my sample. This absence 
makes it impossible to determine whether or not being labeled or identified as Muslim 
transcends racial labeling. In the United States, many people do not think of black bodies 
when they think of Muslims, and so the experience of being a black Muslim in the 
military may be distinct from being a white or brown Muslim in the military. I did not 
intentionally exclude this population.  
Another population that is missing from my sample is implicitly excluded due to 
the design of this study. This is the population of th se who are “passing” as non-
Muslim. From conversations with my respondents as well as personal contacts, it is clear 
that this population does exist and they are unlikely to participate in a study such as this 
because participating carries the risk of “outing” themselves. I was not able to establish 
the level of trust necessary for this within the time constraints of this project. The 
members of my sample are all openly Muslim. This likely influenced the findings.  
 
Barriers to Access 
 One finding of this study is that there are several substantial barriers to accessing 
this population. Although I anticipated that locating respondents would be difficult, I did 
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not anticipate that it would be as difficult as it was. The elusiveness of this population for 
research is worth discussing. 
 Probably the largest barrier is building the trust and credibility to effectively 
recruit from this population. As I noted earlier, working through a personal network was 
necessary; this carries with it the sense of the res archer being vouched for by a known 
member of the community (often a relative or friend). The credibility this lends the 
researcher is important in this case because of (justified) concerns in the Muslim 
American population of surveillance. This is a population that is under great scrutiny. 
Leaks and lawsuits in the past few years have brought to light varied methods of police 
surveillance including the use of informants in mosques across the country. Media 
interest in the Muslim American community is often tied to coverage of violence and 
terrorism. In general, this is a community that is very aware of being under surveillance 
and of the repercussions of being seen negatively. Members of this population may be 
wary of participating in research such as this because of this sense of surveillance and 
concerns about how the information they share will be used. Some may avoid 
participation so as not to “out” themselves or to draw attention to this identity. Others 
may have concerns about being stereotyped.  
This sense of surveillance is likely increased for Muslim service members. Acts 
of violence committed by Muslim service members have focused scrutiny on all Muslim 
service members. In addition to media interest, outreach aimed at supporting this 
population within the military can also create barriers. While the military population in 
general is over-surveyed, those who are openly Muslim may feel especially over-exposed 
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as they are subject to research on the general popuation, media interest in Muslims in 
particular, and other research (such as this project) targeting this very small population.  
   
DATA COLLECTION 
 Once a respondent agreed to participate, we arranged a time for the interview. For 
respondents residing in the mid-Atlantic region, we would meet for a face-to-face 
interview. All other respondents were interviewed via telephone. Six respondents were 
interviewed in person, the remaining nine by phone. Most of the respondents were 
located in the United States, but two were located overseas. There was no systematic 
difference in content by interview method.  
 The mean length of the interviews was one hour and four minutes. The shortest 
interview was 28 minutes, the longest two hours and eight minutes. Interviews were 
digitally audio recorded and then transcribed. All transcription was completed by the 
researcher. There are 175 pages of text resulting from the almost 16 hours of recordings.  
 Interviews followed a semi-structured format. Semi-structured interviews are 
scheduled and planned and are effective when you only have one chance to interview a 
respondent. Semi-structured interviews follow an interview guide (a list of questions and 
topics to be covered) and usually consist of direct questions asked by the interviewer who 
then follows up on the respondent’s response with “probes”. See Appendix B for the 
interview guide. Unlike surveys and structured or standardized interviews, semi-
structured interviews leave the interviewer and respondent able to follow leads and 
allows the respondent to provide the information he or she thinks is relevant and 
important. Interviews can raise concerns of accuracy: just because a respondent reports 
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something it does not mean that it occurred. However, in this project I am less concerned 
with objective accuracy and more concerned with subjective experience.  
 The data this project seeks to collect are far too complex to capture reliably via a 
survey or questionnaire. Also, because this is one of the first projects looking at Muslim 
service members and veterans, it is valuable to use a more open-ended approach in 
gathering data so as to be able to identify themes and motifs that may emerge from 
respondents’ descriptions that were not anticipated in the design of the study. Finally, this 
community is very small and is the subject to great scrutiny. Building rapport and 
connections within the community is essential to gathering good quality data. The best 
way to establish legitimacy is direct interaction. This method also allows the researcher to 
gauge respondents’ reactions to questions, to probe and follow-up on respondents’ 
answers, and to make on-the-fly alterations to the format as needed.  
 
PROFILE OF SAMPLE 
  Chapters 6-8 will present detailed pictures of each respondent. Here I provide a 
general overview to the composition of my sample for orientation. Table 2 outlines the 
demographic characteristics of my sample. My sample is predominately male and South 
Asian, though I also interviewed white, Arab, and multiracial respondents. A substantial 
demographic that is absent from my sample is black Muslims serving in the military. 
Most of my respondents either immigrated to the United States or are the children of  
immigrants. 
 My sample is ethnically heterogeneous. This is acceptable for my project. Much 
of the literature argues that following 9/11 religious identity came to outweigh ethnic 
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identity. It has also been noted that Muslim American youths tend to emphasize religious 
unity over ethnic and cultural differences. Consistent with the literature, I did not find any 
differences in experiences associated with ethnicity. While being Muslim is a salient 
identity for my respondents in order for them to agree to participate, the similarity in 
themes across ethnicities is consistent with the findings in the literature that being 
Muslim has come to act as a master status in the contemporary period. 
Table 2: Demographic 











Parents Immigrants 4 
 
 An alternative way to interpret my sample is to focus on the ways in which they 
may be read by others as ethnically homogenous. Most of my respondents could be read 
as “brown”. Although they came from various ethnic and national backgrounds, several 
noted the ways in which people made erroneous assumptions about their ancestry and/or 
thought that categories such as Arab and South Asian were interchangeable.  
 Table 3 outlines the military characteristics of my sample. Most of my 
respondents are no longer serving in the military. The members of my sample have varied 
military experiences. I talked to respondents from every branch except the Coast Guard. 
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The branches with the largest number of respondents were Navy and Air Force. Only one 
respondent served in the Marine Corps.  
Table 3: Military 
Characteristics of Sample 






Air Force 5 
Length of Service 
<5 years 2 
5-10 years 5 
11-19 years 4 





Combat Position 3 




 My respondents were at different points in their careers when they left the 
military (or at the time of interview). Most of my respondents served fewer than 20 years; 
however, several served 20 years or more. Among those who have left the military, the 
shortest career was 4 years, the longest 24 years. The mean length of service for those 
who have left the military was 10.7 years. My sample was predominantly enlisted and 
only a few respondents were in combat positions. A third of my respondents have 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. 
 
 
                                                
16 One respondent made the transition from enlisted to officer, not included here. 




 My sample is based on self-identification as “Muslim”. An important conceptual 
distinction is the separation of identifying as Muslim from practicing Islam. For this 
project, it is the label “Muslim” rather than religiosity that matters. Meer (2008), in 
exploring anti-Muslim discrimination in Britain, argues for the use of self-identification 
rather than of definitions based on behavioral compliance with the “five pillars” of 
Islam.17 The use of self-identification has the advantage of being a sociological rather 
than a theological definition.  
 My sample included individuals who identified as Muslim due to religious 
practice, conversion, and family history. In terms of religiosity my sample covered the 
spectrum from atheistic to pious. I did not ask respondents about their denominational 
affiliation (e.g., Sunni, Shia) as this is not relevant to my research questions. When I 
asked respondents about their religious practice they tended to categorize themselves 
based on practices such as praying, fasting, and dietary restrictions: 
I wasn’t a very good Muslim on active duty. I didn’t pray five times a day. That’s 
really the only thing that I didn’t really observe. I didn’t really drink [alcohol], I 
didn’t eat pork, I fasted Ramadan (Kareem, Chapter 6). 
 
Several respondents reported that their main religious practice occurred during 
Ramadan.18  
I practice my religion [only] in Ramadan […] otherwise I didn’t even pray. (Zafir, 
Chapter 7) 
 
I practiced moderately, and then when Ramadan comes around I practice a lot 
more. (Najib, Chapter 7) 
                                                
17 The “Five Pillars” are doctrinal duties. They are 1. Profession of faith (shahadah), 2. Prayer (salah), 3. 
Charity/alms-giving (zakat), 4. Fasting in Ramadan (sawm), and 5. Pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj).  
18 During Ramadan, practicing Muslims abstain from food, drink, and sexual behavior from about an hour 
before dawn until sunset. The fast lasts for a lunar month, about 28 days. 




Increased practice during Ramadan is a common phenom n in the Muslim community. 
It is similar to Christians and Jews who only practice on holidays.  
 On the extremes, one respondent identified as an atheist but self-identified as 
Muslim because he was born into a Muslim family. Several respondents reported high 
levels of religious practice: 
Yeah, everybody knows I’m Muslim because I practice my religion. I fast in 
Ramadan, I pray five times a day, I go to the Friday prayer. (Basim, Chapter 7)
 
 My sample includes both individuals who were born into Muslim families and 
those who converted. The inclusion of converts is a fair picture of the U.S. Muslim 
population which Pew (2011) reports is comprised of 20 percent converts. Interestingly, 
for Omar (Chapter 6), Dani (Chapter 6), and Rahma (Chapter 8), Islam was something 
they began to explore due to specific military experiences.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 This analysis takes a content analysis approach in wh ch the transcripts are 
approached as texts (Altheide 1987). This approach best fits the goals of this project. This 
research is based on a framework that has been established before entering the field and 
seeks to explore this framework. 
 Content analysis relies on inductive coding (Bernard 2006). I began work with a 
“start list” of codes based on my theoretical framework, my research questions, and my 
expected findings. The list of codes was revised and refined during the course of the 
research to recognize emerging themes and patterns. Analysis was a combination of 
inductive and deductive coding. In the coding process, text was organized and analyzed 
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by theme. See Appendix C for list of codes and preliminary themes. These overarching 
themes came from the framework and research questions; h wever, within these themes I 
analyzed data using deductive methods to identify common themes. Although 
preliminary analysis was done thematically, presenting the data in this way undermines 
much of the power of an in-depth qualitative investigation by removing context and 
making it difficult to address unique situations. After establishing the common themes 
through a process of coding and preliminary analysis, I reorganized the presentation of 
data to put individual respondents at the center of the analysis.  
 
DATA PRESENTATION 
I have organized this dissertation around my 15 respondents. I present the story of 
each respondent, relying heavily on their own narrative. I make an effort to include 
similar components for each respondent, including motivation to join the military, and 
what it was like being Muslim in the military.  
I have grouped these individual narratives as I have in order to draw out common 
themes and to allow easy comparison across similar cases. As relevant, I direct the reader 
to previous and subsequent cases that relate to thehemes and motifs of each case. The 
decision to group the narratives in this way is a product of my research questions and the 
results of my coding. Grouping the narratives in a different way could draw attention to a 
different set of themes and motifs. There is overlap in theme and motif: some respondents 
have experiences that could place them in several different groupings. I organized 
groupings around the central idea(s) to which I wanted to draw attention.  
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All names used are pseudonyms. Respondent pseudonyms were selected with the 
goal of being distinct and easy to remember for the reader and have no relation to the 
name or ethnicity of the respondent. Given the small size of this community, relatively 
minor details could be used to identify these individuals. I have therefore obscured details 
that would in most studies be included. This includes any indication of the military 
branch the respondent served in. Aggregated totals can be found in this chapter, but all 
identifiers of branch in the narratives themselves have been replaced with generics (such 
as “military”). In order to maintain the flow of the narratives without drawing attention to 
this censoring, in most cases I have not marked where I have made such changes.  
I have also obscured the origins of my respondents by aggregating specific 
backgrounds into the pan-ethnic terms of “South Asian” and “Arab”. When I use these 
terms, they are accurate reflections of the respondent’s background, but intentionally 
imprecise. As with military branch, I have replaced specific references in the narratives 
with a generic term.  
I addition I have done minor cosmetic editing to some of the narratives to enhance 
readability. If substantial text was removed I indicate this with […]. Ellipses without 
brackets indicate that the narrative is intact, but signal a noticeable pause and often a 
switch of topic.  
 
ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER 
The researcher is also a relevant component of the research design. Lukens-Bull 
(2007) notes the particular position researchers who study Islam and/or Muslims are often 
put in. While identity and presentation of the researcher is relevant in any research 
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endeavor, they may be particularly salient when studying this population, “the researcher 
who studies Islam has to deal with the question of subject position in particular, if not 
unique, ways” (173).  
 I am highly qualified to conduct this research in this community. I have 
experience with both the military community and the Muslim American community. As a 
doctoral student specializing in Military Sociology, I have many connections with the 
military and with other scholars doing work on diversity issues in the military and have 
worked for the past several years on issues of diversity in the military. I also have close 
associations with the Muslim community and am myself Muslim. I have taken several 
courses in Islamic studies and have lived, studied, an  traveled throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa. I am extremely familiar with Islamic customs and language, 
including a familiarity with both colloquial and Qur’anic Arabic. My cultural competence 
allows me to function within the Muslim community and interact with respondents 
unobtrusively and with minimal cultural friction. Additionally, my participation with 
several Muslim organizations provided a number of personal contacts I worked with to 
find respondents.  
Although I can work effectively within this community, my own external 
identifiers (name and appearance) may undermine this. My name is easily identifiable as 
having German origins, potentially creating assumptions that I am an outsider to the 
Muslim community. Similarly, my appearance is white/Anglo-European and I do not 
wear hijab. While I can work effectively once I have gained access, these characteristics 
may increase the barriers to access. 
Chapter 5: Research Design   
 83 
 
 In the interviews I utilized an ambiguous presentation of self. I used military 
jargon early in the interview to establish a level of in-group knowledge. I used in-group 
pronunciations of religions terms (e.g., /'mu:slm/ rather than /məzləm/). I used 
linguistic religious markers (e.g., inshallah) if the respondent used them, or if the context 
clearly called for it. For face-to-face interviews, I dressed modestly (covering legs and 
arms, but not head). This presentation gave respondents leeway in how they read and 
reacted to me. This ambiguity was a balance between the potential for increased access 
through claiming in-group membership, versus social desirability bias which might 
inhibit open discussion, particularly on topics of religious practice. If respondents asked 
me directly about my identity, either religious or military, I answered them 
straightforwardly and honestly.  
Although there are many stereotypes about gender relations within the Muslim 
community, experience with this community and results of interviews suggest that my 
gender did not pose a barrier. Muslim veterans and service members have served in a 
gender integrated military and are unlikely to be uncomfortable interacting with a woman 
interviewer. The nature of the project and the interview questions do not violate any 
norms of modesty within the Muslim community. Additionally, my cultural competence 
made it unlikely that I would inadvertently interact with a respondent in a way that might 
make them uncomfortable (for example, I did not initiate handshakes when meeting a 
new respondent, but would shake hands if they initiated it).
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CHAPTER 6: US/THEM IN MILITARY 
 
 
Although most of my respondents found military service to be a rewarding 
experience, most also used the us/them frame in their narratives. This often took the form 
of respondents remembering feeling concerned that their identity as Muslims would 
impede their military careers. For several, they felt that the current political and military 
situations made their identities as Muslims salient. Almost all of my respondents had 
experiences with other people telling jokes about Mslims, making stereotyped 
comments, or using epithets, though for most of my respondents these incidents were 
seen as minor. These experiences and this sense that being Muslim should have mattered 
supports my use of the us/them framework in this project. While many scholars have 
established the activation of this boundary in the civilian world, I extend this analysis, 
and demonstrate that this frame is also present in the U.S. military. This is to be expected 
as the boundary between military and civilian spheres in the United States is permeable. 
Service members come from the civilian community and remain in contact with civilian 
friends and family while serving, in addition, many continue to live in civilian 
communities while serving.   
In this chapter I consider issues related to us/them in the military. I use the cases 
of Mahmood, Ahmed, and Kareem to illustrate the exist nce of the us/them discourse in 
the military and to illustrate my conceptualization f the presence but irrelevance of this 
frame. Next I consider the cases of Omar and Dani, both linguists who have studied at the 
Defense Language Institute (DLI). Their narratives illustrate the role of us/them 
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discourses in this arena of military education. Finally, I introduce Jamal whose narrative 
illustrates the complexity of perspective when using us/them as a framing concept.  
   
BEING MUSLIM IS SALIENT BUT IRRELEVANT 
The processes of othering I describe in Chapter 2 are relevant in analyzing the 
experiences of Muslim service members. My respondents articulated the salience of 
being Muslim clearly and consistently. However, while us/them was present, for most of 
my respondents, they felt that ultimately it did not shape their military experiences. 
Although several respondents voiced concerns that being Muslim would limit their 
promotion or otherwise directly impact their military careers, most felt that it did not. 
Their concern that it would matter speaks to the presence of this boundary, while the 
sense that it didn’t actually matter suggests that for many, us/them was irrelevant. The 
framework of us/them remains useful for analyzing the experiences of my respondents; it 
shapes their own narratives of their experiences and their expectations, but for most, it 
did not seem to shape their careers.  
 
MAHMOOD  
Mahmood has been in the military for 10 years and plans to stay until at least 20 
years at which point he is entitled to retired pay.19 Recently married and in the middle of 
his career, Mahmood is successfully balancing the demands of the military with the 
expectations of family and community. A “success story”, Mahmood does not stand out 
                                                
19 After 20 years of service, service members are eligible to retire and collect retirement pay, which consists 
of a percentage of their base pay as well as benefits such as health coverage. 
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among my respondents. His reasons for joining the military, his experiences while 
serving, and his general satisfaction were common among my respondents.   
Mahmood immigrated to the United States from South Asia as a teenager and 
followed in the footsteps of his father and brother who both served in the military. His 
motivations included family, opportunities for travel, and the military lifestyle,  
[I: What made you decide to join the military?] Because of my brother, 
and just join the military, see the world kind of thing. I wanted to see the 
world and it seemed like the military [would give me that], and the 
camaraderie of the guys and all this kind of stuff. 
 
 Mahmood’s decision to join the military reflects both institutional aspects, such as 
family tradition (Faris 1981) and a sense of service, and occupational aspects focused on 
self-improvement. While not financial in consideration, he voices a desire to join the 
military based in part on what the military can do for him: help him see the world, and 
provide a sense of community. However, belying Moskos’ continuum model, Mahmood 
also sees tradition and a sense of service as reasons to join. 
Mahmood’s experiences are shaped by a sense of service, something that 
came up in many of my interviews. As an immigrant to he United States, he sees 
his military service as a way to acknowledge what te United States has meant for 
him,  
This is my new home, and I think joining the military is the right thing to 
do, whatever country you’re in. I feel that’s how you can serve your 
country and the United States has been awesome, excllent to myself and 
my family. I feel like the country’s given me so much and I am doing my 
share to pay back sort of. 
 
 This is an example of what I mean by performance of citizenship, a 
conceptualization I will more fully address in Chapter 8.  Mahmood does not 
conceptualize his service in terms of claiming rights; rather he sees it as a natural 
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extension of being American. Military service is a w y to “pay back” the United States 
for providing him and his family with opportunities. By expressing a sense of duty to the 
United States, he is expressing, not claiming, citizenship. 
Mahmood directly links his military service and hissense of belonging 
[I: Are you proud to be in the military?] Yeah, I really am actually. Especially 
with the kind of political stuff going on, I don’t feel like anybody can say 
anything to me. […] I don’t think anybody can question my patriotism or 
something like that.  
 
Mahmood acknowledges the prevalence of an us/them atmosphere in society at large, 
“the kind of political stuff going on” that could lead someone to confront him about his 
patriotism, or, we can extrapolate, his right to belong in American society. He sees his 
military service as a clear response to this abstract challenge. He is performing a self that 
is both Muslim and American. While others might try to impose one identity over the 
other on him, he uses his military service as an opportunity to counter this.    
The military lifestyle has been a good fit for Mahmood and he has enjoyed his 
service, adapting with humor to the annoyances it can present, 
Yeah I like [military life]. I’ve enjoyed the moving around, though it gets kind of 
old because your stuff’s damaged. We just moved here, we’re missing three 
couches [laughs]. They’re somewhere. Things like that get old but they only come 
about every three years or so thankfully.  
 
Looking at his 10 years of service, he has only positive things to say,  
 
You know, I can’t really think of a bad experience. I mean OCS [Officer 
Candidate School], was miserable, but now looking back it was fun. [The drill 
instructor would] yell ‘Get in the dirt! Get in the grass!’ Basically doing a lot of 
push-ups, just doing physical stuff and the whole time I’d kind of be thinking 
‘Wow, we’re getting yelled at by this drill sergeant, it’s kinda like a movie.’ And 
so it was stressful because there’s no time and you’ve got to do a lot of stuff, but 
now looking back I only have good memories of OCS.  
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 Until recently Mahmood did not consider himself to be a practicing Muslim. 
Recently he has been striving to become more observant,  
I don’t wanna come off as being a super religious, pious person because I have 
not been. [But] now I’m trying to be, like praying and stuff like that and fasting 
‘cause [Ramadan] just ended. Now if I were super religious and strict I don’t 
know what my experiences would’ve been like in the unit, if it would’ve caused 
friction or whatever the case may be. But being the way I was, people knew I was 
Muslim but I kinda did the stuff that I’m not supposed to like drinking and all 
that, so it didn’t really make that much of a difference because of how I acted. 
Now if I was completely following every rule that I’m supposed to, I don’t know 
if it would’ve been different or not. But I don’t know if it would’ve been because, 
I mean, you can go pray in your car or something, so it’  not like I’d be pitching 
the prayer mat in the middle of the room, so the only thing that I’d be doing 
differently is probably not drinking and there’s plenty of people that are not 
Muslims who do not drink and it’s not like they were excluded, so I don’t think it 
would’ve made a difference even if I was a more practicing Muslim than I was. 
 
Mahmood has had no experience seeking formal religious accommodation, and 
expresses uncertainty about whether a higher level of r ligious practice would have 
changed his experiences. After some discussion, he concludes that he does not think that 
behavior such as praying and abstaining for alcohol would have had an effect on his 
experiences. Interestingly, while he argues that abs aining from alcohol would not be 
unique and so could be done publically without social sanctions, he sees prayer as 
something that is best accommodated by placing it in the private sphere, hidden from 
colleagues. This treatment of prayer as something to be hidden comes up in several 
interviews.  
While prayer and social restrictions have not factored heavily into his military 
experiences, Mahmood does observe the month-long fast o  Ramadan. Two strategies 
emerged from my interviews with regards to fasting. One approach, which Mahmood 
does not take, is to modify military duties to accommodate the fast. This strategy requires 
seeking formal accommodation, and includes things such as rescheduling physical 
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training or altering working hours. Mahmood uses the opposite strategy; he adapts his 
religious practice to the demand of the missions of the day, 
On the days when I had [duties] I didn’t fast basiclly. So it’s not like I was going 
to have the schedule changed for me, so I just decided not to fast on the days I had 
[duties] or if I had early [duties] or late [duties]. If I could do it then I did, and if I 
didn’t think I could do it I just didn’t fast. If Iwas super religious then I would 
have made up the missed fast later I guess.  
 
Respondents, like Mahmood, who used this approach, came up with personal 
ways to negotiate their religious practice without seeking formal accommodation or 
alteration of their military duties. Like Mahmood, these respondents generally described 
a set of personal “rules” they used to guide their fasting. In this case, Mahmood does not 
fast on days where he has certain duties, or those duti s overlap with the times of 
breaking the fast.  
Although Mahmood did use the frame of us/them in his narrative, he does not feel 
that his identity as a Muslim had any impact on his experiences in the military. 
I don’t think it’s like anything different than being non-Muslim. […] I mean, with 
all these conflicts going on maybe you could have a thing like stuff’s going on in 
every Muslim country, […] [but] that’s more political. Personally, being a 
Muslim in the military hasn’t really, I don’t think, affected me.  
 
He acknowledges that the identity of being Muslim may be particularly salient 
because of global political events. However, while this identity is salient, he does not find 
it meaningful in his career. He does not feel that it has shaped his decade of service at all. 
Mahmood, like many respondents, is adamant that although his identity is salient, and 
may be brought up, it has no real impact on his experiences.  
As an example of presence but irrelevance, Mahmood talks about being teased by 
colleagues based on his identity, but understands this to be friendly ribbing,  
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The military is not PC [politically correct] at all, so I get teased about doing things 
or whatever the case may be, but the thing is in the academic world everything’s 
so PC and I feel like for me and my background, you know some of my friends 
call me a terrorist or I’m going to blow myself up, it’s completely different, it’s 
not some redneck making some joke at me. So there’ll be that kind of teasing 
back and forth and all this kind of stuff going on […] But I don’t want you to get 
[the idea] that I was picked upon because I’m Muslim because that wasn’t the 
case at all. […] That teasing goes on with everyone basically. You’ve gotta have a 
thick skin in the military, and it wasn’t personal, I don’t want you to think that. 
 
These interactions are experienced as signs of strong c hesion, rather than as suspicions 
that undercut it. That his colleagues feel free to tease him, and that he takes the teasing 
with good humor is a sign of unit strength. Being teased is a sign of inclusion, and 
because cohesion is strong and the teasers are known and trusted, the interaction is 
friendly rather than malicious.20 
 
AHMED 
Ahmed is the respondent with the longest career in the military. He has served for 
over 20 years, and was still on active duty at the tim  of interview and had no immediate 
plans to retire. As an aviator, he has served all over the world, including in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Ahmed is an immigrant from South Asia. 
He identifies as a moderately practicing Muslim, he fasts and sets up Friday 
prayers on base, but also says, “I’m not really religious”. As with Mahmood, Ahmed did 
not seek any formal accommodation for fasting, prefer ing instead to work it around his 
regular duty schedule,  
I’ve actually fasted and I’ve broken my fast in theairplane. [...] Nobody ever told 
me I couldn’t, it was a very personal decision, andif I knew I could do it then I 
did it. And my colleagues knew that I’m fasting and you know they would make 
fun of me yeah we saw him eating a date in the airplane or whatever because the 
sun had gone down. 
                                                
20 This is description is in line with observations that it is common in military basic training for recuits to 
be identified by unique physical characteristics (for example see Field 2006).  




Ahmed also reports taking on a leadership role in the military religious community,  
On every base that I’ve been stationed on I’ve always set up the Friday prayer. 
And so every Friday whether I attended or not we had t e opportunity to pray our 
Friday prayer. […] Before 9/11 I would get a couple of dozen Muslims […] but 
then after 9/11 I would run into Muslims and I’d say ‘Hey listen we do Friday 
prayers would you be interested?’ And quite a few of them would say ‘No, I’d 
rather not tell somebody I’m Muslim.’ 
 
Ahmed’s first-hand observation supports the supposition that official tallies of 
Muslims in the military undercount the actual population, as, among other reasons, many 
Muslims may choose not to reveal their religious affili tion. That Ahmed ties this change 
in attitude to 9/11 also supports my claim that this particular us/them boundary was re-
activated by 9/11. This attitude likely also contributed to my difficulties finding 
respondents; Ahmed claims that any given Friday before 9/11 there were about twice as 
many people attending prayer on one base as I could l cate to interview.  
Ahmed enjoys his military service and finds the military lifestyle rewarding; his 
experiences have encouraged his brother and daughter to pursue military careers, 
I’ve had a fantastic time, I enjoy [my work], and I’ve moved up the ranks. It’s all 
been good, and honestly people ask me how long you going to stay and I tell them 
I’ve not even thought about getting out because it truly has been an absolutely 
phenomenal experience. And you know the stuff that we do is absolutely 
amazing. Yeah there was no question I was going to stay in, and my brother 
joined after me, and I have a daughter who wants to be an officer. It is just been a 
very positive experience for the whole family. And I mean it’s not an easy life, it 
is definitely very tough, deployments are really tough, you go away, it’s not easy 
to say goodbye to your family […], so it definitely is difficult, very trying but 
then the positive aspects of that I tell people is that the homecomings are so 
special, I remember each and every time I came home […] In the military, life is 
not for everybody, but if it’s for you I think it’s a fantastic career. 
 
Ahmed grew up wanting to fly,  
I am a son of a [South Asian] Air Force pilot, and since as far back as I can 
remember I always wanted to fly and I was interested in military aviation […] I 
was 17 when I started flying, then eventually I came to the United States. After I 
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finished up college I was going to go back to [South Asia] and fly for the national 
airline there. But then Top Gun came out, and I saw Top Gun, and I thought you 
know what this sounds way better than flying for an airline.  
 
Initially Ahmed’s father was disappointed in his decision to stay in the United 
States and join the military rather than return to his birth country,  
my father, because he paid for all my college, I was the older son, he basically 
was hoping that I was going to go back and pick up where he was going to leave 
off. And so he was very disappointed, he didn’t speak to me for two years and 
then he came to visit me and then everything was oky.  
 
References to media, including movies, books, and video games, turned up in the 
narratives of several respondents. The media mentioned is always a part of American 
popular culture, indicating that for these respondents, the decision to join the military, at 
least in part, emerges from an immersion and identification with American popular 
culture.  
For Ahmed, one of the best aspects of military life was the opportunity to broaden 
his horizons and meet new types of people (and in turn be there for others to meet) 
The military helped me break some of [my stereotypes], and conversely I was 
able to help break some of the stereotypes that Americans had of Muslims, and 
then also when I would deploy outside the United States, I would come in contact 
with Muslim officers from different nations and they would ask me ‘Listen, how 
are you treated?’ And so to help break some of those barriers was pretty positive. 
I came to this country with a lot of stereotypes, and those are the same stereotypes 
that a whole bunch of Muslims, when they come to this country, they have those 
stereotypes and not until you actually get to know the people that you have some 
of these feelings about, you know you can’t break those barriers until you’re 
actually given a chance, giving yourself an opportunity to meet and get to know, 
and then when you do you realize that hey we’re all the same. 
 
Ahmed sees his role not just as a Muslim for other service members to meet, but 
as a Muslim service member for Muslims in other countries to meet. He serves to 
broaden the perspective of U.S. service members, and of the citizens of other countries 
about the U.S. military.  
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After I joined the military I met people from all parts of the country, which was 
absolutely phenomenal, and because I met people from all parts the country I met 
an ex-Ku Klux Klan member, and then I met people who ere extremely liberal, 
extremely accepting, maybe not very religious, so basically I met the gamut. For 
me that was an absolutely fantastic experience, and that is really when I started 
feeling like I was an American, and I felt that if hey accepted me and I accepted 
them, and even though they felt like there’s something different about this guy we 
got close enough to where they could joke about my religion or about my 
background. So I was one of the boys, but I was a little bit different, and that was 
okay. So that’s when I really felt good and so thatw s the start and like I said 
there’s all kinds of people and that is one thing that’s so beautiful about the 
military that you take folks from every corner the United States, every different 
background, you throw them together and sure enough because of this 
assimilation most of the people come out a little bit better. So that’s kind of been 
my experience, and during this time I met some extremely racist people and I met 
some people that I knew thought of me as some evil terrorist or something, and 
that’s another thing in the military because we are an equal opportunity 
organization you can’t openly go out there and make accusations or make fun of 
somebody because the repercussions a pretty severe.  
 
There are several interesting elements in this narrative. Ahmed speaks of the 
many different types of people he met through military service (and the many different 
types of people who got to meet him). This is an example of the contact hypothesis at 
work. Because the military provides a space where contact can occur with institutional 
support and on equal grounds, it can successfully break down boundaries. Despite the 
extreme diversity, Ahmed feels accepted, “I was one f the boys”. The military provides 
a space for Ahmed to be Muslim and American, “I was American [but] I was a little bit 
different, and that was okay.” As with Mahmood, teasing and joking about his 
background is positive for Ahmed because it means he i  included. 
The role of formal equal opportunity policies also comes up in this narrative. The 
military formally endorses integration and equality of opportunity, and there is a clear 
system to address complaints of unfair treatment. Ahmed observes this sort of protection 
in serving in the military. While the military brings together diverse populations, it also 
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provides structure and constraint on these meetings. Whatever their personal feelings, 
service members must comply with behavioral norms of inclusion, and if they fail to do 
so, there is a clear way to address and correct this behavior.  
Ahmed did occasionally encounter anti-Muslim discourse among his colleagues, 
though it was never targeted at him,  
I’ve had this happen, where, you’re part of a group where somebody will 
generalize, and they’ll call all Arabs terrorists, or, they’ll say oh yeah camel 
jockey or whatever, they’ll call names, or they’ll just make just a very generic 
statement. So that happened where somebody would just say something negative 
about Muslims and then go oh my gosh we have a Muslim, and then all turn and 
look at me. 
 
He also relates a specific story of encountering this attitude among intelligence officers. 
Disgusted with this attitude among those he expected to be the least ignorant about Islam, 
he confronted them,  
There are a couple of intelligence officers that were making fun of Muslims. And 
so I sit there and I listen, and they had no clue that I was a Muslim, and so then I 
told them ‘You know what, you guys are ignorant.’ I said ‘If you’ve got a 
question you can ask me cause I’m a Muslim, but don’t just go out there and 
spread stuff that’s not accurate ‘cause you’re supposed to be intelligence officers, 
and you’re officers and you shouldn’t conduct yourself that way.’ 
 
Ahmed expressed concern that being Muslim would negatively affect his career, 
but was surprised to find that this did not seem to happen. A few years after 9/11 he came 
up for a prestigious promotion  
So I thought that with my name and the fact that I was a Muslim, and this is post-
9/11, I thought there was no chance I was gonna get sel cted. But I was. And 
when I [got the position] I became the very first Muslim [in this position] in the 
history of the [branch], and that is after 9/11. That for me was very positive ‘cause 
I thought you know what we are equal opportunity, this war is not on Islam, and 
in the military we reward people that work hard. 
 
This narrative illustrates the presence but irrelevance of the us/them frame. That Ahmed 
assumes that his identity would disqualify him from the position is an acknowledgement 
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of the presence of this us/them boundary. He explicitly frames the concern as a product of 
9/11. However, despite his concerns, he gets the promotion. This shows that while this 
boundary is present, in many cases it is seen as irrelevant. There is recognition of this 
boundary and an acknowledgement that it exists; thee r spondents are aware of it.  
The only issue Ahmed has encountered in the military stemming from his identity 
and origin was with obtaining a security clearance,21 
Even though I bleed red, white, and blue and I love the military I had the hardest 
time getting a security clearance. Almost every time they do an investigation on 
me, they always come back with some nonsense about your uncle lives here and 
we’re not sure where your allegiance is, things that just frustrate me to no end. So 
it’s like 24 years of service and since I joined every operation the United States 
has had I’ve taken part in it, and so it just makes m  mad that somebody that sits 
behind closed doors in rooms with no windows and has no clue and what’s going 
on in life is going to judge me and hold something against me because I’m a 
Muslim or I was born in [South Asia]. That does frustrate me a lot but I think the 
time will come when we will start getting past that and start recognizing that oh 
my gosh this is huge to have somebody who has that background ready to use that 
to our advantage. […]  
 
 For Ahmed, being treated with suspicion despite a career of service is sore spot. 
In no other aspect of his military service is Ahmed’s i entity as both Muslim and 
American questioned. Ahmed sees his service as demonstrating his loyalty. Ahmed’s 
service is also tinged with sacrifice in the form of separation from his family and personal 
risk; in demonstrating his loyalty he doesn’t just mention his service, but qualifies it with 
his sacrifices, pointing out that he has “joined every operation the United States has had”.  
                                                
21 In my job with the National Security Education Program (a program in the Department of Defense) the 
difficulty of getting a security clearance for those who lived or have family in many Middle Eastern and 
South Asian countries was something we discussed frequently. There is a large amount of anecdotal data to 
support Ahmed’s complaint; however, because of the sensitive nature of security clearances, no empirical 
data. Information on the adjudicative process can be found at http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/adr/ 
foreigninfluence/foreigninfluenceframeset.htm. Note that behaviors as benign as having family in a foreign 
country, communicating with them at least every twoweeks, and visiting every 2-3 years are seen as 
potential warning signs.  
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Ahmed also relays a moving story that belies the simplistic view of a military 
with a black-and-white view of an American-us at war ith a Muslim-other. After 
finding the body of a local civilian, Ahmed is called to help the chaplain perform Muslim 
funerary rites in order to bury this man with honor and dignity - more dignity than the 
neighboring Muslim countries gave the man,  
we had just kicked off Operation Enduring Freedom […] And so one day I got a 
phone call in the afternoon ‘Hey listen, the chaplain wants to talk to you.’ So I 
went to see the chaplain he said ‘Hey listen, we found a dead body and we’re not 
sure where he’s from, but he’s dark, we have a feeling he’s either Pakistani or 
Omani. And so the U.S. authorities contacted both the nations and said ‘Hey listen 
this might be your citizen would you like to claim him?’ And both the country 
said ‘No we don’t.’ The chaplain had contacted me so that I could do the Muslim 
prayer that you do before you bury somebody. I’m not really religious, I don’t 
know the whole prayer, but I knew parts of it. But I felt, it really moved me 
because I thought here it is, I myself am flying missions in support of this 
operation and there are people that are saying it’s a war on Islam. But we found a 
dead body and just because we think this guy’s a Muslim we want to bury him 
with dignity. And so I did the ceremony. And I thought this is what’s so 
remarkable about the United States. The terror attacks happened but we’re not 
going to hold everybody accountable or responsible, and this poor civilian that we 
found we’re going to bury him with honor and not feel like Oh he’s a Muslim, 
you know the Muslims attacked us or whatever. I wasvery surprised. 
 
The narratives of Mahmood and Ahmed serve as good introductions to what I found in 
this project. Both enjoy their military service and have found success on this career path. 
Both express the presence of the us/them frame, and both provide illustrations of minor 
manifestations of this, such as teasing based on their identity, or in the case of Ahmed, 
witnessing anti-Muslim rhetoric in action. However, neither Mahmood nor Ahmed feels 
that being Muslim has affected their military careers. The distinction between us and 
them is present, they know it’s there, but it has little practical effect on their experiences.  
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ABSENCE OF ISLAM IN LANGUAGE TRAINING 
OMAR  
Omar has recently left the military after putting i eight years. Although Omar 
joined the military as an alternative to further schooling and as an opportunity to travel, 
he became a linguist and spent his entire career stateside, much of it in school. Omar 
converted to Islam while in the military. After his conversion, his leadership resisted 
assigning him to languages associated with Islam and he had to involve the Equal 
Opportunity office.  Omar did not enjoy the military lifestyle in general, and reports 
being happy to be a civilian again. Omar is multi-racial and was born in the United States 
to immigrant parents.  
Omar joined the military out of high school as an alternative to college.  
I just didn’t want to go to college and like I didn’t want to study or anything like 
that, and I picked like the last job for that. Like b ing a linguist you’re constantly 
studying and constantly learning languages, so it kinda backfired [laughs].  
 
As with several of my respondents, Omar also referenced popular media in his decision 
to join the military,  
I can understand why people want to be in the military, there’s like really cool 
Playstation games, really cool movies. I saw Independence Day and I was like I 
gotta be in the military.  
 
 Although he decided to join the military straight out of high school, Omar – a 
pacifist who appreciates his independence – predictably found the military to be a 
mismatch for his personality and values,   
My family like, they were cool with it but a lot of them didn’t think I’d really do 
it ‘cause I’m all pacifistic and stuff. So I kinda id it also to prove them like hey 
I’m doing this, learn how to hold a gun and stuff [laughs]. But that’s why I got out 
though, ‘cause it obviously wasn’t me 
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 Omar is thrilled to be out of the military. While other respondents reported 
appreciating the discipline and hierarchy of military life, Omar found it oppressive,  
I just hated the PT [Physical Training], all the exercise and things like that, I just 
want to be healthy on my own, I don’t need someone telling me to be healthy. 
There’s a lot of little nit-picky things that just add up. It’s so much better being 
out, so much better. And not just ‘cause being Muslim, it’s just not a life I 
imagine anyone would ever want. [laughs] […] I think the best, I don’t know if 
you read Harry Potter, but the best description would be the Dementors22 who 
just suck your soul out, that’s exactly how [it felt in the military]. I used to be so 
cheery and things like that […] But they really just took every happy thought out 
of my life, […] it’s like they’re just constantly beating down on you, whether it’s 
religion related or just the way they act around you. I just got out and [it’s] like 
the sun’s shinning, I see the flowers and everything. It’s nice. 
 
Omar converted to Islam during his military service. His process of religious 
exploration arose, ironically, out of anti-Muslim attitudes expressed by an instructor,  
When I joined I wasn’t Muslim. My family was, but I wasn’t brought up learning 
anything about it. And when I was in class I had this one Sergeant who did like a 
tour in Somalia, and he always had mean things to say about Muslims ‘cause he 
was an “expert” and I didn’t agree with what he said nd I knew a lot of people 
who are Muslim -- like family, relatives, or people from when I was in high 
school, and I had a good impression of them. I didn’t know anything about it, but 
I knew that they were nice people. I couldn’t argue with the guy because I had 
nothing to back up my argument, so I just went to the library and got like a 
Dummies Guide to Islam or something and I started reading it and then I liked it, 
and then I decided to become Muslim myself. 
 
Growing up in a diverse community and family, Omar is an example of the 
contact hypothesis in the civilian context. Throughout his childhood, Omar was in contact 
with peers and family who are Muslim, meeting many of the elements of Allport’s model. 
Later in life, when Omar is confronted with one-dimensional depictions of Muslims as 
evil “others” he draws on his own experiences with Muslims that he has known to 
question this. This supports the idea that having the opportunity to meet Muslims, not as 
                                                
22 “Dementors are among the foulest creatures that walk this earth... they glory in decay and despair, they 
drain peace, hope and happiness out of the air around them... Get too near a Dementor and every good 
feeling, every happy memory, will be sucked out of y u... You’ll be left with nothing but the worst 
experiences of your life.” (Rowling 2001: 140). 
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“others”, but as complex and complicated humans, facilit tes the rejection of simplistic 
stereotypes.  
Omar’s narrative also points to the role of military education. In his unit an 
“expert” with a particular ideological approach was t pped to teach about Islam. This 
attitude does not characterize all instructors in the military, but the views expressed by 
particular instructors may play a role in shaping the atmosphere of leadership and by 
extension the unit as a whole.  
 For Omar, being Muslim shaped his experiences in the military in ways that he 
often felt were negative,  
It’s always, the odds are always out of your... I mean even if you’re not, even if 
you’re Muslim and not in the military, it’s still a disadvantage because 
everywhere you want to go for breakfast is bacon and ham and sausage. So in the 
military it’s even more of that kind of stuff. I can’t really be specific about it. But 
you’re always on the losing end of something. You get used to it. 
 
He felt that his identity and religious practices, such as not drinking, set him apart 
and prevented building strong relationships with his colleagues,  
They know that I’m not going to go drinking with them so I had less friends 
‘cause he’s not gonna do anything cool. So they were just really good work 
friends and none take home friends.  
 
Omar’s characterization of socialization with his colleagues is very different from 
Mahmood who argues that although he did drink alcohol, abstaining would likely have 
little impact on off-duty socialization. It is possible that Mahmood’s hypothesis that 
abstaining from alcohol would have had little effect is incorrect and he like Omar would 
have felt excluded if he did not drink. It is more plausible however that other differences 
between Mahmood and Omar explain this discrepancy. There may be individual-level 
differences such as personality. There may also be unit-level differences, with 
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Mahmood’s colleagues being more accepting of voluntary sobriety than Omar’s 
colleagues.  
Omar sought formal religious accommodation during Ramadan. Rather than adapt 
his religious practice to his military duties, Omar adapted his military duties to 
accommodate fasting. Unlike many other aspects of military life, which Omar felt were 
weighted against him as a Muslim, accommodation for Ramadan was easy,  
whenever Ramadan came up I could just walk up to the PT leader and be like 
‘Hey, I can’t. I can’t drink anything and if I run like 10 seconds I’m just gonna 
pass out’ and then he or she would just be like ‘Ok, just come back when it’s 
over’. And I don’t think I ever really had a problem doing that 
 
Omar provides one of the clearest examples of hiding prayer. This was a common 
theme among my respondents; several people spoke of finding someplace private to pray. 
This stood in contrast to other religious practices, such as fasting, that my respondents 
engaged in publically. Omar treated prayer as a secret. Rather than explain why he would 
leave his office, he let his co-workers form their own rumors,  
I always went somewhere isolated to pray. […] There was one guy, […] he was 
really religious, and I would meet with him to pray nd we’d find some isolated 
place to pray. [My colleagues] probably thought we were doing something weird 
‘cause I’d always come in ‘Are you ready?’ and we’d l ave every day.  
 
There are several possible reasons prayer was treated as something to be hidden 
while fasting was never talked about by my respondents this way. One is the familiarity 
of the practice to others within the Christian norms of U.S. society. Fasting is a practice 
that is found in Christianity (and Judaism), and although what is meant by “fasting” 
differs (most Christian and Jewish fasts allow drinking water, while Islamic fasting does 
not), the general practice is familiar. On the other and, salah is seen as foreign to 
Christian tradition. Salah is most commonly understood to be required five times a day 
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and is formal and formulaic, involving precise movements of the body combined with 
recitation of certain phrases in Arabic. This is very different from contemporary Christian 
prayer which tends to be less frequent, more personalized and requires minor bodily 
movements (folding hands, crossing arms, kneeling, etc).23  
Fasting and prayer are also very different in their popular associations. Ramadan 
may be recognizable due to media coverage as an “exotic” but celebratory event. Because 
Ramadan is celebrated in many Islamic countries with feasting and decorations, the 
images in the media are comfortingly cheery. Salah however, is associated in the media 
with the idea of Islam as other and violent. Shaheen (2001) considers the portrayal of 
Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood movies and notes how images of Muslim men praying 
is often used in association with violent villains, “When mosques are displayed onscreen, 
the camera inevitably cuts to Arabs praying, and then gunning down civilians. Such 
scenarios are common fare” (9). 
Unlike Mahmood and Ahmed, Omar did feel that being Muslim had negative 
effects on his career, and this might also shape his reluctance to discuss his religious 
practice with his non-Muslim colleagues, 
they would behind my back say, and that happened a lot, they would just say all 
these anti-Muslim things behind my back even though they spent all day with me. 
They learned such and such about Islam and they would still say that same thing 
that I just corrected.  
 
After five years as a linguist working with a European language, Omar requested 
a more challenging language,  
                                                
23 There is an Islamic equivalent of the personalized prayer for the needs or wishes of the supplicant, this is 
called dua. Dua can be performed at any time and does not require ritualized movement or a particular 
format. However, when speaking of “prayer” with Muslims, it is usually understood to mean salah. 
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the commander said ‘I will not give you an Islamic language ‘cause you’re 
Muslim’. He thought I would use it to communicate with terrorists and things like 
that.  
 
With the help of the Equal Opportunities Office he was eventually given a new language, 
but rumors about his loyalty flourished,  
after that people did have rumors about me, like maybe I would be a traitor or 
whatever because I was helping them with Islamic topics. […] It wasn’t a 
problem being Muslim until I started helping them out with Islamic things. For 
some reason that drew more attention.  
  
The distinction implicitly made between us and them in this statement is interesting. 
Working on Islamic topics as a non-Muslim is viewed as acceptable as is being Muslim 
working on other topics, according to Omar’s account. It is only when identity and topic 
intersect that suspicion arises. This suggests that for Omar’s colleagues, the boundary 
between us and them was only salient under certain conditions, but under these 
conditions the boundary was actively policed. This is a very different experience than 
either Mahmood or Ahmed. 
Omar also alleged that within military language education Islam was routinely 
excluded from the curriculum. This was a claim also made independently by Dani who I 
will introduce next. Omar studied at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in the early 
2000s and says that at that time instructors were not allowed to teach students about 
Islam.  
The teachers did like me more because they weren’t allowed to talk about Islam 
but I was because I could say I researched it and this was my project. Which I did. 
And the students they just loved it 
 
This exclusion of religion does not appear to be a universal policy at DLI. 
Another respondent, who I will not name for confidentiality reasons, studied Russian at 
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DLI in the 2000s. He reported that not only was religion included in the curriculum, but 
his class was required to attend a Russian Orthodox Church service, 
Omar used class assignment and projects as an opportunity to bring Islam into the 
discussion, seeing its exclusion as problematic,  
I got to speak about Islam to my class and things like that and they were really 
into it ‘cause hey we’re learning about Afghanistan, we should learn about Islam. 
It only makes sense. But that was only my class. They put how many classes 
through a year and I come here and I see the people who learned other languages 
that have to do with Islam, they don’t know a single thing. And it’s bad. This is 
what keeps the war going. People assuming things about other people. 
 
This void of formal consideration of Islam in the classroom seemed to allow 
common stereotypes and misconceptions to take hold among the students,  
And [the students] were like yeah I heard that you’re actually supposed to kill 
non-Muslims if you’re Muslim. That’s like, I can’t believe how you got this far 
learning the language and still think that. I mean all your teachers were from 
Afghanistan, do you think they would teach you? [laughs] Are you alive right 
now? I mean they would’ve killed you if that was true. It’s just common sense 
some of this stuff. 
 
It is important to remember that Omar here is talking about advanced students learning 
specific languages to support the military mission. I was surprised that he reported these 
attitudes among these students, who I assumed to be more open-minded due to their 
education. However, throughout my sample many of the specific examples of anti-Islam 
encounters involved those who should be most aware of these issues: linguists and those 
in intelligence.  
Omar also taught an optional class on Islam. Enticing students to attend with 
pizza, Omar used these classes as a venue to address common myths about Islam and 
Muslims, 
Sometimes we had topics for the day but sometimes we just asked people to ask 
us questions. Because they’re too nice to ask us about virgins and blowing 
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yourself up and stuff, so we brought those subjects [up] and explained to them, 
hey this is not actually, this is just a rumor and things like that and then we’d give 
proofs and things like that. So they liked that, that we weren’t just saying ‘Hey 
Islam’s peace’, we were actually giving proof. And a lot of people were coming 




Dani is a veteran who served for 20 years, much of it as a linguist. Experiences 
while deployed to the Gulf War led Dani to convert to Islam. Dani is white and was born 
in the United States.  
Dani joined the military primarily for occupational reasons; the military was a 
source of social and geographic mobility, 
I was from a small town and my family was poor. […] I’m a product of two non-
college graduates, so I’m still from Small Town, USA where everybody doesn’t 
go to college when I was growing up and they didn’t k ow how to recommend 
what school or anything to you. They just, ok you graduated high school, time to 
get a job. I ended up going into the military, I thought it was cool.  
 
Dani did not go into the military anticipating that he would make it a career,  
 
I wanted to go in for two years get some money and go to school, be the first one 
in my family to finish college. 
 
However, a responsive leadership worked with Dani to find him opportunities that 
appealed to him, so he stayed for much longer. Eventually, the appeal of retirement 
benefits enticed him to remain for 20 years although he felt that his opportunities had 
dried up,  
I was just like I’ll stay in for a couple years and get out, but it kept going and 
going and then I had like 18 years in and I knew I was...I was disappointed with 
the promotion and all that, I never really got promoted like I thought I should 
have. And there was 18 years and I could have got out, but […] I was like, hm let 
me think about this I could either get out now at 18 and just get a job and get 
nothing ever, or I could stay two more years and get paid every month for the rest 
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of my life. Hm, what should I do [laughs]. So I stayed in the rest of the way. But 
after 20 I just was done. 
 
 
In general, Dani was satisfied with the military lifestyle. As with many of my 
respondents, he felt that the military expanded his horizons,  
How do I know that I would ever have taken shahada [converted to Islam] if it 
wasn’t for the military. Living in Small Town, USA how do I know I would have 
ever had that exposure. How do I know that I would have ever met my wife, 
started my family, who knows. 
 
As with Omar, Islam was something Dani began to explore due to specific 
military experiences.  
I was in Saudi Arabia for the [Persian Gulf] War and I’d see these people pull 
over on the side of the road to pray. I thought it was the coolest thing. […] I 
learned so much, just kept learning more, and I becam  a Muslim.  
  
As a white man with a typical American name, Dani provides an interesting 
opportunity to explore how people are recognized or identified by others as Muslim. 
While many of my respondents discuss being identified as Muslim due to their name or 
appearance, Dani had neither external marker. Perhaps because of this, when his 
commander was asked about the status of Muslims in his unit, he reported that they did 
not have any despite the active role Dani played in the Muslim military community,  
The General called all the commanders and each installation had to report back to 
the Secretary of Defense ‘Ok we’re good here all our people are taken care of’. 
But then the people who were in charge of me reportd ‘thumbs up, we don’t have 
any Muslim soldiers’, or something like that. And the General, I knew the General 
because I was the lay leader on [base], he goes, ‘So [redacted] doesn’t work in 
your battalion anymore?’ And [my commander] was like ‘Well yeah he does but 
what about him?’ ‘Well, he’s just the head of all the Muslims on the base and 
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Although he did not have any formal anti-Muslim encounters as Omar did, Dani 
did feel that Christian norms pervaded military culture, and occasionally made him feel 
excluded,  
That’s probably my least favorite thing about the military, it’s a Christian culture. 
I mean I was in it for long enough I understand it, but it’s a very Christian culture. 
[…] If you don’t believe in these values, you’re not one of the good guys.  
 
I asked him to elaborate on the Christian culture of the military,  
 
There’s always a prayer before everything, let us pray, and praying for the 
country and the commanders, and the commander’s kids, and his pets [laughs]. 
And then in Jesus’ name, they always say in Jesus’ name.24 
 
Dani also discusses the implicitly Christian nature of the annual winter “holiday” party,  
everybody tries to be politically correct now, it’s no longer a Christmas party, it’s 
a holiday party, but every holiday party has a Santa Claus and a [Christmas] tree. 
And I’m like really, a holiday party? […] I made the mistake a couple of times of 
calling it the Christmas party, and they were like ‘Oh no this is a holiday party.’ I 
was like, whose holiday is it? Whose holiday is in December? It’s a Christmas 
party, we get it.  
 
Dani observes that replacing the Christian term “Christmas” with the generic “holiday” 
does not change the underlying meaning of the event. The timing and the decorations 
clearly communicate that this is a Christmas party, whatever it may be called.  
Dani also independently corroborates Omar’s observation that Islam was 
explicitly excluded from language curriculum at DLI. Dani attended DLI in the mid-
1980s and in the late-1990s. He says that even at that ime, Islam was a touchy subject, 
There was a big Middle East contingent there it wasre lly very shy about staking 
a claim to Islam. [When I] went back for the refresh r course […] I’d see them on 
break and they’d whisper to me like enti Muslim? [Are you Muslim?] and I’d be 
like ta3ban [Of course]. And they were looking around like they were so paranoid 
of somebody. And then I found out there were so many political things of hiring 
instructors. Arab instructors, they wouldn’t talk about their religion or their 
                                                
24 Military chaplains are encouraged to offer nonsectarian prayers when performing public prayers outside 
denominational services. However, this is an accurate report of what Dani told me. 
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beliefs because the [Coptic] Christians25 were in charge at the time. And if you 
would let it be known that you were Muslim they wouldn’t hire you. 
 
According to Dani’s account of DLI in the 1990s, the avoidance of discussion of Islam 
had little to do with the contemporary us/them boundary I am exploring in the 
dissertation, and more to do with an often tense sectarian divide in the Arab world 
(another type of us/them boundary). Dani continues,   
They went through a change [in] the 2000s because the Department of Defense 
was giving a lot of money for culture instruction.26 […] I asked them like where’s 
your cultural stuff in here, when do you talk about this? They say that because 
they have native instructors in front of the class that’s the culture piece. I’m like 
really?!? But yeah, I don’t know how much they really talk about it, because it 
seems to me like it’s inseparable. 
 
Religion is a central component to culture and its ab ence from language and 
culture curriculum can handicap students. Learning to communicate in another language 
is not simply a matter of learning a new vocabulary and syntax. A whole host of 
nonverbal strategies must also be learned as well as a f miliarity with underlying cultures 
values and norms that make this communication possible. How prominent a role religion 
should take in this will obviously vary depending on the language being learned and how 
similar the associated culture is with the student’s ative culture. For a language such as 
Arabic, religion is a relevant component. From a purely linguistic standpoint, the Qur’an 
is understood to be an exemplary example of the poetic possibility of Arabic,27 religion 
shapes everyday life, and religious expressions are used throughout the Middle East in 
                                                
25 Copts are a minority ethno-religious group found primarily in Egypt where they comprise almost 10 
percent of the population.  
26 As of the writing of this dissertation, the stated mission of the DLI is to “[provide] culturally-based 
foreign language education, training, evaluation, research, and sustainment for DoD personnel in order to 
ensure the success of the Defense Language Program and enhance the security of the nation.” 
(http://www.dliflc.edu/mission.html).  
27 Qur’anic passages were used in Arabic classes I took to teach certain linguistic concepts, just as Biblical 
passages were used for this purpose in my Hebrew classes, and examples from literature were used in my 
German studies. 
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everyday contexts. A basic understanding of religion helps grasp cultural significance and 
also matters at a purely linguistic level, 
I know so many people who graduated around the same time I did and they never 
talked about any religion stuff, although now I seeev rything is integrated 
because even non-Muslim Arabs say Allah28 they’ll use salaam aleikoum as a 
greeting. We weren’t taught that at DLI, we were taught marhaba.29 And I’m like 
they don’t even use it. […] We didn’t learn about Ramadan, I mean just the effect 
that month of fasting has on everyone in that area nd anyone associated with the 
deen.30 At DLI you didn’t learn about Ramadan, you didn’t know Qur’an or hijab, 
simple stuff that everybody in the Middle East knows, hether Muslim or not. 
You didn’t learn that at DLI ‘cause they wanted to separate the culture or the 
religion from the language learning. Which I think is sorta ignorant. 
 
The exclusion of topics such as Ramadan, hijab, and Qur’an in an Arabic 
language class is a serious handicap for students who will be working in the Middle East. 
As Dani observes, these are concepts that are highly relevant to life in the Middle East, 
regardless of religion. This would be equivalent to sending a Hebrew linguist to Israel 
with no understanding of Shabbat [Sabbath], not knowing when or why a kippa 
[yarmulke] is worn, and unfamiliar with what the Torah is. This person may be able to 
get around to a certain degree (though they may face problems when the daily schedule is 
changed due to Ramadan or Shabbat), but they would be missing important information 
conveyed by nonverbal cues such as clothing, and would be unaware of the significance 
of religious texts and interest groups in popular culture and political life. In these 
countries, certain religious practices shape the entire society for everybody, even those of 
other religions, and because they are different from practices common in the United 
States must be actively taught if students are to understand them.   
                                                
28 Allah () is the Arabic term for God. It is used as a prope name and is understood to refer to the 
Abrahamic God. It is like the English “God” (rather than “god”), and is used by all Arabic-speaking 
monotheists.  
29 Salaam aleikoum means “peace be upon you” and is used when Muslims greet each other. It is also used 
commonly by Arabic speaking non-Muslims. Marhaba means “welcome”, and it is rarely used by native 
speakers. It is primarily something someone who has le rned Arabic from a textbook uses. 
30 When used in this way, deen connotes Islamic religious practice and faith. 
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As with Omar, Dani found that this void led to the use of inaccurate stereotypes 
about Islam including the oft-repeated claim that Muslims are enjoined to kill non-
Muslims, 
After 9/11, when people wanted to know about Islam and everything, it was like 
always the most Christian person usually would always try to give this 
[presentation] of what Muslims are supposed to believ  and what they’re 
supposed to do. And I was like really, about how the Muslims had to kill people 
in order to go to heaven. I was like really? I guess I need to know stuff like that 
being a Muslim and all, thanks [sarcastic]. Sometims I would [just] laugh. 
 
As with Omar, Dani found that sometimes the stereotypes were so ridiculous that 
the only response was to laugh them off. Also similar to Omar, when teaching classes on 
Islam, Dani worked to address these misconceptions, 
One of the classes I would teach was an Islam class[…] we’d talk about jihad, 
probably one of the most misunderstood things about the deen and I’d talk about 
the greater jihad, and the lesser jihad.31 […] At the end I’d say, for example 
greater jihad can be teaching a bunch of military people about Islam, that’s some 
Muslim’s greater jihad. And they still didn’t get it. And then I’d get these 
whispers “Are you Muslim?” I sure am. Why do people a ways whisper about it, 
it’s like you have a disease or something. It’s funny. 
 
At the same time, Dani was clear in his denouncement of the idea that only Muslims can 
or should teach about Islam,  
my boss [would introduce me with] ‘Well he’s a Muslim’ and I went to him and 
said hey you don’t have to tell people that, it’s none of their business. First of all 
why would it matter? I mean if I’m able to teach the classes.  
 
 Omar and Dani provide additional evidence of the us of us/them discourses in 
the military. Both identify situations where they felt excluded due to being Muslim. For 
Omar, the attitude of a specific leader negatively affected his career, though he did 
successfully utilize the equal opportunity system to address the issue. For Dani, 
                                                
31 Lesser jihad (al-jihad al-asghar) refers to a physical, military war; greater jihad ( l-jihad al-akbar) refers 
to internal struggle for personal improvement (for example a Muslim might refer to the “jihad” of waking 
up for pre-dawn prayer, meaning the struggle of striving to achieve this).  
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manifestations of us/them were much more subtle, and as with Mahmood and Ahmed, he 
didn’t find being Muslim to significantly shape his career. The cases of Omar and Dani 
are also interesting for what they say about military education. Both worked as military 
linguists, and both studied at DLI, though their sojourns there did not overlap. Between 
them, they provide a glimpse at military language learning over a period of more than 20 
years. They independently provide reports of similar exclusion of any discussion of Islam 
from language training in Arabic and other languages spoken in predominately Muslim 
countries. This apparent concern with separating education about religion and language 
speaks to the framework of us/them, particularly as it is not observed by another 
respondent studying Russian. The avoidance of this top c seems to allow a specific set of 




Kareem is a veteran with an 11 year career as a military machinist. Kareem 
immigrated to the United States from the Arab world as a teenager. Us/them permeates 
his narrative.  
Kareem’s motivations for joining the military were primarily occupational; he 
joined for the benefits military service offered. As with many of my respondents he felt 
that the opportunities available in the military were xcellent, and in his case they enticed 
him to remain for more than a decade.  
Initially I just wanted to travel and experience new things away from home, the 
travel, money for college basically. The plan was to do it for four years and get 
out but I decided I liked it too much so I stayed in for 11 years. 
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For Kareem’s father, military service was not a part of the life he envisioned for 
his son in the United States.  
My dad’s main concern was how is this going to fit in with your school ‘cause my 
father is, he came to the U.S. to study and do his grad school here in the U.S., so 
he values education very much, so his main concern was no, you go to school, 
you finish your undergrad, you go to grad school, then you get a good job, then 
you buy a house, then you get married and that’s the track of life he had imagined 
for me. 
 
Kareem’s family immigrated to the U.S. to enable his father to complete his graduate 
education. This is a common family history in the American Muslim community, 
especially among recent immigrants. With the end of the Asia Exclusion Act in 1965, 
immigration from the Islamic world increased and became characterized by high levels of 
education and ambition, it “included a large number of highly educated, socially mobile, 
professional Muslims – part of the Arab and South Asian ‘brain drain’” (Haddad 2004:5). 
For Kareem’s parents, and for many immigrant Muslim parents, a specific trajectory is 
expected for their children that emphasizes education and family. Serving in the military, 
and particularly choosing to serve in the military before or in instead of attending college 
is a serious deviation from the expectations of many parents within this community. 
Kareem also suggests military service may also be viewed unfavorably because it is seen 
to encourage a lifestyle at odds with religious/cultural expectations,  
I’m sure the reason why [my father] was against me joining the military he 
thought I was gonna go, 19 year old boy wanted to leave home and his immediate 
thought was oh this guy wants to party. 
 
 Despite the reservations of his family, Kareem found the military to be highly 
rewarding. Like many of my respondents, he felt thaere were many opportunities in 
the military. 
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The military was extremely good to me, I would say that the military was my rich 
daddy. There was no question whatever I wanted to do I could totally do it. I’d 
say military, daddy, I wanna travel and [they] sent me everywhere, or allowed me 
to go everywhere, provided me with the opportunity to go everywhere […] I said 
oh I want to go to school for this, they’d send me to school for that. They’d send 
me to all kinds of military school, even like civilan education for my undergrad 
and even for, when I got out of the military I went to grad school, I was 
completely out of the military, I went to grad school and I was still collecting 
veteran benefits, I was getting paid every month. The new GI Bill, the post-9/11 
GI Bill it’s an incredible deal. […] It was an incredible opportunity I have 
absolutely nothing bad to say about the military. No regrets whatsoever even 
though I joined at a young age. I could’ve wasted my life on booze and party but I 
didn’t. I think the military it is what you make out of it. 
 
In line with his general occupational bend, after over a decade of service, Kareem 
felt ready to pursue opportunities in the civilian world and left the military.  
 Kareem noted the increasing presence of the us/them boundary in the civilian 
world. Kareem, who began his service before 9/11 saw this shift in both military and 
civilian spheres, 
The awareness of the simple American [shifted], not just the simple [service 
member], of what a Muslim is, or may be. I’ll call it the paranoia factor, the 
Muslim paranoia. Yeah that really started up in 2001. […] I think today people 
are more aware, they know brown people are dangerous, people from the Middle 
East are dangerous, people who are different, Middle East, Far East yeah that’s all 
the same. Muslim, Sikh, Baha’i, Hindu, they really don’t know the difference. 
The average American still does not know the difference. All they know is that 
Middle East, Far East, oh terrorist. They really don’t know.  
 
Kareem noted that while people were more aware of “brown” people, a great deal 
of ignorance remained,  
People really honestly did not know what the hell Arab is. […] Occasionally I’d 
say I’m Arab and people would say ‘Oh my God, my next door neighbor’s from 
Bangladesh, you should totally get together.’ […] They actually thought that 
people from Bangladesh, people from Afghanistan, people from Libya and 
Morocco [are the same], they all speak the same langu ge, they all eat kebabs, 
cool. 
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For Kareem, it is obvious that attitudes in the civilian world will permeate the 
military 
the military, it’s a small society in itself so the factors of society are very well 
represented in the military as a whole, so there are r cist people in the military  
 
My discussion with Kareem illustrates the centrality of perspective in 
conceptualizing us/them. Kareem noted that us/them could be constructed by al-Qaeda to 
include anyone residing in the West,  
A terrorist organization is a terrorist organization, when the time comes to kill, for 
them to kill someone they will not distinguish betwen Muslims or infidels. They 
would bomb the University of Maryland with a Muslim sister32 there, knowing 
that there are a lot of Muslim brothers and sisters there just because it represents 
the infidels period. 
 
Kareem notes that from the perspective of al-Qaeda, or similar groups, “us” 
encompasses only those with similar worldviews as proven by living outside the United 
States. From this perspective, “them” includes anyone living in the United States, 
regardless of religious, ethnic, or national identity.  
Kareem provides an example of yet another us/them prspective. Discussing 
differences in opinion within the Muslim community, he explains that some Muslims 
characterize “us” as all Muslims regardless of ideological view (“us”),33  
some people like to interpret Islam differently. Some are more fundamentalist 
than others. Some will say the sheik34 bin Laden, others will say the terrorist bin 
Laden. So the ones that say sheik bin Laden are the ones that’ll say the military is 
haraam,35 we will not participate in any campaign that kills Muslims, that’s 
haraam. I participate in campaigns that kill bad Muslims, you know. If it walks 
                                                
32 The terms “brother” and “sister” are commonly used in the American Muslim community to refer to 
fellow Muslims.  
33 The context of this perspective is complex and beyond the scope of this project to explain. Kareem’s 
discussion is useful for illustrating different ways us/them is used, but should not be taken as a reflection on 
the opinions of most American Muslims. 
34 Sheik/Sheikha is an honorific in Arabic. It means “elder” and connotes being a leader and a religious 
scholar. 
35 Not-permissible, forbidden, sinful. Within the Islamic worldview, a distinction is drawn between what is 
permissible (halal) and what is forbidden (haraam).  
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like a duck, if it quacks like a duck, it’s a duck. A terrorist organization is a 
terrorist organization […] It’s like no, we don’t just go and kill Muslims, we kill 
bad Muslims, period. We don’t just go and bomb Sheik Muhammad the peaceful 
guy who leads people at prayers on Friday, no. We will however conduct a 
campaign and get the guy who killed thousands and thousands of people and drop 
him in the ocean, yeah. We’re not bad guys for doing that.  
 
Kareem actively redefines who is us and who is them in his response. Rather than 
accept an approach based on ethno-religious identity, Kareem argues that the enemy is 
composed of those who are terrorists, which he sees as asily identifiable, “A terrorist 
organization is a terrorist organization”. He distinguishes between “Muslims” as a group, 
and “bad Muslims”, identifying only the latter as the enemy (and presumably lumping 
bad-non-Muslims in this category as well, though he do s not elaborate on this).  
The ones I have a problem with are those who have a problem with the military, 
particularly because they kill Muslims, and to me th se people are no different 
from the average redneck, forgive my [language], who doesn’t know the 
difference, this is an Arab, this is a Pakistanian [ ntentional mispronunciation], 
they’re all the same, they’re all raghead. And again the Muslims who don’t make 
the distinction between good Muslims and bad Muslim, or violent fundamentalist 
Muslims and good Muslims, are no different from those ignorant rednecks who 
have no idea. To them Muslims are Muslims, bad or go d they’re all brothers and 
sisters. I beg to differ. 
 
Kareem sees the use of monolithic categories based on religious identity to be 
intellectually lazy when used both in the non-Muslim American community and in the 
Muslim community. Just as he denigrates “the average edneck” for thinking all Muslims 
are the same, he also expresses disdain for Muslims who do not recognize radical and 
violent elements within their global communities. This speaks to the necessity of 
complicating ideas about us/them. 
 




Jamal is a veteran with a 20 year career in the military. Of South Asian origin, 
Jamal immigrated to the United States as an adult. For Jamal, positive experiences while 
immigrating shaped his desire to join the military,  
[The immigration official] said ‘Well [education and IQ are] irrelevant, you’re 
coming as a husband, you’re married to an American.’ That was one of the most 
emotional moments of my life, I almost broke down. I could not believe that a 
rich country would be so governed by law, so governed by humanity, that they 
didn’t care that I was a doctor or not a doctor, they didn’t care if I was retarded or 
smart, just based on my value as a human being they were willing to let me 
immigrate. And at that moment I decided that this is a country worth dying for. 
And that’s when I decided that I would eventually join the [military]. 
 
Jamal powerfully articulates the sense of service that was common among my 
respondents, for him, the U.S. was “a country worth dying for”. Jamal’s motivations were 
highly institutional, and stem largely from his specific experience of immigration. Jamal 
expresses no occupational motivations, though he does n te that one of the unanticipated 
benefits of his military service is the status it conveys to him as a brown man who might 
otherwise be treated with suspicion,  
What I did not anticipate of course was 20 years later s a brown-skinned Muslim 
man now [at] every airport I have to prove I’m not a terrorist and of course a 
military ID helps.  
 
While other respondents addressed reluctance in the South Asian community to 
have children serve in the military, which is viewed as less prestigious than other careers, 
Jamal provides insight into how generational differences and particular histories of 
colonialism may shape the perceived prestige of a military career. Speaking of his parents 
who grew up in Colonial India, he explains, 
what is important in their life growing up was the might of the British Empire, 
which was of course made evident through the might of the British military. So 
for them, my joining the military was a source of great pride. […] During the 
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British times the British recruitment policies favored big tall strong soldier races 
[…]. So the British army was mostly Sikhs or Punjabi Muslims. And people from 
my tribe, we were excluded from the Army, we were too small, too pathetic, too 
weak, too cowardly, or so the stereotype went. So when I could get into the 
military from my parents’ point of view that was a big success and they showed 
off about it incessantly. 
 
While his identity as a service member was a source p id  for his parents, Jamal 
anticipated that his Muslim identity would be a source of concern in the military, but was 
surprised to find that it had little effect,  
I don’t think I was ever harmed by [being Muslim], in fact I was a little surprised 
why it didn’t come up. Somehow I thought that surely my Muslim heritage should 
have aroused suspicion a long time ago, but it apparently never did.  
 
Jamal expected his identity to pose a barrier to success in the U.S. military and 
was surprised when it did not. The expectation speaks to the presence of this boundary, 
while the outcome suggests that this boundary has little relevance in the military setting.  
 Jamal’s work focused on terrorism. He felt that his South Asian Muslim 
background added depth to his work,  
I have a [published academic] theory of terrorism. It’s not too different from 
everyone else’s theory, but it differs in minor details. […] The strength of it 
probably was that because of my Muslim heritage I know of things that can’t be 
proved by data but I can understand certain nuances of language and looks that 
non-Muslims probably miss. So I’ve spoken to, I’m not saying that I’ve spoken to 
millions of terrorists, but I’ve spoken to millions of Muslims, and they have 
various degrees of political opinion. I’m probably more difficult to fool than 
someone else. I do speak Urdu and I can pick up these v ry subtle nuances, 
especially in Urdu which is a very poetic language. 
 
For Jamal as for Pervez, who I will introduce in Chapter 7, growing up in this particular 
ethno-religious community provided him, he felt, with a depth of knowledge as well as 
certain unquantifiable characteristics that gave him an advantage in dealing with issues of 
terrorism in the Muslim world. Jamal attributes this intuition to being able to subliminally 
process cues from language, dress, and behavior based on a lifetime of experiences 
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interacting with diverse members of this group. This is not to say that all Muslims will 
have this “sixth sense” or that it is impossible for n n-Muslims to gain this knowledge. It 
is seen by both Jamal and Pervez as a product of a particular process of socialization 
rather than an innate characteristic.  
 Jamal also found that his background enabled him to build rapport with locals 
while he was deployed. While serving in Afghanistan, he encountered a man living 
locally. Based on their shared language (Urdu) theystruck up an extended acquaintance. 
During the course of their chats they discussed Muslims in the United States  
he said to me ‘So what’s it like in America?’ and I said ‘life is wonderful’ and he 
said ‘How do people treat you?’ and I said ‘Very well.’ And he said, ‘They do?! 
They treat you well? But you’re Muslim.’ And I said, ‘Can’t you see? I [have a 
good career], I joined the military without any problems. […] I’m a Muslim 
American, I live in a society where nobody messes with my religion, I can 
practice whatever religion I like, I joined the military, got promoted. It’s a very 
fair society.’ 
 
Jamal felt that his military service was an opportunity to demonstrate the extent of 
diversity and religious tolerance in the United States. Such efforts may help bolster the 
social legitimacy of the U.S. military as it strives to win the “hearts and minds” of 
civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq. The opportunity to interact directly with Muslim 
service members is a powerful counter argument against claims made by al-Qaeda that 
Americans are monolithic. While I have discussed the contact hypothesis in terms of 
developing inclusion in the U.S. military, Jamal serves a similar role for the local 
population and humanizes Americans.36  
Jamal’s interaction with this man continued, taking a fantastical turn and building 
on local traditions of storytelling,  
                                                
36 Differences in status stemming from the differential positions of soldier and civilian complicate Allport’s 
model in this case; however, we can also see this theme in the narratives of Ahmed, Hakim, and Pervez. 
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And he said, ‘Yeah yeah, […] has anyone done anythig really good for you?’ 
[…] And then I remembered a story of a man I’ve never met. I said after 9/11 the 
Muslim community in America was fearful of a backlash. I was fearful that I 
could go out and somebody would beat me up or something. […] Every time I tell 
this story I tear up a little bit, the story that I heard was that [Dr. Fried] showed up 
for work and started growing a beard, and when he was asked why are you 
growing this beard, he said that most of my residency class are mostly foreign 
doctors and half the class is Muslim. He said after 9/11 I want them to know, I 
want those with beards to know that I’m one of them. If anyone has a problem 
with my Muslim residents, they have a problem with me. It’s a very powerful 
message for me. So I told this man that Dr. Fried, who I’d never met, did this 
apparently. And the man in front of me was large, man-looking, tough-looking, it 
wouldn’t have surprised me if he had one foot in al-Q eda.37 I would not want to 
be alone with him in some Afghani cave or anything [laughs]. He was spellbound 
at my story and his eyes became teary. […] So he says to me, this man must be 
rewarded. I said I’m sure God will give him his reward. He said no no, I have to 
reward him. […] So I said to him, you’re not without influence, you can commit 
an act of charity I’m sure. I said I’m pretty sure that Dr. Fried is Jewish, and I’m 
pretty sure that most Jews fear that if they’re caught by al-Qaeda they’ll be very 
harshly treated. So if you have this influence and you want to reward Dr. Fried 
why don’t you give me permission to inform Dr. Fried that in his name any 
Jewish prisoner that you capture will not be treated harshly, and that will be his 
reward. And he said, that’s very difficult for me to do, that’s a war decision, I 
don’t make those decisions and that may not go down very well with my people. 
And I said well do you think it went down well with Dr. Fried’s people. After 
9/11 it showed enormous courage, enormous character, nd if you don’t [have the 
character] he doesn’t want your carpet and trinkets and whatever. […] He said 
okay tell Dr. Fried he has six lives. So I have no idea who that man was. I have no 
idea if this was a game he was playing with me, I have no idea if he was sincere 
or insincere, and there’s no way I can check or anybod  can check. The story’s 
not fictitious, [my co-workers] can confirm that this man came in. […] But yeah 
there’s good outcome to the story which at least in my fantasy I like to believe 
there is. I mean I have no idea how many Jewish American soldiers get taken 
prisoner in Afghanistan. Probably not many. I have no idea if this man will be 
there at the time. But you know there is a tradition of storytelling in Afghanistan, 
so I’m pretty sure that this man told the story of me to many of his friends, and 
I’m sure he said that I met a Muslim and gosh guess what he lives in America. It’s 
not impossible that he tells this story as well, I’m hoping that generates a certain 
environment of compassion, mercy, love. 
 
This fantastical story stems from Jamal’s ability to build rapport with this local. Through 
a shared language and a shared appreciation for the a t of storytelling, Jamal introduces 
                                                
37 Among other things, that this man spoke Urdu, which is not the local language of the area where this 
occurred, suggests that he may have had political reasons for being there. That Jamal makes this connetio  
without elaborating it is a demonstration of this “sixth sense” he spoke of earlier. 
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this man to a complex vision of America where Muslim  and non-Muslims can form 
friendships, and where in the wake of 9/11 many Americans stood with their Muslim 
friends and neighbors rather than against them. A facility with the cultural norms of 
storytelling, and also an understanding of cultural norms of honor and respect, helps 
Jamal humanize American service members, and he hops that this will have a long term 
positive effect, even if just among those people this man shares his tale with.  
Although his identity did not pose a barrier to hismilitary career, Jamal 
discovered that the us/them boundary could be seen in the visceral reaction of others. He 
attributes a close call with friendly fire to his “brown” appearance, 
Once I was nearly shot at but it wasn’t because of my religion, it was because of 
my looks, my skin color. We were in Iraq, in the first Gulf War and we got lost. I 
was in a jeep and it was 2 o’clock in the morning ad we got lost and we came to 
some checkpoint and some 18 year old idiot guard stopped the driver, checked the 
driver’s ID and then he came to the back and suddenly, it all happened in one 
millisecond, he pointed the gun at me and locked and loaded. So I saw the gun 
pointed at me and I heard the click and of course everyone yelled and so he didn’t 
fire. And then a minute later he was trembling and saying ‘Oh my God, gosh, are 
you ok?’ and was very apologetic. And apparently what had happened was earlier 
that day this idiot 18 year old had been reprimanded for not checking carefully 
enough. So at 2 o’clock at the morning, he’d probably woken up from sleep, 
we’re in the middle of Iraq and it’s very dark so he as a flashlight and he comes 
to the back of the car, he’s probably not very awake, he opens up and he sees five 
white faces and one brown face. I think it was thatins antaneous visual look. And 
his instincts were to lock and load which he did. 
 
Although being brown has little relevance for Jamal’s career, this story points out 
that there are other possible relevancies in military life. In this context, split-second 
decisions about friend or foe based as much on intuition as on rational thought can mean 
the difference between life and death. In this situat on, being connected, however 
subconsciously, with an enemy-them can be dangerous. Jamal is the only respondent to 
report an incident of (near) friendly fire so I do n t have data to elaborate on this further. 
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But this incident does remind us that in many ways the military remains a unique context 
where internalization of us/them discourse may have more potentially violent outcomes 
than in civilian society. 
Jamal also shares a story that illustrates that who is “us” and who is “them” is a 
matter of perspective. For Jamal, being seen as a dngerous other, one of “them”, by al-
Qaeda had tragic consequences. Jamal, who analyzes terrorism, served as an expert on 
local television shows, and so became a public face of anti-terrorism work. It is this 
prominence, he believes, that led to him being threatened by a stranger,   
 [Before I deployed to Afghanistan] I took [my mother] to the butcher. [As we 
were standing in line] the guy next to me turned to me and he said ‘What’s the 
difference between a chicken and a traitor?’ He said it with a big smile, so I 
thought it was some sort of a joke, [laughs] ‘I don’t k ow, tell me the difference 
between a chicken and a traitor.’ And he said ‘The c ickens first we kill and then 
we skin, but the traitors first we skin and then we kill.’ And then he walked away. 
And suddenly I was frozen. I mean I started sweating, it was such a chilling 
statement that he just made and for like one millisecond I couldn’t speak, I 
couldn’t move. Of course by then he was gone. And I thought did I hear this 
correctly? Was this a joke? Was it a threat? Does this guy know me; I don’t know 
him from Adam. But that’s what happened. […] I told my commander […] but 
the next thing I know I’m on a plane to Afghanistan. 
 
While he was deployed in Afghanistan, his uncle in Pakistan was murdered: 
 
When I came back [from Afghanistan], […] I heard that my uncle [in Pakistan] 
had been murdered. And nobody ever told me that al-Qaeda did it, but just the 
coincidence of, he was an old man, never harmed anyone, nothing was stolen 
from his home. So one of the theories was that he was pushing me, an American 
soldier to go back and give a lecture on terrorism and al-Qaeda’s position was we 
don’t need a lecture on terrorism from this man’s nephew, especially someone 
who is so against us. But the murder was unsolved, robbery was ruled out, 
because Pakistan is an ugly place, there are robberies, but robbery was not the 
motive ‘cause nothing was stolen.  
 
More devastating, Jamal’s father was subsequently murdered in Pakistan:  
 
[My father] showed off about me a lot, ‘My son the soldier.’ […] I got a medal 
once and I’ve given him a copy of the little commendation and he put it up on his 
wall. So he wasn’t shy about showing off that his son was an American soldier. 
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And then one day I got the news that he was dead. When I looked into it I could 
not get any details the best I can get is the local newspaper […] and then I learned 
that the headline was that he had been tortured and kille  and I discussed with 
many people including his own brother, nobody wants to talk about it. His own 
brother, I said can you give me the death certificae? And he said I’m not going 
anywhere near this case. And the only thing that can arouse such fear and 
intimidation is if al-Qaeda had done it. […] nobody wants to discuss it, talk about 
it, nobody wants to meet me if I’m there. Nothing was stolen from his home and 
he was tortured. In robberies nobody’s tortured. […] When I heard all that it made 
me ill for a week and [ultimately] I decided to quit the military, I mean it’s just 
too ugly, too horrible. I have other relatives there. They killed my uncle then they 
killed my father and I just didn’t know if they could kill somebody else. Everyone 
in the Pakistani community here told me you know you’re behaving very 
dangerously by being so outspoken about your politica  views. 
 
 This idea of U.S. military service members as “them” has been clearly expressed 
by al-Qaeda. In 1998, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda issued their famous “fatwa”38 in 
which they called for the murder of Americans and their allies 
The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an 
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in ay country in which it is 
possible to do it […] We -- with God’s help -- call on every Muslim who believes 
in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s rder to kill the 
Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenev r they find it. We also 
call on Muslim ulema,39 leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s 
US troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who 
are behind them so that they may learn a lesson (qtd in Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service 2004) 
 
This statement is a clear example of us/them rhetoric from an alternate 
perspective. While some in the United States see Islam as bent on the destruction of 
America, al-Qaeda and similar groups see the United S ates as pursuing a campaign 
against Islam and use propaganda to this effect to attract followers. From al-Qaeda’s 
perspective, Americans, regardless of religion, are suspect and legitimate targets. Just as 
we’ve seen in the use of this us/them framework in the United States, being Muslim and 
                                                
38 A “fatwa” is a juridical ruling usually issued by a scholar. Different schools of Islam have different 
perspectives on the validity of fatwas. In this case I use the term because it is the term used by al-Qaeda, 
though it is arguably a misuse of the concept. 
39 Scholars, connotes Islamic religious scholars. 
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being American are posed as mutually exclusive. In this statement, being American 
overrides all other identities and affiliations; it is impossible to be American without 
being the enemy. In particular, the focus of al-Qaeda on the U.S. military and its 
engagement in the Middle East, makes service members a particularly “othered” status. 
For al-Qaeda, the religion of a service member does n t make them less “them”, in fact, a 
Muslim choosing to serve in “Satan’s US troops” may be viewed even more negatively 
than a non-Muslim doing so. Such a decision may be seen as being a traitor, as we saw in 
the threat made against Jamal.  
Jamal’s narrative reminds us to beware of an overly-narrow conceptualization of 
us/them. Seen as a potential “them” from the perspective of a young American soldier on 
guard duty, he is also seen as a dangerous “them” by al-Qaeda, who respond with threats 
and violence, torturing and murdering Jamal’s uncle and father. Overall, Jamal’s 
narrative illuminates and complicates the framework I have proposed.  
 Jamal and Kareem both had generally positive experiences in the military, and 
both add evidence to the existence but irrelevance of the us/them framework in the 
military. Jamal expects his identity to shape his career, while Kareem observes growing 
“Muslim paranoia” in both civilian and military spheres. Despite the presence of this 
boundary, neither Jamal nor Kareem feel that their mil tary careers have been negatively 
impacted by their identity. Jamal was surprised to find that his identity rarely came up, 
and Kareem has taken full advantage of many opportunities during his military service 
for travel and education. More importantly, Jamal and Kareem complicate the idea of a 
simple conceptualization of us/them. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking of us/them 
in only one direction, when in reality this dichotomization can be used by anyone, and 
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both us and them can and are defined in many different ways. For example, this frame is 
actively used by al-Qaeda to pose all Americans as “them”.  
 
DISCUSSION 
While presenting very different stories, the preceding accounts illuminate the 
theme of us/them and demonstrate that this discourse is present in the U.S. military. 
These respondents all recognize that being Muslim sets them apart to some degree. They 
all articulate recognition of the us/them boundary. For some it is articulated through 
global political situations, for others it is made cl ar to them through the responses of 
others service members to them.  
For most of the respondents introduced in this chapter, although us/them was a 
feature in their narrative, they found that it had little practical effect. These respondents 
felt that they were identified by colleagues as Muslim  and all saw the ways in which this 
us/them boundary was activated. However, with the exc ption of Omar, these 
respondents felt that this membership had no effect on their military careers or 
experiences. For the most part, these respondents felt like full members of their units. 
They worked towards shared goals with their colleagu s, and felt that their abilities were 
respected by others.  
As another way to establish the existence of the us/them discourse in the military I 
presented two narratives about language and culture education in the military. The 
accounts of Omar and Dani provide additional evidence that an us/them that distinguishes 
Muslim from non-Muslim is salient in the U.S. military.  
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 Finally, the narratives of Kareem and Jamal, which recognizing the role of this 
specific use of us/them in the military, also complicate this conceptualization by posing 
situations where who is “us” and who is “them” is defined differently.  
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CHAPTER 7: LEADERSHIP 
 
 Having established that the discourse of us/them is present in the military I turn 
my attention to the role of leadership in shaping whether this discourse becomes relevant 
or not. For most of my respondents, although they wre aware of us/them, it did not 
shape their experiences in meaningful ways. For some f these, leadership that valued 
diversity and was invested in providing a safe a supportive environment shaped the 
irrelevance of processes of us/them. For those few respondents who had negative 
experiences relating to being Muslim, leadership played a central role in exacerbating 
tensions. In addition to controlling rewards and punishments, such as Omar’s leader 
denying him permission to change languages, leaders also set the tone for the unit. 
Leaders communicate through their actions and attitudes what behaviors will be tolerated 
in the unit.  
In this chapter, I present three cases of strong leadership. For Tarek, leadership 
sets an example of support after a troubling encounter with us/them and his colleagues 
rally around him. Najib experiences the benefits of institutionalized religious 
accommodation during Ramadan at a military academy, and serves with a leader who 
models the value of cultural competence. Pervez finds that his particular skill set makes 
him useful on the ground in Afghanistan. 
 I also present three cases where weak leadership, or leadership that accepts the 
us/them dichotomy, negatively shape the experiences of respondents. Zafir spends a short 
career constantly at odds with a specific commander. With a history of racial intolerance, 
this commander shows a disdain for diversity and uses us/them conceptualizations in 
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accusing Zafir of supporting the insurgents and refer ing to him as “Taliban.” Sadia also 
faces an unsupportive leader. Accused of being a terrorist by her ex-husband following a 
domestic dispute, Sadia’s commander institutes a full-fledged investigation and tolerates 
an atmosphere of gossip ultimately leading Sadia to leave the military early. Basim 
decides to leave the military after an over 20 year career when he feels that the post-9/11 
atmosphere in his unit is marked by suspicion and distrust. His decision is also shaped by 
a new leader who denies him basic religious accommodati n and fosters a generally 
unwelcoming environment.  
 These cases will be used to draw out themes of leadership, arguing that since 
us/them permeates the military, as it does the civilian society, leadership serves as a 
powerful factor in either mitigating this divisive atmosphere or exacerbating tensions to 




Tarek is a veteran who worked in a military clinic for four years. Born in South 
Asia, Tarek came to the United States as a child. Tarek’s motivations to join the military 
were primarily occupational, including money for college and on-the-job medical 
training. In addition to these occupational concerns, Tarek also voiced a sense of service,  
So many people come into this country and don’t do anything to, like all they do 
is take; no one gives back. Honestly I didn’t do it because I had this epiphany of 
patriotism but I did it to better myself, but then o ce I joined, after being in the 
military, I found a sense of pride, it sounds very clichéd but […] I had that. 
 
Tarek was the first in his immediate family to serve in the military though he had 
an uncle and a cousin who had served. His mother was concerned about his decision to 
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join the military because of the ongoing conflicts, but his father approved of the decision 
seeing it as a good long term investment.  
Tarek is proud of his military service. Though he begins by couching it as a joke, 
the depth of his pride is clear,  
 [I: Are you proud to be a veteran?] Oh yeah. I get to eat free at Applebee’s, it’s 
great [laughs]. Yeah, I didn’t realize there were so many benefits for being... I 
was in class today and my instructor told me he’s so impressed. And I’m like I 
didn’t really do anything. It’s nice, the country as  whole always has pride and 
respect for people who served. I’m not trying to milk it or anything but it is nice, 
you have more pride than you had before, everyday it kinda grows. So it’s nice. 
 
Although he does not frame his pride in terms of citizenship, his discussion of being 
respected by others is related to my conceptualization of performing citizenship. Because 
he has served, he feels that he is held in higher est em by others than if he had not. In 
addition to the opinions of others, his service has increased his own sense of pride.  
Tarek enjoyed the military lifestyle  
I liked the discipline of it, all those different things that I didn’t like at the time, 
like I didn’t like being told what to do, but at the end of the day the military is a 
cakewalk compared to jobs in the real world.  
 
Tarek saw his military service as a series of opportunities,  
I started to realize that there’s opportunity for education, there’s opportunity for 
advancement, there’s opportunity to travel; it’s a very accommodating 
environment if you allow it. People tend to think tha  the military is harsh and is 
no room to grow and I never had that feeling. I enjoyed being around other 
service members. So in a nutshell I enjoyed the variety of it. 
 
Tarek also observed that the military provided the opportunity for service 
members to broaden their horizons,  
I think a lot of times when people join the military they go outside their bubble 
just like I did. But it was easier for me to get used to it because I grew up in a 
diverse part of the country. I know there’s kids I went to boot camp with that 
never saw snow and I know there are kids I went to bo t camp with, I know this 
one kid from Kentucky he never saw an African American, you know he never 
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saw me, a brown person. There’s still people like that in this country and that’s 
OK. It just comes down to how you deal with your exp riences. Overall my 
experience is great.  
 
This observation speaks to the idea of the “Contact Hypothesis”. In the military, 
Tarek comes into contact with all sorts of people; he goes “outside [his] bubble”. At the 
same time he is the “other” for service member who have never encountered someone 
like him before. The military provides an environment where service members can meet 
and work with people different from themselves learning to think beyond stereotypes and 
us/them dichotomies.  
Contact occasionally required action on the part of my respondents to address 
stereotypes and misconceptions. Tarek reported using dialogue and humor to defuse tense 
situations and to educate those around him,  
Once people found out like ‘Oh you’re born in South Asia?’ ‘Yeah I was born 
there.’ It was like time to play 21 questions. I never shied away from anything. I 
told them I like the Yankees, I don’t know anything about cricket, I’d make little 
jokes like that. Sometimes it would defuse it. I think people, just being curious, 
would ask questions. 
 
Tarek is a practicing Muslim who, among other things, only eats halal40 meat,  
 
During boot camp all the meat wasn’t halal so I was basically vegetarian, so I lost 
a lot of weight. I got in shape so it was an advantage.  
 
Due to his work schedule, fasting during Ramadan did not require any 
accommodation, though he did discover how much he had previously been relying on the 
formal support of his family in maintaining the fast, 
[I] just did my 9 to 5, it was fine. It’s hard to do it solo I didn’t realize, that was 
the tough part because when I was growing up, mom wuld wake us all up, we’d 
crawl out of bed, stuff food in our face, pray and then go back to sleep. On my 
own it was all on me so of course it was tough, there were times when I wouldn’t 
                                                
40 When referring to meat, halal means that the animal was slaughtered in a specific manner according to 
Islamic custom. Some American Muslims eat only meat slaughtered under strict Islamic guidelines; others 
view all non-porcine meat as acceptable.  
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eat in the morning and fast without but you just get it done, just a part of being an 
adult I guess. 
 
Tarek felt that he was largely identified by others as being Muslim due to his 
name and his appearance,  
I have a very common [Muslim] name, very popular name, and obviously the way 
I look, so most people are like where are you from? Well I was born in South Asia 
but I grew up in New Jersey, and the first thing peopl  say, it still surprises it’s 
still pretty funny, they’re like ‘Wow you don’t have an accent.’ They associate 
South Asian people with the guy from The Simpsons.41 I came here with my 
family when I was five years old. I don’t think people get that. 
 
This again demonstrates the presence of the us/them framework. Tarek 
recognized that he was seen as “other” despite of his lack of an accent. Due to his name 
and appearance, he found that people made assumptions ab ut his differentness, 
associating him with a cartoon character who is largely defined by his “otherness”.  
Tarek also found that he was able to identify other Muslim service members by 
their names. When he came into contact with foreign xchange officers,  
I kind of befriended them when I was doing the medical coverage because I’d 
start writing his name down and I could tell right away he was from another 
country, he was kinda happy to see me, so we would all do Friday prayers 
together, it worked out.  
 
Interesting in Tarek’s narrative is the implicit sen  of us and them. The foreign service 
members, likely coming not just from South Asia butfrom throughout the Arab world 
and perhaps elsewhere, identify with Tarek. The similarities in their names, and the 
religious affiliation this communicates, form an instantaneous bond. Tarek reports that he 
knew “right away” and that these service members were “happy to see [him]”. That these 
foreign service member and Tarek recognized each other as members of the same in-
                                                
41 The character Dr. Apu Nahasapeemapetilon first appe red on the television show The Simpsons in 1990. 
An Indian immigrant with a Ph.D. in Computer Scienc, Apu works at the local convenience store and 
speaks with a strong accent. 
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group affirms the presence of the boundary between Muslim and non-Muslim in the 
military.  
Although he did witness anti-Muslim comments from other service members, 
Tarek does not report feeling targeted or treated in a discriminatory manner,  
There’s times where you feel uncomfortable but I think a lot of that was 
associated with people making remarks, the same type of rejudice, certain 
opinions that you get with people who weren’t in the military. For example 
someone making a remark about terrorists or someone making a remark about al-
Qaeda. All those negative things you hear on the news. It was never targeted 
towards me. I was always peer side by side.  
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter 6, the boundary between us/them is present in the 
military; here Tarek discusses occasionally finding himself in situations where he feels 
uncomfortable. However, even in these situations he does not feel excluded. While 
us/them is clear in these types of remarks, Tarek do s not feel targeted; he feels that he 
remains a peer. 
Tarek did report one particular situation where a patient had a negative interaction 
with him based on his identity as a Muslim. However, the event led to an increased sense 
of inclusion when his colleagues and superiors rallied around him, demonstrating the role 
of strong leadership in shaping the us/them environment. On this occasion, Tarek was 
working at night in the clinic, when a family came in with an ill child,  
I did have one patient be a little racist towards me. But the surprising thing was I 
just brushed it off. I was working in the pediatric clinic and I was checking in this 
lady’s daughter. And she looked at my name badge, she was friendly, she wasn’t 
angry towards me at all, and she’s like ‘Oh are youMuslim?’ So I said ‘Yeah I 
am,’ I didn’t hesitate, I said it with pride. And she was like ‘How radical are 
you?’ And I was taken aback because it is very shocking. And I just said ‘I’m not 
radical and all.’ And I just ignored her 
 
In this situation, the patient presumably identifies Tarek as “other” because of his name 
(perhaps in combination with his appearance). She then makes a comment that reflects an 
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acceptance of stereotypical conceptualizations of Muslims in which all Muslims are 
inherently “radical”. Shocked, Tarek ignores the incident until his superior addresses it 
with him later. 
The doctor I was working with was right next door and she heard the conversation 
so we were closing up the clinic and she was like, ‘Wow I’m really impressed 
how you handled that.’ And I said ‘What do you mean?’ And she said, ‘I would 
have been furious.’ 
 
The doctor, one of Tarek’s superiors, offers Tarek support, both informally by 
congratulating him for handling the situation well and also formally by suggesting that a 
formal grievance be filed. Tarek feels that this will only exacerbate the situation,  
my clinic manager wanted to file a grievance against thi  patient. I was like 
‘Whoa, time out.’ The last thing I want is this lady’s kids to hate me because they 
can’t go see their pediatrician. And I thought about it and everybody at work was 
like comforting me and they were like ‘Wow I can’t believe she said that.’ But I 
think it was just she chose her words very poorly and it's a shame […] I didn’t 
lose faith in people I actually gained faith in peole because all of my coworkers 
comforting me and supporting me, that was nice.  
 
By providing support to Tarek, and respecting his decision to drop the matter, Tarek’s 
superior is clearly modeling a commitment to maintaining a safe and diverse workplace. 
Tarek’s co-workers express their support of him after the incident, demonstrating the 
cohesion of this work unit. The support of his co-wrkers contextualized the stereotypes 
of one patient as a minority opinion, allowing Tarek to largely dismiss the incident. With 
the context of his colleagues’ support, Tarek begins to think of the incident as a situation 
of poorly chosen words, rather than anything more malicious. In focusing on the task of 
effectively providing healthcare to military families, the staff of the clinic drew together, 
supporting each other. 
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After the interview is finished, Tarek and I chat for a few minutes and he brings 
up the case of Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist who killed 13 fellow service 
members at Fort Hood, TX, 
When I heard about it I was at work, and it’s not like I was looking over my 
shoulder or anything; I think people around me were obj ctive enough to realize 
ok this guy has more things going on than being Muslim. He was also disturbed 
and angry and frustrated and he turned to this Imam [Anwar al-Awlaki]. I guess 
that’s just my way of thinking that it’s just like Timothy McVeigh and the guys at 
Columbine, it’s a common theme, someone is emotionally disturbed. I talk to 
people and they ask me ‘Hey what do you think?’ And I’m like he deserves the 
worst penalty. It’s a shame because he was supposed t  be the one consoling 
people, that’s the thing that frustrates me, ‘cause not only am I Muslim, but I’m in 
the medical community. It was like a double, triple hit for me.  
 
In the interviews, I intentionally did not mention the case of Hasan to see if respondents 
brought it up on their own; only two did. For Tarek, because Hasan was not just a 
Muslim but also in the medical field, the events at Fort Hood seem to be particularly 
salient. Consistent with the situation he experienced with the problematic patient 
however, the cohesion in clinic appears to be healty nd his co-workers are easily able 
to reject simple conceptualizations of us/them in order to acknowledge the complex 
combination of personal experiences, emotional problems, and opportunity that shaped 
the events at Fort Hood.  
 
NAJIB  
 Najib is currently serving, and has been for nine years. A military academy 
graduate, he currently works in a support position. Najib’s parents immigrated from 
South Asia and he was born in the United States. 
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 Najib joined the military for primarily occupational motivations; initially the 
military was his second choice after not getting onto the prestigious academic track he 
desired,  
I wanted to go to a magnet [high] school and I failed […] I was like what am I 
going to do with my life if I can’t get into a magnet school and go to Harvard or 
MIT and be a scientist or whatever. And then I somehow learned about the 
Academy and I saw all the opportunities that there was coming out of the 
Academy.  
 
 Although Najib’s motivation was largely occupational - to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by military service, he also expressed institutional motivations,  
the reason I wanted to go into the military was for that opportunity to serve and to 
have opportunity in general available to me. 
 
He also connects his motivations to popular media, as several others did, indicating 
embeddedness in American popular culture 
when I was little I played too many computer games, it was a flight simulation 
that sparked a little bit of interest, and then I read too many Tom Clancy books 
which sparked a little bit more interest and then I wanted to [join the military]. 
 
 Najib’s family viewed his decision to join the military as a deviation from their 
expectations,  
my brothers majored in engineering and my sister majored in neuroscience, and 
they all have decent careers in their fields, and here I am doing something 
completely off the ball, joining the service, and potentially going to war, and not 
coming home. So they were really against it. 
 
His family also had concerns about his safety,  
 
They were really against [me joining the military]. They said if you do this with 
the world in this kind of state, we’re afraid what’s going to happen, […] you’re 
going to get hurt  
 
Ultimately they accepted his decision. He notes, however, that his family would still 
prefer he resume the expected life course,  
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they still want me eventually to leave, like as soon as possible. ‘Eventually as 
soon as possible’, makes sense right. But that’s more because they want me to get 
on with my life and start a family, get married have kids, the things that they were 
raised to do. As South Asian guys, we’re supposed to go to school, get an 
education, get a job, get married, have kids, have a family. And so far I’ve got an 
education and I’ve got a job, so a little behind the curve. 
  
 Najib, as with most of my respondents, did not think that being Muslim had 
impacted his military career,  
maybe I’m naïve, but I don’t think people look at me as a Muslim I think they just 
look at me as another guy in the office.  
 
He observes that discussions of religion rarely came up within his unit,  
 
If it was a topic of conversation it was a topic of c nversation when we had free 
time, and we didn’t have a whole lot of time, we were mostly working. I don’t 
think that people were afraid to talk about it, I think it just didn’t matter at the 
time, in that environment. 
 
Najib’s narrative adds to the evidence that in a helt y unit that is not plagued 
with rumor, gossip, and suspicion, normal processes of cohesion incorporated Muslim 
service members, making this identity irrelevant. I this unit, leaders are apparently 
shaping an environment where work identity outweighs other identities.  
As a former cadet at one of the academies, Najib’s narrative provides a window 
into institutionalized religious accommodation. At the academy there were institutional 
preparations for Ramadan that facilitated the religious practice of Muslim cadets with a 
minimum of fuss or disruption, 
So at the academy they know that it’s coming; they prepare for it and are ready. 
The Food Service Officers have the guys prepare like a box lunch. […] And so we 
get that for breakfast. So we wake up in the middle of the night and eat and say 
our prayers. […] When the Muslims all had dinner at the academy we went to a 
separate room in the dining area and we ate dinner tog ther, the same dinner as 
everyone else we just didn’t have pork served to us. It was a good time. And then 
they also have those boxed lunches for morning there so we just take them to our 
rooms and we could eat it in our rooms in the morning.  




Najib commented on the way this institutional support shaped his religious practice. 
Accommodation being provided as a part of everyday life at the academy encouraged his 
observation of the fast. After leaving the academy, seeking religious accommodation and 
making preparations for the fast fell on him as an individual and he was more likely to 
forgo the practice.  
After the academy it was completely on us and there were years when I just didn’t 
fast. […] This past year, I did fast, and I did thefast because [I’m stationed in a 
Middle Eastern country and] this country is so supportive of fasting during 
Ramadan that it’s actually illegal to drink and eatin public during daylight hours.  
 
Granted, it is not the role of the military to enforce or encourage religious practice. 
However, what is interesting here is the clear illustration of the difference normalized 
institutional support can make. Najib’s narrative demonstrates that, at least for some, it 
does make a practical difference in whether or not support is provided and whether or not 
that support is normalized. By taking the initiative in providing boxed breakfasts for 
fasting cadets and providing a space for them to break their fast at the end of the day, the 
academy is communicating that this diversity is valued. Cadets who want to fast can 
easily do so without having to worry about potential repercussions of formally requesting 
accommodation from leadership with an unknown attitude towards Islam. 
 After leaving the academy, Najib had some mixed experiences, but eventually 
landed a position with a leader who he deeply respect . Najib clearly articulated the 
important role of leadership. He explains why strong leadership is important, and how it 
can create a sense of self-worth and positive military experiences  
The most proud thing that I can feel was knowing that our boss and the guys in 
command trusted us to do the jobs that we were doing that we are sometimes the 
only guys that could do the job that we were doing. That’s a good feeling when 
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your boss trusts you to do something, to go out on your own and do that, that’s 
something that’s very important.  
 
Najib wants to do his work well because he respects his commander, not because of 
extrinsic rewards or punishments offered by the leader. This is an illustration of strong 
leadership. Experiences with this commander shaped Najib’s view of his military service. 
Feeling appreciated, being given responsibility, and not being singled out for his identity 
made Najib feel like an integral member of his unit a d the military. 
Najib’s commander also goes out of his way to show respect and interest in 
Middle Eastern culture. At the time, Najib was serving in a Middle Eastern country 
(outside the war zone), and his commander, a non-Arab and a non-Muslim, made a 
conscious effort to learn about and respect the local culture, which had positive effects in 
building rapport locally, and also gave Najib a sense of pride in this leader,  
 [My superior’s] speech is very eloquent, he’s very well versed […]We’ve got 
some really good friends like our rug dealer, Abdul, […] They have conversations 
about Islam pretty regularly. Captain’s very curious about it and he knows quite a 
bit, and he’s learning Arabic a little bit, he practiced Arabic in his office and his 
kids are taking Arabic. His son is actually pretty good. So he comes from a very 
open-minded family I think. It’s kind of refreshing to have the personality that 
you’re working with every day.  
 
This normalization of cultural competence, the idea that even an officer in a leadership 
position will make the effort to learn another langua e and culture speaks volumes to his 
unit about the value of respecting and striving to understand the local culture. 
Interestingly, this level of everyday respect is occurring here in a unit that does not have a 
primary mission relating to language, culture, or intelligence.  
 




Pervez is a veteran with a seven year career in the military. A product of the 
ROTC system, Pervez served in the infantry and deploy d to Afghanistan where he was 
wounded. Pervez’s parents immigrated from South Asia and he was born in the United 
States. 
Pervez joined the military for largely occupational reasons, 
So I stopped by [the ROTC information desk], talked to them, and I found out 
more about the program […] They told me you can do it f r the first two years 
and we’ll pay for your tuition and you can walk away after two years if you 
decide not to serve. […] So I said, ‘Ok you’re going to pay for my tuition, teach 
me first aid and how to shoot a gun? I’m in, sign me up!’ 
 
Pervez’s parents were supportive of his decision. Though after he was wounded his 
parents became more concerned,  
I was wounded in my first deployment to Afghanistan and that really affected my 
mother. I had a second deployment I had to go on and they were more concerned 
for my safety at that point than anything else because the reality kinda hit of the 
nature of my job.  
 
After his initial tour of duty, Pervez’s parents started expressing the desire that Pervez 
continue his education, find a career, and start a family,  
when I told them that I wanted to extend my service they voiced some concern, 
not so much about my safety, but as any parents I guess they kinda wanted me to 
move on in my life, I was single at the time. They wanted me to further my 
education and come back. And they’d missed me ‘cause I’d been far away from 
home. They kinda wanted me to come back to you know “settle down” and 
choose a long term career path for myself.  
 
 In deciding to leave the military, Pervez considered family demands and the type 
of father he wants to be,  
I stayed single the entire time I was in the military. I knew I wanted to get married 
and have kids. As much as I loved my life in the military, I personally, especially 
being a Muslim, I didn’t really want to live married and family life while being 
active. And it’s not like the military is a bad place for Muslim married couples 
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‘cause I know Muslim married couples that were active duty and they had very 
strong marriage and stuff like that. But I watched the guys on my team, like on 
webcams, watching their kids open presents from the on Christmas, and it’s just 
like it’s a huge sacrifice that they made, but I just, I kinda look back at the way 
my parents raised me and my dad was always there whenever I needed him, and I 
wanted that for my wife and for my kids, so I made th  decision to leave the 
service. 
 
Pervez is a practicing Muslim, and one of the few in my sample who reported 
being public in his religious practice, “I prayed in front of my guys, they knew exactly 
what I was doing.” However, this wasn’t his usual approach; he preferred to pray in 
private, not wanting to be seen as “showing off” and seeing religion as a personal matter,  
For me it was like religion’s always been more of a personal thing, so I wouldn’t 
like go and deliberately pray in front of our men to show [off] 
 
Pervez recognized that the us/them boundary was activated following 9/11, but 
felt, as with most of my respondents, that it had little effect on him personally,  
I know it’s [discrimination] gone on, so I’m not going to deny that it doesn’t. But 
I never personally [experienced it]. I was always fairly confident in my faith. 
After September 11th you’d hear, sometimes you’d hear comments but it’d be 
more out of curiosity than anything else. And you’d be surprised the folks in the 
military now, where they’ve been, what they’ve seen, how much understanding 
they have of the Muslim faith and they can pretty easily distinguish between 
everyday Muslims and those that choose to use religion for bad reasons.  
 
Pervez has not personally experienced any negative effects of the activation of the 
us/them boundary. However, he does acknowledge that this boundary is present, saying 
that he can’t deny that anti-Muslim discrimination does occur. As with many of my 
respondents, Pervez reports hearing comments following 9/11, but unlike most of my 
other respondents who characterized at least some of th se comments as being negative, 
Pervez perceives them as results of curiosity not malice.  
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Also in contrast to most of my other respondents, Pervez feels that members of 
the military in particular are able to see beyond this dichotomy. Because Islam is relevant 
to the contemporary missions of the U.S. military, Pervez feels that service members 
have learned to think beyond generalization and engage with the complexity of the 
situations they face. This perspective stems from the positive experiences Pervez had 
with inclusion and diversity.  
Pervez’s leadership expressed the value they placed on diversity, and were happy 
to use his skills and background to their advantage, for example, after 9/11 
one of my unit commanders asked [me] to do a presentatio  on Islam, you know 
because a lot of people were very ignorant about what as going on, what was 
being said. So yeah, I’ve always been viewed as an asset in that regard and as an 
information source.  
 
Being actively viewed as an asset rather than with suspicion or as diversity to be 
“managed” demonstrates the value placed on diversity in this unit. In addition, in the 
field, Pervez took on a leadership role, reinforcing the value of diversity through his own 
leadership practices. As a practicing Muslim, Pervez continued to practice while 
deployed to Afghanistan where he found that his identity had benefits for the mission. He 
found that having a mosque on base was a useful tool for building rapport with local 
leaders and soldiers 
Whenever I got the chance I’d go, we actually had a sm ll mosque that was built 
on our base, mainly for the Afghan soldiers and local village elders to use but I’d 
go and pray with them.  
 
Although he went to the base mosque to fulfill religious duties not as a show to attract 
local attention, his presence created a chance to interact informally with Afghan soldiers 
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and civilians thereby building rapport while serving as a visible representation of the 
inclusiveness of the U.S. military.  
So when I walked in, being an Urdu speaker and also being Muslim, I mean one 
of the first things we do when we get on the ground is building what’s called 
rapport with your locals and also your Afghan National Army soldiers and it was 
instant for me. I mean they recognized my name, me being Muslim. I prayed with 
them and you know I met with the local villagers, introduced myself as 
Muslim...and especially when you’re talking about a country where some of the 
villagers don’t have any access to electricity, no TV, no internet, so you can 
imagine what their perception of America is. So me coming in and introducing 
myself as an American, as a Muslim, can have a hugeimpact. Saying that I 
understand the religion, I understand the cultural dynamics. It was amazing how 
much respect the Afghan National Army soldiers gave me as well the village 
leaders when I was there.  
 
Pervez encountered a population ignorant of America and cut off from global 
communications and information flow. As with Jamal, Pervez saw his presence as having 
“a huge impact”. He was not just able to quickly build rapport with local soldiers and 
leaders, but was able to serve as a representative of a diverse and inclusive military force 
and country in the face of stereotypes and myths about Americans and the U.S. military. 
At the same time, his success building rapport withthese locals provided an example for 
his unit of the value of having a diverse team.  
His identity as well as his cultural and linguistic competence helped Pervez build 
rapport with local soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan.  
no matter how much you get from the schoolhouse, nothi g can replace me. At 
that point I’d had 27 years being Muslim, being raised in a Muslim family, 
understanding things.42  
                                                
42 Despite his advantages, Pervez encountered situations that he was not prepared for, illustrating thatin-
group membership will not erase cultural and regional differences, “I was kinda shocked at, you know I’d 
say certain things to my team leaders about our religion, and the religious practice in Afghanistan ca be 
very different [laughs]. They’re like ‘they’re not really doing what you said’ and I was like ‘yeah dude, I 
don’t know what’s going on’ [laughs]. You know ‘cause it’s, I mean a very uneducated society; some of 
the things that they do it’s just like a lot of tribal influences on the things that they do. […] I’m sure you’ve 
seen the blend between culture and religion and just p t it on steroids and that’s what you get in 
Afghanistan [laughs].” 
 




As with Jamal, Pervez felt that growing up in a Muslim community gave him an 
advantage in interacting with the locals. 
 The value of diversity was reinforced by the success of this unit. Pervez and his 
team were very good at what they did,  
we were very very successful with our mission in our area in Afghanistan. We 
created an environment that was very peaceful. We basically achieved mission 
success in our 5 to 10 km radius.  
 
For the members of this unit, having a diverse team is something to be respected, 
something that contributes to their ability to complete the mission, and as an infantry unit 
in a war zone, success contributed to their personal safety. In a situation like this, the 
value of diversity is obvious and likely helped shape the irrelevance of us/them 
boundaries.  
While Pervez was seen as valuable to the military, he also recognizes the role his 
military service has played in his subsequent pursuit of a professional degree and 
employment,  
my military experience is plastered all over my resume, so it’s not like an official 
veteran hiring preference, but there’s no doubt that I got the current position I’m 
in because of my military experience on my resume. I’m absolutely certain that’s 
the reason why, that’s what kinda sets me apart from my peers is the military 
experience but it’s not just, I don’t think it’s just cause of a check mark that I’m a 
veteran, it’s because, again not to pound my chest, but I think I’m a very unique 
individual being Muslim in the military post 9/11. There aren’t too many of us 
like that. Yeah, it definitely helps. 
 
Like most of my respondents, while being a veteran w s personally meaningful, it 
was not something Pervez likes to brag about,  
I don’t pound my chest with it or anything, no. If people ask about it, or are 
curious, I’m more than happy to talk about it. It’sdefinitely something that I’m 
proud of as well, I’m not shy to talk about it. […] but I don’t, unless it comes up 
somehow in a conversation I don’t force it, or introduce it into the conversation 
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when it’s not really a part of the conversation. Unless I’m getting a discount 
somewhere, then I’ll drop it in a heartbeat [laughs]  
 
Joking about receiving veterans discounts was a fairly common response when I asked 
respondents if they were proud of their service. As with invoking popular culture media 
to explain joining the military, the reference to receiving discounts at restaurants and the 
like speaks to embeddedness in American culture. Unlike the Nisei Masaoka (1987) 
wrote about, my respondents don’t make a direct link between their military service and 
their citizenship; instead they respond with jokes about everyday things, demonstrating a 
sense of belonging.  
WEAK LEADERSHIP 
While most of my respondents had positive experiences in the military, Omar 
experienced negative events that he attributed to discrimination. In addition to these 
incidents, two respondents, Zafir and Sadia, reportd consistent conditions of suspicion 
and fifth column treatment. These respondents felt targeted because of their identity as 
Muslims and both of them spent substantial amounts of time during their military service 
under investigation. Both left the military extremely disappointed and with a negative 
view of their service and of the military in general. Basim had generally positive 
experiences, but his military career ended on a bitter note. Following 9/11 he felt targeted 
and treated with suspicion. This combined with a new leader who denied him religious 
accommodation he was accustomed to led him to leave the military. 
 
ZAFIR  
Zafir is a veteran with a four year career in the military. He joined the military 
with dreams of using his language and culture skills to help the U.S. military, but found 
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himself entangled in unit-level politics. He perceived himself to be singled out for 
negative treatment because of his religion and background. Feeling disgusted with the 
system, he left the military. Zafir immigrated to the United States from South Asia as an 
adult.   
 As was common among my sample, Zafir reported a sense of service as one of his 
main motivations for joining the military  
I wanted to do my part to serve the country and to utilize my knowledg , my skills 
and abilities about Middle Eastern and South Asian cultures [and] languages so I 
actually joined the military.  
 
His sense of service is not just a general sense of obligation or desire to give back, but is 
specifically based on his experience with cultures and language relevant to the current 
military missions.  
 Zafir also expressed secondary occupational motivation in the form of seeking 
expedited citizenship. He is the only one of my respondents to make this type of 
connection between his military service and formal citizenship  
I had green card and I wanted to get my citizenship expedited. So that was another 
reason for me to join the military. 
 
 For Zafir and his family, military service was seen as positive, and related to ideas 
of heroism and American-ness,  
my mom felt pretty good because she knew that her son was gonna be a hero. She 
loved the United States 
 
 Zafir clearly articulated the view that having a diverse military was crucial to 
maintaining social legitimacy. In this view, having practicing Muslim service members in 
the U.S. military serves as proof of multiculturalism and religious tolerance in the United 
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States; it also supports executive claims that the current operations target terrorism not 
Islam. Zafir argued,  
I think I should work here so that I can stop peopl like Osama bin Laden and 
people of al-Qaeda and Taliban in their propaganda that the United States is 
fighting a war against Islam and Muslims. 
 
He also articulated his sense that inclusion is an important tool against radicalism,  
It’s very important to impose the EO policies and to make sure that those Muslims 
who are serving in the military are not called Talib n or Al-Qaeda, like I was […] 
We have to learn from previous experiences. I gave them an example of 7/7 
bombing in London.43 I told them that those people who committed that act they 
were born in the United Kingdom, […] and the terrorism experts [think] that most 
probably were suffering from identity crisis because [they were] born and raised 
there and they have a feeling in general that they ar  not treated like the white 
British people. So it becomes easy for the radicals to recruit them and tell them 
hey these people hate you because you’re a Muslim, o they go against their own 
country. My fear is that this may happen in the military. If they don’t control and 
impose the EO policies we may end up seeing something like 7/7. And, the fear 
came true when I heard about the Fort Hood shooting and the person who did it he 
said that he was discriminated against. 
 
In addition to a consideration of the practical importance of inclusion as a method 
of preventing future attacks from “homegrown terrorists”, Zafir also addresses the 
willingness of al-Qaeda to accept followers based on ideology rather than ethnicity or 
background, 
 [I was] helping the United States with the education I got, not because I wanted 
to get something but to do my part to serve the country. How was [the] United 
States gonna win the war against an enemy who doesn’t care about the skin color, 
about the country of national origin, about the English accent of a California-born 
white American, Adam Gadahn or John Walker [Lindh, and Richard] Reid.44 
Because those people they, even though they are evil people, but they are very 
sincere to their cause. And I was not finding a lot of sincerity with the people I 
was working with.  
                                                
43 On July 7, 2005 four western-born terrorists carried out suicide attacks on London public transit killing 
52 civilians and injuring 700 others.  
44 Adam Gadahn is a California-born convert to Islam who adopted an extreme ideology and is now a 
propagandist for al-Qaeda. Richard Reid is the “shoe b mber”, a Briton who attempted to bomb a flight in 
December 2001. John Walker Lindh is an American citizen who was captured in 2001 in Afghanistan 
fighting with al-Qaeda. 




For Zafir, trying to fight an enemy that is willing and able to make use of diverse forces 
requires that the U.S. military learn how to effectively include diverse service members 
in the force.  
Zahir worked in a language and culture specialty and found that he had to begin 
by educating those he worked for on the very basics of the region,  
When I joined the program I actually found that peol  didn’t know most of the 
things, like they thought that Afghanistan was an Arab country. I was the first 
person who told them that it’s not an Arab country. Was it a Middle Eastern 
country? I said No, it’s actually a South Asian country.  
  
As with Kareem, Zafir felt that activation of us/them boundaries created a sense 
of monolithic other, Zafir articulates how this facet of us/them can negatively affect 
military effectiveness in the planning stages. The idea that Muslim counties and 
populations in the Middle East and South Asia are indistinguishable was something Zafir 
speaks here about encountering. Later in our discussion he recalled having to explain that 
different languages were spoken throughout Pakistan complicating recruiting projects as 
only speakers of certain languages were needed.  
Zafir felt that while working for a specific commander he was consistently treated 
differently than his colleagues. He felt that this treatment was a result of his identity,  
The most negative experience, I felt, was the mindset of the people. […] They do 
their best to punish that person in order to remind him that if he doesn’t belong to 
their race, or their skin color, or their life as child he is wrong. 
 
He elaborated on the various mistreatments he perceiv d which included job instability, 
assignments that wasted his skills, and accusations of misconduct and disloyalty.  
Due to the nature of his job, Zafir could either be assigned to his post for an 
extended term, or he could be renewed monthly. His commander chose the latter leading 
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Zafir to feel that his job was unstable and not knowi g from month to month where he 
would be working. Due this uncertainty, Zafir was uncomfortable committing the 
resources to move closer to his workplace, and so commuted 90 minutes each way, 
since I was not sure about stability of [my] job, I didn’t move, and I was driving 
back and forth every day, back and forth. I had no life. 
 
Zafir reported that this commander called him names,  
 
[My commander] once called me a Taliban and once he told me that I was trying 
to infiltrate the military. 
 
Unlike other examples of name calling my respondents recount, these comments 
seemed to reflect a breakdown in unit cohesion, rathe  than friendly ribbing among 
colleagues. Most notably, these comments are different because they came from Zafir’s 
commander rather than from peers or in the context of basic training.  
Zafir also felt that his commander was actively targeting him for negative 
treatment. In addition to name calling, Zafir reports that he was regularly ordered to take 
on tasks outside his job duties, including babysitting and assembling furniture, 
[My commander] was trying to do something so that I get frustrated and I 
disrespect him. I didn’t do it. He told me to make shelves, I made them, even 
though they were not related to [my job] at all.  
 
Subsequently, Zafir was accused by a co-worker of sexual harassment  
 
she started flirting with me. […] So I started flirting back. And then she 
introduced me to another female, and they both were flirting with me. Then one 
day I got a call from my First Sergeant in the unit. She said that somebody filed a 
sexual harassment complaint against you.  
 
The complaint was taken to a higher jurisdiction and Zafir was required to appear before 
a board where charges of disloyalty were added, 
I was shocked to hear what they say. They said that this guy he was flirting with 
us and not only this, but he came to us and told us that he didn’t get deployed, that 
I didn’t get deployed because I support the insurgents.  




 Zafir tried to counter claims that he supported the insurgents by pointing out the 
logical inconsistency in accusing him of both sexual misconduct and of sympathizing 
with an organization known for its violently conservative sexual views.  
And I said ‘How is it possible? A guy who is married, ok, not even single, and 
he’s flirting with not one but two females at the same time and he supports those 
insurgents who are religious radicals and they beata man in public if somebody’s 
just guilty of looking at a woman who’s not his wife.’ 
 
 Eventually the accusations of Zafir’s disloyalty were dropped, though Zafir 
continued to pursue the matter,  
I actually filed a complaint against those females, that what they made was a false 
accusation  
 
Zafir presented his complaints to a Colonel who tried to mollify him,  
 
when I appeared before a full-bird Colonel, he toldme ‘Ok, forget all these 
things, tell me what I can do for you.’ […] he told me that majority of people in 
the United States are so ignorant, we go to France, Germany and talk to them in 
English expecting they be able to speak English, so e said that this is a problem 
in our country, people are ignorant. It’s not ignorance. False accusations were 
made, it was pre-planned. 
 
Despite the apparent support of some elements of the command structure, Zafir 
reports that problems remained with his immediate commander. Zafir reports that this 
particular leader had a history of problematic encounters with non-white soldiers,  
One time he actually verbally abused the security personnel in the garage because 
they were African Americans […] And he had a weird excuse all the time, he 
used to tell me that he was white and he worked at [redacted] which is 
predominately black and he was always discriminated [against]. So I said, Sir, I 
wasn’t the person who was discriminating against you, why should you 
discriminate against me? 
 
This suggests that this particular commander may have been a “destructive leader” (Reed 
and Bullis 2009) or at the very least, a leader uninterested in supporting diversity. In this 
situation, Zafir’s treatment may have more to do with general prejudices of this leader 
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than with his Muslim identity; that it, if Zafir had been non-white but Christian, he may 
still have been singled out for negative treatment, as these guards were. However, that the 
reported mistreatment took the form it did reflects the activation of us/them boundaries – 
in another historical moment it is unlikely he would have been called “Taliban”.  
 For Zafir, the final straw came when he felt his family was being dragged into the 
conflict. At the time Zafir lived with his mother. After the charges against Zafir were 
dismissed, he reports that his commander made repeated demands that Zafir and his 
mother host him at their home, 
The worst thing that happened was that he insisted [I] tell my family members to 
invite him at my home. and I told my mother, my mother says ‘That sounds kinda 
weird, why should we invite him?’ And he was continuously insisting […] And I 
said ‘If it was my home I could invite you, my mom is not ready for this.’ And he 
said, ‘Do you live at your mother’s home or your mother lives at your home?’ I 
said ‘She’s my mother, I’m her son, it doesn’t matter who lives at whose home 
and who’s paying the money.’ […] he said ‘No you have to invite me.’ I said ‘Ok, 
I can try I will ask my mother if she does that’s okay.’ And he did it seven times. 
[…] my mother was so frustrated. She was so angry. She said that he is treating us 
like slaves because my mother doesn’t fall under th chain of command, I’m the 
person who falls under the chain of command. […] he told me that it was never an 
order, but he told me that you gotta do it. 
 
Zafir eventually enlisted the help of the EO office. Ultimately his commander was 
ordered to stop this behavior, though Zafir was angered to find out that his commander 
was subsequently relocated and then promoted,  
I found out that that Captain who mistreated me, mistreated my family members 
[…] was promoted in rank from Captain to Major just after that formal complaint 
in which they acknowledged the fact that what he did by harassing my family 
members were wrong, they said that he was gonna take the cultural classes. I said 
it’s not a cultural issue, it’s a human rights issue. 
 
Zafir’s negative experiences took a toll on his health, 
 
I got so frustrated at that time, I got so sick I couldn’t sleep for three days, I went 
to the hospital; they gave me medication. That was the first time that happened to 
me that I experienced insomnia and it was terrible. 




 Zafir is not a regularly practicing Muslim, he explains, “I practice my religion 
[only] in Ramadan […] otherwise I didn’t even pray.” So to the extent that these issues 
were motivated by his identity, it was a conceptualization of an “other” based on skin 
color, national origin, and associations with religion, rather than actual religious 
practices. This is the idea that it is the label of Muslim that is salient, not religiosity. Zafir 
explicitly linked his treatment to his identity as perceived by others. Zafir perceived 
himself as fully American,  
since I wanted to become an officer I got rid of the citizenship of the country 
where I was born and raised. and I didn’t consider myself [foreign nationality] 
anymore.  
 
Zafir left the military due to these experiences and the opinions of his mother and wife,  
 
When I joined the military I had so many things in my mind that I would help the 
United States. […]  So I wanted to utilize those things but all my time was wasted 
in proving myself right and refuting other people’s false accusation. […] So I 
mean this was really frustrating, and so after that I actually had no choice but 
because of my family pressure I went to ETS out of military.   
 
 Zafir was one of the few respondents who reported extremely negative 
experiences. Throughout his service he felt that he was treated unfairly and that his 
unique skills and knowledge were wasted. Ultimately his led him to leave the military 
and left a very negative impression of military service for himself and his family. Many 
of Zafir’s negative experiences stemmed from interactions with a particular leader who 
Zafir notes may be generally prejudiced against racial nd ethnic minorities. This leader 
himself creates problems for Zafir, but also fosters a culture of suspicion in the unit.  
 




 Unlike Zafir, Sadia is a practicing Muslim. However, as a white convert Sadia is 
not automatically seen as Muslim due to her name or appearance. Rather she is identified 
by her religious practice and public identification as a Muslim. Sadia left the military 
after a five year career. Trained as a linguist, Sadia converted to Islam while in the 
service. After a hostile split from her husband, he accused her of being a terrorist, and she 
spent the following two years under investigation. Her security clearance was revoked 
and she was reassigned to administrative work. She remarried, and her new husband was 
also treated with suspicion for his connection to her. Sadia was eventually offered the 
opportunity to leave the military early, and did so.   
 Sadia joined the military on a whim after high school and intended to stay for a 
career. Sadia is a good example of what Ginexi, Miller, and Tarver (1995) refer to as a 
“Flounderer”. Based on in-depth interviews exploring motivations to join the military, 
they identified institutional and occupational motiva ons, but also identified “Flouderers” 
which they describe as, “the visit to the recruiter and subsequent decision to enlist was 
completely unplanned and extremely abrupt. These individuals’ goals were very unclear 
[…] these individuals appeared to have been waiting for something to happen in their 
lives yet had lacked the initiative or motivation to alter their present situations” (9). 
Sadia’s description of her decision to join the military fits this conceptualization,  
It was sorta random, and I woke up one day and decided to do it. It was the best 
and worst decision I ever made [laughs], but it worked out in the end.  
 
Sadia generally fit in well with the military lifestyle. She had family members 
who had served and was familiar with the demands of military life, though she does not 
attribute her decision to join to the family history,  
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when I was little I wanted to join the military cause my mom was in the military 
before I was born and my dad was in the military. I mean a lot of people when 
they ask me why I joined the military I would cite that, ‘Oh it’s just a family 
tradition,’ when really I just woke up that day was like you know, it’s a Tuesday, 
I think I’m gonna join the military.  
 
Sadia enjoyed the language training she received in the military, and like many of 
my other respondents enjoyed the way the military broadened her horizons, including 
introducing her to her current husband. Despite her early positive experiences, Sadia’s 
Muslim identity was taken as evidence of her untrustworthiness. Sadia spent two years 
under investigation during which time she was removed from her skilled position, lost her 
security clearance and was given temporary secretarial work. The investigation began 
after her ex-husband made a false report following a domestic dispute:  
He was upset, he was very angry and then I gave him all his stuff back […] and I 
gave him back his ring and so he was very angry, and he went in to the 
commander the next day and said I was a terrorist. 
 
At the end of an all-night shift, Sadia was told to report to her commander. Thinking it 
was to receive praise for an extraordinary test score she had recently received (“I had like 
the best test score that they had ever on that test”), she was shocked when her commander 
accused her of disloyalty, 
Like ‘Oh you know you’ve been doing this and you’ve b en doing that so we’re 
putting you under special investigation’ and stuff like that and I’m like what!?! 
Like me seriously shaking. They escorted me off the base and that was pretty 
much the beginning of the end for me.  
 
She was confused and in a state of disbelief 
The investigation was horrible ‘cause I didn’t really grasp that they were serious. 
They were accusing me of funneling information and stuff to the enemy and 
clearly I’m not doing that. I know that, and they know that I wasn’t doing it 
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During the course of the investigation, Sadia was under surveillance, noticing strange 
cars following her, “And then later I’d see the pictures of myself doing random things.” 
After she was removed from her job, rumors began flourishing.  
it was hilarious. [My colleagues said] I got sent to Guantanamo, I was in 
Levenworth, I went crazy and was in an institution. […] ‘cause I wasn’t allowed 
back, I just disappeared one day and so you know the rumor mill. I was still in the 
dorms though! Those people lived there, like how did they not see me? 
 
 Despite having planned to make the military a career, this experience convinced 
Sadia to leave the military and left her with negative feelings about the military, 
I signed for 6 [years] originally cause I assumed that I’d stay in forever, that I’d 
stay in until they kicked me out ‘cause I was too old and crusty. And yeah, so I 
love them a little less now.  
 
 Like Zahir, the stress of being under suspicion also had negative health effects,  
I was having panic attacks, I’d forget where I was; I’d forget where I lived. I 
would completely black out, you could ask me what pl net I was on and I’d not 
be able to tell you. 
 
As with Zafir, specific leadership seems to play a central role in Sadia’s story. 
Without knowing the details of the investigation from the military’s point of view, the 
decision to conduct the investigation, place Sadia under surveillance, remove her from 
her skilled job, and push her out of the military seems extreme, and likely the result of 
particular attitudes from leadership/climate of unit. 
Zafir reported that his commander had a history of treating non-white soldiers 
negatively, suggesting a general climate of intolerance, Sadia also observed troubling 
tendencies in the atmosphere of her unit suggesting that weak leadership may have been 
an issue. She noted that other religious minorities, such as Mormons were also singled 
out for negative treatment,  
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I mean it’s not exclusive to Muslims, like I worked with a Mormon girl, […] she 
took a lot of abuse. […] they hated her because she was Mormon and you know 
they were otherwise generic Christian or probably not practicing or anything, but 
since you’re not their flavor they are angry about it. And so before I came she was 
public enemy #1. 
 
 While hiding prayer was a common theme in my data, Sadia used her in-limbo 
status to make her prayers public.  
I’m like whatever. I’m already under investigation; they’re claiming they think 
I’m a terrorist, what else are they going to do? So I’d pray at work, just get my 
little rug out and bam right there in the middle, which upset a lot of people. At the 
last place I got farmed out to, there was one guy I could tell it really bugged him. I 
was like whatever I don’t care about you. 
 
Using prayer as a way to discomfit people as an act of resistance speaks to the idea that it 
“should” be hidden. Since the military is not a secular institution where the discomfort 
would be expected from any religious expression, this suggests that certain expressions of 
faith are encouraged over others. That salah can be used to create discomfort also 
demonstrates the presence of us/them and supports my suggestion that salah has negative 
associations for some non-Muslims.  
 
BASIM 
Another example of the role of leadership in shaping the environment and 
acceptance of Muslim service members were the experiences of Basim. Basim is a 
veteran who spent 22 years as a linguist for the military. He has served in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Basim joined the military due to difficulties finding stable 
employment. Although he enjoyed most of his career, Basim reported that after 9/11 the 
atmosphere changed, and upset with institutionalized suspicion in his unit and difficulties 
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getting religious accommodation, he decided to retire. Basim immigrated to the United 
States from the Middle East as a teenager to pursue hi  education.  
Basim joined the military for occupational reasons. Unable to find steady 
employment, Basim decided that the military was his be t option,  
I didn’t have a job and I work[ed] from fast food restaurant to fast food restaurant 
and nobody [was] hiring, almost like we have now. Then I decided to go ahead 
and join the military. At least there was something stable. […] I was living on my 
own, trying to make rent, and the car payments and everything else and I was 
struggling, so finally I joined the military and it worked out for me. 
 
For Basim, 9/11 was a defining moment in his military career. Up until this point 
he had enjoyed his military service, and intended to stay not just to retirement at 20 years, 
but for a full 30 years. However, in his view, 9/11 changed the way he was perceived and 
treated,  
I’m proud to be a veteran. It was a good life, it was a good experience, and I’ll 
never forget it, even with the negative at the end of it, you can’t expect life to go 
by with everything good in it. Bad and good. I’d say, out of the 22 years, 20 was 
good. 
 
Following 9/11, Basim reported being treated with suspicion and he was even 
asked to report to the base security office where h was questioned, 
 It wasn’t bad ‘til September 11th, then they start looking at us different. 
Generalizing everybody. Even the people who you care for and work with and 
know you all this time, they start looking at you in a different way, like 
suspicious. I noticed that a lot of times it seemed like we were watched, we were 
asked to report to the [security office] and they question us: what’s your life, who 
you know, who you don’t know, what do you know. A lot of things that make you 
feel like you’re not part of the unit, not part of the [military]. I contacted other 
Muslims and they say they went through the same thing and that’s why I was 
really upset then because I’d been in the [military] for almost 20 years, and some 
guy just been in the military for three years he qustioned my integrity and my 
patriotism asking me question like that: do you know what is a sleeper cell? I’m 
familiar with that, I’m military, we study it. […] so then I retired […] because of 
the treatment. Prior to September 11th everything was outstanding, you feel like 
you’re part of the country, part of the military, you’re doing your job, you’re 
doing your part, everybody like an intricate machine. Then on September 11th 
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they start looking at us in a different light, even though they know me for almost 
20 years, know my work, my integrity, everything I do for the country, and they 
start putting you in a questionable place. 
 
In Basim’s narrative we can see his sense of belonging crumble. Before 9/11 he 
reports, his service made him feel like a part of something bigger, a part of the nation. 
The suspicion with which he is treated following 9/11 erodes this sense of belonging, 
leaving him feeling like he no longer belongs. Basim’  narrative also speaks to the 
expectation that military service will be understood t  express citizenship. He is affronted 
at the temerity of questioning his loyalty in the face of his 20 years of service, suggesting 
that he might see questioning as acceptable under oth conditions. He clearly sees his 
service as expressing his loyalty and when he is que tioned despite this, he is insulted. 
Despite the negative treatment, Basim found support among his colleagues, 
But a lot of the people I worked with who’ve known me all these years, they 
stood up with me and they were ready to do anything possible to stop the 
interrogation and stop the questioning. 
 
His long career prior to 9/11 may have contributed to a breakdown of prejudice through 
extended contact. Colleagues who had worked with him were less likely to accept the 
us/them suspicion of him; their personal knowledge of him trumped overriding ideas 
about the untrustworthiness of others. 
 Although Basim felt that the whole military atmosphere changed following 9/11, 
it was a change in leadership and the denial of religious accommodation that he was 
accustomed to that was the final straw. Having been gra ted permission to leave work to 
pray, especially to attend congregational prayers on Friday afternoons, throughout his 
career, Basim was shocked when a new commander denied his request,  
 [my commander] said ‘No, I can’t let you go to Friday prayer, and I can’t allow 
you to do this and do that’ so I continued praying but I had to hide it. I pray 
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whenever he goes somewhere, I pray when he’s not around […] I felt like I’m not 
even a human being if you can prevent me from praying, and I had to hide myself 
behind the curtains just to do the prayer. I felt like this is not America, this is not 
the country I came to, the country I love, the country I respect and [it] made me 
have a negative tone about the whole thing. I mean it’s ot right. But I can’t do 
anything because everybody’s looking at us in a different light now. 
 
More than just seeking privacy, Basim reports having to literally hide himself in order to 
pray. For Basim, being denied the right to pray wasa blow against his sense of 
belonging. Beyond the questioning which he reported ma e him feel like he no longer 
belonged in the military, the denial of accommodations to pray makes him feel like he 
has been excluded from the nation, and denied his humanity, “I felt like I’m not even a 
human being”. These experiences directly influenced Basim’s decision to leave the 
military, 
I was planning on staying to the end, ‘til almost 30 years, whatever I can stay. 
Like I said, people who come in new, three years in, because of their job with the 
[security office] or something asking you about your integrity. I have a Master’s 
Degree and it’s like somebody coming first year in college question your job, how 
you teach or how something and it’s not right, it’s not what I expected from the 
military. Even though I love it so much, and I still do. 
 
Despite his negative experiences at the end of his service, after leaving the 
military Basim recognized that the military provided a level of protection absent in 
civilian society,  
it’s a big time adjustment. Just like going from a controlled area, a fish bowl, to 
an open sea where you can be a target to anybody and ou can’t do anything 
about it. [If] Anybody in the military called me names I would have just go to unit 
commander and he would reprimand them. Here people scream at you in the 
streets, calling you names, but you can’t do anythig about it. If you call the 
police and say ‘Hey this guy said, you know, called me names.’ ‘Well we can’t do 
anything about it unless he threatened your life.’ And that’s an adjustment, yes. 
[…] It was hard for the first couple of years, and now I’ve adjusted to the people 
around you here, you know, say things to you. In the military nobody ever called 
you a ‘Sandnigger’ or anything, but here my kids in chool, they are called names 
and stuff, whereas this is not in the military, it’s not part of the military. 
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The institutional protections offered by formal EO policies and a clear chain of 
command provided a protected environment (a fish bowl versus the open sea). While 
us/them clearly permeated Basim’s unit following 9/11, there were still lines that were 
not crossed and a clear system of redress.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The cases presented here clearly demonstrate the difference leadership and 
institutional support can make in the experiences of individuals. The examples of positive 
experiences provided by Tarek, Najib, and Pervez ar also examples where diversity is 
valued by leadership and actively supported. Tarek encounters a manifestation of us/them 
as he goes about his job; however the supportive response of leadership and his 
colleagues allows him to contextualize this incident as exceptional. Najib considers the 
way institutional support shaped his religious practice and also discusses an example of 
good leadership that is deeply invested in diversity. This leader is greatly respected by 
Najib. Pervez provides an example of diversity being seen as an asset. His ability to 
interact successfully with locals in Afghanistan makes it clear to his unit that diversity 
has practical value, and promotes a context where diversity is valued and because of this 
value supported.  
 On the other hand, Zafir, Sadia, and Basim all leave the military following 
negative experiences. As my respondents with the most negative experiences, it is 
interesting to note the central role specific leaders play in each case. Zafir feels targeted 
and singled out by a specific leader for intentionally negative treatment, including name 
calling. Sadia finds herself under formal investigation after her commander accepts 
accusations made against her by her ex-husband. Basim de cribes a situation where a 
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change in leadership had dramatic effects on his experiences. After two decades of 
service in which his identity as a practicing Muslim had little effect on his experiences, a 
new commander and post-9/11 tensions lead Basim to feel that he is being unjustly 
targeted for questioning and surveillance. He takes this as a personal affront given his 
long and loyal service. When his new commander denies him religious accommodation 
he is accustomed to having, Basim decides it is time o leave the military.  
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CHAPTER 8: EXPRESSING AND NEGOTIATING CITIZENSHIP 
 
 Military service and citizenship are closely connected. I entered the project 
expecting to find that Muslims were using military service as a way to make citizenship 
claims as Japanese Americans did during World War II. However, this is not supported 
by the data. Few of my respondents made direct connections between their military 
service and citizenship. While my respondents are not using military service to make 
claims of citizenship, citizenship is still a relevant frame for understanding their 
narratives and deeply shapes their decisions to serve and the centrality of dialogue in their 
narratives.  
 My respondents are not serving in order to make citizenship claims, but a sense of 
patriotism and national belonging shapes the motivations of many to join. These 
institutional motivations speak to the central role f ideas of citizenship in the military 
service of my respondents. My respondents also actively negotiate space in which they 
are recognized as both Americans and Muslims in a context where these identities are 
often assumed to be in conflict. This can be seen in the frequency with which my 
respondents speak of engaging in dialogue and education and the explicit role of “bridge 
builder” taken on by some respondents.  
 These themes can be seen in many of the narratives lready presented. In this 
chapter, I present three narratives that specifically illustrate this theme. Yusuf, a combat 
soldier, articulates institutional motives, engages in everyday negotiations and is valued 
by his unit for this and relates a story of his parents using his military service. Hakim sees 
it as a responsibility to engage in dialogue and takes his decision to educate those around 
him very seriously. He builds bridges both with other service members and with locals in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. Rahma is very clear in making the connection between valuing the 
United States and choosing the serve in the military. She also engages in active dialogue 
and education and sees herself explicitly as a bridge builder 
 
YUSUF  
 Yusuf is one of several respondents who served in an active war zone. As a 
member of the infantry, Yusuf had the most direct combat experience of my respondents. 
Raised in South Asia, Yusuf immigrated to the United States as a teenager and joined the 
military out of high school. Yusuf decided to join the military for a variety of reasons, 
including the sense of service that I have already outlined,  
It was a collection of factors. I wasn’t sure what I wanted to do. I was always 
fascinated by the military. And thought as a Muslim I had something to contribute 
back. 
 
As I have already discussed, the articulation of institutional motivations speaks to the 
ways my respondents see themselves as Americans. Yusuf serves because he feels he 
should “give back”. He does not see the decision to join the military as a way to prove 
himself, rather it is a natural extension of his sense of citizenship.  
Yusuf also mentions the role of media in his decision to join the military, 
speaking to his embeddedness in American popular cuture,  
I was like show me some videos, I was really motivated. I saw Full Metal Jacket 
[laughs]. That was it. 
 
 Yusuf felt that the context of the current conflicts made his Muslim identity 
visible,  
 You were certainly aware that you’re Muslim, especially ‘cause of the conflicts. 
But if the conflicts weren’t happening it would not be an issue at all. 
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Yusuf felt that his colleagues identified him as Muslim from his name, however, as with 
many other respondents, he felt that it didn’t change how he was treated,  
As soon as they saw my name tag [they knew I was Mulim], but it was just like 
being part of any unit, I never had a problem. […] I think it’s no matter who you 
are as long as you perform that’s how you’re gonna be known. You sleep with 
them, train with them, do almost everything with them. You become sort of a 
family. You don’t feel like you’re different.  
 
This is another example of the power of strong leadership and unit cohesion to replace 
us/them identities with a strong sense of in-group membership. Yusuf identifies the unit 
as “sort of a family”, and because he is contributing his fair share, he is fully included. In 
this case, group identity overpowers other possible sources of identity. The context of 
being a combat unit may also shape the importance of acti ns in building trust. In the war 
zone, Yusuf’s unit had a clear shared goal – stay alive. In the face of this overwhelming 
shared goal, differences in race, national origin, and religion lose importance. The group 
becomes highly cohesive not because members are similar to each other, but because they 
are working towards the same goals, and the more succe sful they are, the greater trust 
they have in each other. This trust and camaraderie makes meaningless abstract 
distinctions between us and them and increases Yusuf’s sense of belonging. 
Yusuf experienced times when his identity as a Muslim was verbally used against 
him, but he perceived this to be a part of hazing tradi ions and saw it as equivalent to the 
treatment received by his colleagues, and therefore as a sign of inclusion,45  
One time in bootcamp I did get hazed and the drill instructor was like ‘Are you 
part of al-Qaeda or something’ and he was going off on me. But he’d go off on 
other people you know, that you look funny. So I don’t think he specifically did 
that to me but I remember that happening like once or twice when I was getting 
hazed, doing push-ups and they were shouting in my face. They try to break you 
down so they might have thought let’s break him down this way.  
                                                
45 This is description is in line with observations that it is common in military basic training for recuits to 
be identified by unique physical characteristics (for example see Field 2006). 




 Yusuf ties this experience into the process of becoming a soldier. In this context, 
the harassment is an indicator of full belonging. He was not treated differently, or 
excluded from this process of hazing that he sees as ultimately leading to being a member 
of this elite, cohesive group. 
 As a member of the infantry, Yusuf deployed multiple times to the combat 
theatre. His primary characterizations of combat are confusion and senselessness,  
We would go into the city, different houses, just lost. At times getting frustrated, 
throwing things around, getting angry at the Iraqis. ‘Cause there’s [different] 
personalities within your unit, so you know some have  breaking point, a 
threshold for confusion, less than others. It was a different, I mean, I guess I’m 
trying to get at it’s a, it was a very weird experience in its own right. I would not, 
if I had the option, go through it again.  
 
Things happen for no reason, like your buddy gets blown up, dies in front of you. 
Like what the hell. One minute he’s laughing, next minute he steps on an IED and 
he’s dead. 
 
When ordered to deploy again, Yusuf was reluctant, but expressed an institutional 
commitment to the ideas of service and duty,  
I was reluctant to go back, but as a solider I knew that I had a duty and I wanted 
to complete my duty to the best of my abilities. I didn’t agree with it but it’s 
politics and it’s not the first war or the last war. I just try to keep my hands clean. 
You know don’t shoot until you’re shot at, no innocents, so I had my own moral 
ethics I tried to follow. And I think for the most part I did it and I’m proud of that.  
 
Yusuf drew heavily on his faith to cope with the stre s of combat,  
I would pray a lot. But not physical like five time prayer. In my heart. Just say 
some of the common prayers, the small prayers in the Qur’an that I knew by 
heart, and God would always be on my mind going on missions, you know, don’t 
let this man be killed on my hands, protect me and my unit too. Things like that.  
 
Religious practice has long been recognized as a part of war and a response to 
stress. Military historian John Keegan (1976) discus es the role of prayer and religious 
preparation in medieval battle. For example, before the battle of  Agincourt in 1415 
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“[King] Henry himself heard Mass three times in succession before the battle, and took 
Communion, as presumably did most of his followers” (115). Keegan argues that 
religious observance is a vital part of preparation for battle. Watson (2006), who 
examined combat resilience among British and German troops in World War I, found that 
faith on the battlefield tends to have more to do with a sense of spiritual connection with 
divinity than formalized religious traditions. Yusuf articulates this in distinguishing his 
battlefield religious practice from the formal ritual of salah (five daily prayers).  
In their study of American soldiers in World War II, Stouffer et al found that 
prayer was a common strategy for coping with combat (Stouffer et al 1949). While it is 
not always clear what was meant by “prayer”, the men regarded it as a “very important 
source of support” (173). Stouffer et al compare the frequency of respondents indicating 
prayer “helped a lot” with the perceived usefulness of four other adjustments (“couldn’t 
let the other men down”, “you had to finish the jobin order to get home again”, “hatred 
for the enemy”, “what we are fighting for”). They find that the majority of respondents 
rate prayer as helping a lot. They argue, “Reliance on prayer obviously had other roots in 
addition to extreme stress – for instance, the beliefs to which the men had been educated. 
[…] But the data establish a definite relationship between stress and reliance on prayer” 
(184-5). 
The role of religion in the reintegration and healing process of veterans has 
recently begun to be discussed as well. Bosworth (2008) argues that, “Religious traditions 
appear to be a valuable but underutilized resource in the treatment of veterans” (245). He 
argues that existing research on PTSD focuses on things done to or witnessed by the 
soldier, but disregards the psychological stress of killing and the effects of feelings of 
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guilt for actions in combat. Bosworth uses the biblical term “bloodguilt” to describe this 
sense of post-combat guilt. Cook (2009) sees PTSD as an issue for psychology and 
psychiatry but also as a spiritual concern. He suggests the usefulness of considering the 
implications of military service spiritually and tobring “moral ambivalence, guilt, and 
post-traumatic stress explicitly into the spiritual conversation” (18). 
 Yusuf expresses some of this sense of ambivalence, a d clearly sees his faith as 
relevant to his conduct during combat, and as an important component in processing his 
experiences,  
When I look back, sometimes there’s a conflict as a Muslim, did I do something 
wrong, ‘cause I went and participated in this operation. But then I say if God truly 
is unbiased, and we’re judged on our intentions rather than what happened,46 I see 
that my intention was not to hurt any innocents rega dless of who they were. As 
far as I know I accomplished that, so I can be at pe ce with myself.  
 
After leaving the military, Yusuf immediately returned to school, and credits the 
structure and support provided by his family and by his confidence in the morality of his 
own conduct with easing his reentry into civilian life,  
Civilian life it wasn’t as hard ‘cause I came back to my parents, they supported 
me, I had a structure. But since I’ve gotten out, in he company five people have 
killed themselves. For me it wasn’t so bad when I think of them. I did struggle to 
make sense of what I want to do in life and sometims it would just hit me what I 
had gone through. At that time when you’re going through you just think of 
staying alive, getting through the day, looking outfor your back and for your 
buddy’s back. But when you’re back you think of, it seems like a movie, where 
you’ve been. I mean those thing will probably never happen to me again. The 
things I did, the things that happened. […] But overall I would say it was not bad 
because the support structure was there for me. But if it wasn’t it probably would 
have been, I would have been a bitter guy.  
 
His return from the war and his re-entry into the civilian world felt like a new start,  
 
                                                
46 In the Islamic worldview, intention in central; for example, a good deed done with ill-intention is 
understood to be an evil deed. Sincerity and intention are seen to be matters of which only Allah has full 
knowledge. 
Chapter 8: Citizenship  
 166 
 
I went right away to school, ‘cause like I said I was very motivated, ‘cause I 
thought I had a new life, a sort of new beginning. After we came back from 
deployment, the first thing when you touch ground you’re like we made it! You 
know, fully intact we made it. […] I took some preparatory classes ‘cause my 
math skills had gone down. But I found that I had another set of skills, like I could 
concentrate better, on studies I could motivate myself, the discipline which I 
didn’t have before in school. Also I had that drive to do well and make something 
out of myself. I didn’t take things for granted.  
 
 Despite the trials of combat, Yusuf found his military service to be an extremely 
rewarding experience. When I asked him what the best thing about serving in the military 
was he responded immediately,  
Discipline. They give you self-confidence. Friends that you made while you were 
in the service. Just camaraderie in general, even when you get out [the sense of 
belonging]. 
 
In part, Yusuf is describing healthy unit cohesion. He feels a sense of camaraderie 
and belonging to the group.    
Yusuf felt like a full member of the unit, and did not feel singled out because he 
was Muslim. At the same time, he found that his background was useful to his unit in 
explaining cultural and religious issues that they encountered. Yusuf felt that his 
experience and advice was particularly valuable for his comrades because of the 
inadequacy of the pre-deployment cultural training that his unit received,  
[Pre-deployment cultural training] was poor, I’d give it a poor rating. The guys 
would just warn you don’t do this, don’t do that, and that was what cultural 
training was. I mean simple things, like don’t wave with your left hand, say 
salaam aleikoum to everyone. They would say it to everyone. What tey don’t get 
is it’s good to say that, but after a little while they’re just gonna think you’re 
annoying. There’s no point in the little Arabic you know to keep throwing it out. 
You know someone just comes and says ‘Howdy, howdy’ to an American you’d 
be like, ‘What, is he an idiot?’ That’s what a lot of these Iraqis looked at us like. 
Who are these idiots? What are these idiots doing here?  
 
 Once on the ground, Yusuf served as an informal resource when members of his unit had 
questions,  
Chapter 8: Citizenship  
 167 
 
They would ask why is it bad to show the sole of the feet? Why is it bad to use 
your left hand? Why is it bad to say certain things or to handle the Qur’an? Why 
is it bad to come with your shoes on inside the house? Why are they so nice to us, 
the Iraqi people, even when we’re searching their houses, turning the house 
upside down, there’s shooting outside, why do they still offer us food? So I 
explained to them that it was the Arab culture, andmore broadly the Islamic 
culture. Just give them some details so they have bett r understanding. 
 
 
 In one of the clearest examples of the connection between military service and 
first-class citizenship to come out of my interviews, Yusuf relates how his parents use his 
military service to negotiate anti-Muslim conversations at their workplaces,  
[My parents] both have customers coming in and theyalk. So like the average 
American would say like ‘These damn Muslims are lik ruining the world’ or just 
‘What’s wrong with them.’ So they would say ‘Oh I’m a Muslim and my son is 
serving in the military,’ and then they’d say ‘Oh we didn’t mean it in that way, 
say thank you to your son.’ 
 
In these interactions, his parents have found a way to successfully reframe the 
conversation by asserting their membership in the group being generalized about, and 
then bringing up their son’s military service. The connection between service and 
citizenship is such in the United States that this strategy shifts the conversation from one 
of us/them to one of congratulation and compliment.  
 
HAKIM  
Hakim is currently serving, and at the time of intervi w had put in 18 years. He 
does not have plans to retire anytime soon. Hakim has worked in various support 
specialties, and is currently furthering his education in preparation for his next post. 
Hakim has deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq. An intellectually curious youth, 
Hakim had been studying Islam before joining the military, and converted soon after. 
Hakim is multi-racial and was born in the United States to immigrant parents. 





For Hakim, the decision to join the military was largely an institutional one 
stemming from the military service of his family.  
Well, I’m a military child. My father […] enlisted before I was even born. When 
he married my mother, she was living [in the town where he was stationed]. They 
eventually divorced but my mother remarried [and] my step father [was] also in 
the Army. So when it came time for me to decide what I wanted to do, for me it 
was I wanted to join the military. That’s what I grew up with. 
 
For Hakim, the military was a familiar environment and he derived comfort from 
the discipline of it. When he attended a civilian college he felt lost and decided to leave 
school and return to the military, this time as a service member,  
I had just turned 17 when I went to college and I was just too young. […] it 
wasn’t an academic issue for me, I had gotten a scholarship. […] It was the social 
aspect. All my life up until that point I had only dealt with military children and 
military schools, so going to a civilian public university was just complete culture 
shock. It was like ‘What in the world? These people ar  wild! They don’t have 
discipline and order in their lives’. I just couldn’t deal with that so the military 
was the environment I needed to be in. [The military] llowed me to remain 
focused on my goals and objectives in life.  
 
In a very common theme among my respondents, Hakim discusses the 
opportunities presented by the military and the wayit has broadened his horizon,  
I can’t even imagine at this point doing something else. The United States military 
is a diverse organization. It’s a microcosm of the reality of America. […] It’s an 
eye opener. […] the experience has allowed me to go through life without the 
blinders, that tunnel vision. I’ve been able to seea bigger picture, the horizon’s a 
lot wider, and I would say God’s grace is a lot bigger than the limitations that 
people put on it.  So I’m good with it, I enjoy it.  
 
Hakim has experienced the effects of us/them, thoug he notes that it is not 
limited to a post-9/11 world. As a new convert in the 1990s, he felt that even at that time 
some people saw Muslims as “other”,  
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I’d just become a Muslim and […] there were individuals that didn’t take very 
well to the idea because of their misinformation, their ignorance, etc. […] and so 
people had their preconceived notions, their stereoyp s, their generalizations.  
 
Although Hakim does not come from the Arab world or S uth Asia, Hakim’s 
physical appearance could easily be interpreted as “brown”. He also wears a kufi,47 a 
form of religious headgear and so is easily visually identifiable as Muslim, 
Ever since I joined the military I’ve always worn a kufi or a taqiyah, the religious 
headgear, because there’s authorization for it. In civilian clothing I wear it, but in 
uniform I wear it as well. I see that it’s allowed so I’m going to do it. […] it’s not 
a statement, it’s just what I do as an expression of my faith, very similar to those 
that wear a cross around their neck, or when Jews [wear] the yarmulke, it’s no 
different. It’s an expression of faith.  
 
 Since 9/11, he has experienced many of the same syptoms of the re-activation 
of this boundary as my other respondents, including general comments, name calling, and 
occasional suspicion, 
after 9/11 I do recall people making comments, you know you get the emails and 
things of that nature.  But one guy he made a statement to me, I forget what 
exactly he asked me, but it was as though there was this assumption that all 
Muslims know one another.  Like I have Osama bin Laden on my speed dial, and 
say hey you need to quit this nonsense.  It was really ridiculous.  
 
As with most of my other respondents, the incidents Hakim encountered were 
minor, and his reaction was to laugh them off and to engage in a dialogue. Hakim takes a 
very active role in claiming a space as an American Muslim service member. Of all my 
respondents, Hakim takes the most active role in negotiating everyday citizenship, 
When I hear a comment being made I’m quick to address it. I’m pretty vocal. And 
I think I’m that way ‘cause that’s the only way peole are gonna become 
educated. You have to address the ignorance; you can’t just let it slide, like oh, 
they just don’t know any better so I’m just not going to say anything.  
 
                                                
47 A taqiyah is a cap or hat worn by some Muslim men. In the United States it is generally referred to as a 
kufi. It may be worn all the time or just during prayer. Those who wear it generally do so to emulate the 
prophet Muhammad who, along with his 7th century followers, would have covered his head when in 
public. 
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Hakim also engaged in formal education, providing, for example, presentations on 
Islam during which he directly addresses some stereo yp s,  
I’ve had wonderful, I can see them as learning experiences, learning opportunities 
when someone challenges me in a presentation ‘Well you know, doesn’t the 
Koran say to kill the infidel’ I mean just remarkable, and you can tell they’re just 
repeating what they’ve heard on the news or something t ey may  have heard in a 
conversation with someone else, it’s just repeated propaganda, and so the 
presentations I give I actually put that on a powerpoint presentation those few 
words: ‘Kill the unbelievers wherever you find them’ and then on the very next 
slide I show the entire context of the verses48 and I say ‘just read that’. And 
they’re sitting there reading, and they’re like wow. And I’m like, do you have a 
different impression now that you see the context of that verse? And they’re like 
yeah it doesn’t say that at all. It’s like yes. So next time, just open the book up and 
read it for yourself and don’t be spoon fed.  
 
Hakim took a very active role in defending his rights. He sees this as a 
responsibility and emphasizes the importance of Muslims speaking up for themselves in 
order to define their experiences rather than be defined by others. He feels it is important 
to be outspoken in standing up for his rights and the rights of other Muslims in the 
military, 
I’m outspoken, I definitely let my voice be heard. And I deal with whatever 
consequences may [be]. I know the Constitution, and I know the military 
regulations, and I know what I can say and what I cnnot say […] I would say that 
there is a responsibility for Muslims in the military to study up and find out what 
their rights are, to know what they can and cannot do.  
 
Hakim explicitly sees it as a responsibility to be educated about his legal rights. 
Hakim treats being knowledgeable about one’s rights as a duty. Hakim does not wait for 
                                                
48 “They wish you to become disbelievers as they are, so that you should become like them. Therefore hold
them not as friends until they go out of their homes in the way of God. If they do not, seize them wherev r 
they are and do away with them. Do not make them your friends or allies, except those who take refuge 
with a people allied to you, or those who, weary of fighting you or their people, come over to you. If God 
had so willed He would surely have given them power over you, and they would have fought you. If they 
keep aloof and do not fight, and offer peace, God has left you no reason to fight them. You will also find 
persons who, while wishing to live in peace with you as well as with their own people, turn to civil war the 
moment they are called to it. If they do not keep away from you, nor offer you peace, nor restrain their 
hands, seize them and kill them wherever they are. We have given you a clear sanction against them.” 
(4:89-91; A. Ali Translation) 
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others to recognize his rights and give them to him, instead he actively pursues them. For 
Hakim, belonging is a matter of knowing and claiming rights rather than a process of 
assimilation. Hakim does not seek inclusion by changing his appearance or behaviors to 
blend in; instead he maintains practices that stand out, relying on his confidence in his 
rights and his own voice to claim a space in the natio l collective on his own terms.  
Hakim also addresses the role of informed and strong leadership in implementing 
religious accommodation. While Hakim himself is well-versed in regulations regarding 
religious accommodation and is not shy about standing up for his rights, he observes that 
his right to wear a kufi in uniform has been repeatedly questioned by those unfamiliar 
with these policies,  
people have had an issue with the religious headgear [I wear], and every single 
instance I’ve found out it’s because they have not read the regulation. Every 
single time. And it’s on page two. It’s very clear, it says very clearly, it describes 
the religious headgear, it says that it’s authorized. It says what the color has to be, 
the size of it. It gives all those descriptions and yet I’ve come across a number of 
senior-ranking officers and senior enlisted that are like ‘Are you authorized to 
wear that?’ I’m like wow have you not read the regulation, that’s one of the most 
common regulations in the military, how could you not read that? […] Seriously, 
it’s just a matter of education.  
 
Taking the time to read and understand the regulations regarding religious 
accommodation demonstrates an investment in diversity. It s, as Hakim observes, a 
matter of education, but it’s also a matter of caring. Leadership that does not bother to 
familiarize themselves with these types of policies communicates that it is not worth 
knowing the rights of minority service members.  
Hakim, similar to several other respondents, felt tha being Muslim gave him 
particular insight,  
It’s one thing to learn about Islam academically and not experientially. […] You 
may understand this [theology], but in the practical aspect, in the social aspect, in 
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interacting with people and different interpretations and different responses, that 
takes on a whole other study in and of itself.  
 
While Hakim gained this experience as a member of the group, it is not 
necessarily information that is only available to in-group members. What is important 
here is not just knowledge about the group, but experience with the complexities and 
humanity of the group as well. Hakim uses this cultural competence in his military tasks 
interacting with locals in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
what has ended up happening both in Afghanistan and Ir q is [my commanders] 
see how I interact with locals and how they respond t  me and it’s like someone 
observes that and is like hey you know what, can we use you in a different 
capacity by talking to the locals, establishing rapport, interacting with local 
businesses, businessmen and other personnel? And so I’m like yes of course.  
 
This ability to interact and build rapport with locals was a common one among my 
respondents who deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq. For example, Yusuf talked about this 
during his combat deployments, while Jamal used a shared language and a familiarity 
with traditions of storytelling in an extended interaction with a local man.  
 More than just being able to easily interact with locals, Hakim found that he was 
able to serve as representatives of the inclusiveness of American society, 
Interacting with the locals I came to find out [they] didn’t even know 9/11 
happened. And that was so insightful. We were like wow, these people don’t have 
a clue, they’re just as ignorant as you can assume, obviously the literacy rate is 
quite low, but the fact that they didn’t have access to radio, television, etc. They 
just saw us as an invading force. They were not aware of why we were there. […] 
So for them to come across me, they were like what?! You’re a Muslim? You 
look like an Afghani. and I’m like no I’m not, I’m an American, I was born and 
raised in America, I have no Afghani ancestral DNA that I’m aware of. But it was 
good ‘cause they have been told up to that point that the foreign devils - 
Americans - are coming here and just like the Russians and British before them. 
They’re against Islam; they’re against Muslims and so on and so forth. So I’m 
sitting there explaining to these local Afghans andtribal leaders that no, that’s not 
the case. I told them Islam is flourishing in the United States, we have mosques 
and Islamic institutions and charities and we’re free to practice our faith. I’m 
explaining all of this and they’re just looking at me in amazement, like are you 
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serious?! Like this can’t be possible [laughs]. I’mlike no I have photos, I can 
show you. This is real.  
 
In this situation, Hakim serves as a bridge builder – he not only negotiates a space to be 
Muslim American in the military but also negotiates what it means to be American with 
the locals he encounters. Similar to Jamal’s narrative (Chapter 6), Hakim, as a Muslim 
American, finds himself engaged in discussions about the acceptance of Islam in the U.S. 
His ability to interact with the locals opens the way for this type of conversation to take 
place, something that anyone regardless of identity bu  with the right cultural competence 
could do. However, being Muslim American himself, he not only engages in this 
dialogue, but serves as living evidence of what he is saying. Just as he builds bridge with 
other service members, negotiating a space where his differentness is accepted, Hakim 
also builds bridges with the locals he encounters in the field. He negotiates with multiple 
clients his identity as Muslim American.  
 Having leadership that valued the skills and knowledge Hakim brought shaped his 
experiences for the better, 
I’ve just taken every opportunity to try to engage in dialogue with people and 
fortunately I’ve been under the command of individuals who take advantage of 
that. They see that we have someone born and raised s an American, military 
child, is a Muslim as well, has been deployed, is involved with the local Muslim 
community, and I’ve been utilized to build bridges of mutual respect and 
understanding. And it’s been fantastic.  
 
Rather than treat him with suspicion, Hakim’s leadership actively used his differentness 
to help them achieve their missions.  




Rahma is a veteran with a six year career in the military where she worked in a 
support position. Rahma converted to Islam while in the military. She decided to leave 
the military to be closer to her family and to start a family of her own. Rahma is white 
and was born in the United States.  
Rahma joined the military for primarily institutional reasons. Family tradition 
played a large role in her decision, 
Mainly because my family was all in it. For me it was kinda a carrying on 
tradition.  
 
Rahma’s family was generally happy with her decision to join the military, 
perhaps because of the family tradition. She did, however, feel that her gender made her 
decision particularly confusing for other Muslims.  
The community that I frequented they were the whole ‘Oh my gosh, but sister 
how are you in the military!?’ They were all shocked about it, about the family 
aspect of it. They weren’t shocked about me being a Muslim, they were more 
shocked how would you reconcile your family with your military work, you’re 
gone for months on end.  
 
Rahma found that being a service member transgressed xpected roles of 
femininity within the civilian Muslim community, 
if you [say] you’re in the military the guys won’t even give you a second chance. 
So it was sort of like a dating disaster and I wanted to settle down so I made a 
more conscious decision to settle in one place without the possibility of them 
shipping me out to the desert months after I’ve had my baby  
 
A sense of service and loyalty to the United States wa  also a component of her 
decision. Although Rahma is native-born, she grew up abroad and much of her family 
currently lives abroad, so living in the United States is an active choice,  
It was serving my country that I chose to be in, ‘cause I could go but I chose to be 
here. I chose to live in the United States ‘cause I think this is a better place to live. 




Rahma makes a clear connection between her service and ideas of citizenship. 
Rahma notes that it is a conscious choice for her to live in the United States. Organically, 
from this choice comes the decision to serve. It is an expression of the value she places 
on being American.  
Rahma enjoyed her experiences in the military. As with most of my other 
respondents, she sees her service and broadening her horizons.  
Just the opportunity to go to any place at any time. That was a great positive 
experience, and just the, when you join the military, if you put your mind to it you 
have so many open possibilities that you can be, […]the possibilities and the 
opportunities that the military itself presents you are limitless if you put your 
mind to it. So just to have that I think that is one of the greatest positives you can 
get out of the military. 
 
She also values the sense of community she felt in the military,  
There’s so many [positive experiences]. Being deployed and meeting so many 
new people you build such camaraderie with them. It’s friendship and it’s like 
brotherhood and sisterhood between all these different people, and in some 
instances you become closer than family. That was one of the greatest positive 
experiences that I’ve had in the military.  
 
Since leaving the military, Rahma has found that she misses the camaraderie and 
competence of working with her military colleagues,  
you miss the military camaraderie, the whole brotherhood and sisterhood that you 
get for people, you miss it. There were the deployments where you go out 
someplace and it is just you and a group of people and that’s it, you guys have 
each other’s back and you know nothing will happen to you because these people 
are competent in their jobs.  
 
As with Yusuf, this emphasis on the sense of camaraderie in the military suggests 
that Rahma served under strong leaders who emphasized the development of military 
identification. Similar to Yusuf, she identifies her colleagues in family terms – brothers 
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and sisters. She trusts that her colleagues “have ech other’s back” and competence rather 
than racial, ethnic, or religious identification is the primary characteristic of this trust.  
As a white convert, Rahma is not immediately externally identifiable as a Muslim. 
Her identity, however, was a matter of public knowledge and she informed her 
commander and colleagues following her conversion. As with most of my respondents, 
she did not think that her identity as a Muslim had any effect on her military career,  
I never really had any major issues. I had some stupid comments here and there, 
you know ‘The Muslims, the Muslims’ but it wasn’t really anything directed 
completely towards me, it was more like a general statement that was being made 
in my hearing, but I never took it personally 
 
As I found throughout my sample, this us/them boundary was present, she heard 
comments that use an us/them framework (“The Muslims”), but it was irrelevant to her 
day to day life and to her career. Also as with most of my respondents, Rahma was easily 
able to brush off these types of comments.  
 She takes an individualistic frame to her success/failure, and argues that her 
achievements are the product of her personal effort and not affected by her identity. She 
also recognizes the role of leadership,  
I think if there would have been a disadvantage or anything that I missed out on it 
would’ve been more something that I didn’t achieve personally rather than 
something that was affected because I was Muslim. Again I was lucky with my 
team command because they really [cared about] my achievements personally 
rather than what my belief system was. 
 
Rahma feels that she was lucky to have a good commander who judged her on her 
work rather than her identity, and this shaped her experiences. For Rahma, the lack of 
negative interactions reflected the protective nature of the military (and also American 
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society as compared to western Europe). Her sister, who had also converted and who 
lived abroad, reported many negative interactions, 
She’s been physically attacked, prodded with umbrellas, prodded by old people 
with umbrellas just sitting at the bus station and yelling at her ‘Go back to your 
own country’ and she’s like ‘I’m born and raised here, I am in my country.’ Her 
kids have been attacked. She’s gotten discriminated gainst. So all the 
experiences that she’s experienced, I’m glad to have not had that here, that’s one 
of the reasons I choose to be here. That’s one of the reasons why I’m glad in the 
military I really never got a whole lot of that; there’d be one or two incidences 
where somebody would mention something but that was not directed towards me.  
 
Rahma’s leadership was accepting of her conversion, and open to providing 
accommodations as needed. The command structure demonstrated an investment in 
diversity by reaching out to her to make sure her needs were being met,  
as the only Muslim in the unit I was approached a few times by the chaplain, or 
even the command, asking me hey look are there certain special requirements that 
we need to give you guys for certain holidays, is there anything special that we 
need to do when we go overseas, we all have our briefings when we go but we 
want to hear it from you just to make sure is the right information.  
 
That these interactions involved requests for confirmation of material received in 
briefings speaks to the value placed on having accur te information by the command 
structure. Similar to Najib’s commander, this is a w y of demonstrating respect, 
particularly in preparations for deployments to Middle Eastern countries, and a way of 
modeling the importance of cultural competence and preparation. This is another example 
of strong leadership that values diversity creating a unit atmosphere where my 
respondents had positive experiences.  
 Rahma regularly sought formal accommodation for religious practice and did not 
have any issues getting it. During Ramadan she sought accommodations to alter physical 
training requirements,  
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We met at dawn to do PT, so not having any fluids or anything, it got hard. So I 
went to the commander at the time and I said look these are my requirements 
during this month and I would very much like to observe this, do you have any 
issues with it, or do you have any suggestions on how to get around the PT 
requirement.[…] So he [sent] me to the PT NCO and we came up with this plan 
that on the days that we’re supposed to do PT in the mornings I would be there 
but I would be there as like a water person you know handing out water, I would 
assist with getting the times for their runs and everything, and make sure people 
are hydrated and all that, but I myself would do PT at night. […] That’s how we 
worked around that. 
 
By not excusing her from dawn PT, this accommodation n rmalizes religious 
diversity in the unit. She is not absent from early morning trainings, which could become 
a source of resentment, and her altered presence (handing out water and writing down run 
times) makes the accommodation visible, normalizing the idea that diversity can be 
effectively accommodated.  
Rahma is one of few respondents who reported praying publically. She shared a 
story of publically praying while her unit waited for directions,  
So we went around the side of the building to pray, members of the unit, I guess 
some of them saw us praying so they came around and they all started coming 
around with their cameras and taking pictures. Yeah. Um yeah very awkward. 
And it was sort of a bit distracting.  
 
This story provides another perspective on why it was so common among my 
respondents to hide prayer. Here there is no maliciousness associated with the actions of 
her colleagues, and Rahma herself acknowledges that bec use of where they were at the 
time, the view was gorgeous, and it is easy to imagne that the tableau of several service 
members praying in front of beautiful natural landscape would be tempting to record. 
However, the sense of being on display is uncomfortable for Rahma and takes her away 
from the spirituality of the act. It also speaks to the existence of us/them. Performing 
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salah is seen as something exotic and worth documenting; that it draws such attention 
speaks to its “otherness”. 
Rahma is proud of her military service,  
[I: Are you proud to be a veteran?] Yes. I’m proud to be a veteran and I’m proud 
to be Muslim. And I’m actually going to be sworn into the VFW Post as an 
official member, and I’m going to be the first Muslim veteran at this VFW Post. 
[…]it’s not something I would have made note of ‘cause it’s just part of who I 
am, but they made a note of it and that’s how they announced it.  
 
Her experiences with the VFW are yet another example of the presence but irrelevancy of 
the us/them boundary. We can see that Rahma being Muslim is a salient issue because the 
VFW post has noted that she is the first to join their post and sees this as important 
enough to announce. This marks her out as different or o her. At the same time, this 
differentness is no barrier to her entry.  
While she is proud of her service, she feels that it is “not something to brag 
about”,  
but I don’t brag about it, it’s not something to brag about is just part of the service 
that you did for your country.  
 
Rahma makes an explicit connection between her military service and her sense 
of citizenship,  
I’ve had the whole people staring at me when I walk down the street if I have a 
scarf on my head or ‘Oh yeah, go back to your own country’, I can constantly just 
ignore it ‘cause I know I am in my own country, I’ve served for my country, and 
they most likely didn’t; though I don’t know their background just as much as 
they don’t know my background.  
 
For Rahma, her military service is a way for her to dismiss activation of the 
us/them boundary in her everyday life that identifies her as “one of them”. She 
acknowledges experience such as stares and comments, but hrough her military service 
she is confident in her rights and belonging. She symbolically deploys her service to 
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counter these processes of othering by redirecting the shame of not belonging back at the 
speakers, “I’ve served for my country, and they most likely didn’t.” 
Rahma also sees herself very clearly as a bridge builder. She negotiates and 
educates others in the military about her faith, she has confidence in being Muslim 
American in the public sphere because of her servic, and she works to carve out a space 
as a veteran in the civilian Muslim community. She takes on this role with confidence, 
and as with Hakim, a sense of responsibility, 
I can be a liaison. Like in the mosque people talk about the military in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, I feel confident in my voice, ‘Hey look I was in the military and 
that’s not really how is, it’s more like this.’ And the same as when I was still in 
the military, […] when they talk about oh the Muslims this, the Muslims that, I 
can be like, ‘Well hey, that’s a myth, that’s something that you see on TV that 
perpetrated [sic] by the media, not actually something that goes on in our 
everyday lives, that’s not something that we do.’ You know we don’t go around 
screaming Allahu akhbar with swords in our hands and burning the American 
flag. So I feel more confident in my voice talking to either one of the communities 
and dispelling myths or saying hey look this is the real deal, this is how it really 
is. 
 
Being able to serve as a bridge, a source of information is an experience that Rahma 
greatly values,  
I think that’s one of the greatest things about being Muslim in the military that 
you get the chance to get so many questions where you can answer, where you 
can set the record straight. We’re not all terrorists, no we’re not all crazy fanatics 
strapping bombs underneath our burqas [laughs]. Some of us are pretty good 




Citizenship is a theme that flows throughout the narratives in this project. While 
few respondents use their military service to make dir ct claims on citizenship, the 
connection between service and citizenship is clear. M ny respondents expressed 
institutional motivations to serve; they see joining the U.S. military as a way to express 
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their sense of being American, as a way to “give back”, but not as a way to prove 
anything about themselves. They serve as an expression that they already belong. These 
institutional motives are clear in the narratives of Yusuf, Hakim, and Rahma. All see their 
military service as an expression of their deep-seated American-ness. For Yusuf it is a 
way to give back, for Hakim it in a continuation of family tradition, and for Rahma it is 
recognition that she chooses to live in the United States because she thinks it is a good 
place to be.  
Citizenship can also be seen in the frequency with hich my respondents engaged 
in dialogue and education. In spite of the us/them at osphere which I have discussed at 
length, my respondents reject the idea that they must choose between being American 
and Muslim. They embrace both identities and when necessary engage in interactions 
both formal and informal to demonstrate this compatibility. Yusuf, as with many of my 
respondents, is seen as an asset by others in his uit because of his cultural competence. 
As part of a combat team, he does not have to engag in much discussion, his actions and 
the usefulness of his knowledge, demonstrate for him t at he is both American and 
Muslim. Hakim and Rahma engage more directly in negotiation. Both see it as a 
responsibility, and a privilege, to engage in dialogue and education, explaining and 
demonstrating the compatibility of these identities. Hakim is quick to stand up for his 
rights, and literally engages in a display of uniformed difference as he wears religious 
headgear in uniform. He, as with several other respondents, also uses his position in the 
space between us and them to build rapport with locals. In the face of us/them pressures 
he redefines a world in which Muslim American is not just a possibility, but a reality. 
Rahma also engages in bridge building activities. A ource of information for her unit, 
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she also takes on the role of dispelling stereotypes about both Muslims and service 
members. She sees her combined identity as giving her a unique perspective which she is 
eager to share.  
Chapter 9: Conclusion   
 183 
 
CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 
From racial requirements for citizenship, to limits on immigration by national 
origin, to the civil rights movement and voting rights, U.S. society has long struggled to 
define who should be included in the nation. The evnts of 9/11 and the subsequent 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq reinvigorated a boundary that defined Muslims as a 
dangerous “other”. Although the official rhetoric was that it was not a war of religion, the 
boundaries that were being activated distinguished between an “us” who was Judeo-
Christian and a “them” who was Muslim. Mosques were monitored by the FBI, 
individuals with Muslim names were put on watch lists, and over a thousand Muslims 
were detained (Murray 2004). Processes of othering have been well documented in the 
civilian world; in this project I add to the literatures on the post-9/11 experiences of 
Muslims in the United States and diversity in the military by exploring the experiences of 
Muslims in the U.S. military.  
The military is a powerful social institution. It is central to the symbolic 
construction of nationhood. As the primary agent of legitimate violence, sociologists see 
the military as a fundamental element of the modern nation-state. In addition to symbolic 
significance, the military is the physical defender of state interests, and is a primary 
means by which the power of the state is measured. The military is a social institution 
deeply intertwined with conceptualizations of nationh od and definitions of who “we” 
are. It is therefore an important context in which to examine issues of diversity and 
processes of othering.  
The purpose of this project is to explore the experiences of Muslims serving in the 
U.S. military. Since 9/11, the dominant discourse in American society has been one that 
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others Muslims, treating the identities of Muslim and American as being mutually 
exclusive. Within this time period, thousands of Muslims chose to serve in the U.S. 
military. Using in-depth interviews with 15 respondents and qualitative analysis of the 
resulting narratives, this project considers the experiences of Muslim service members 
and veterans. In particular it examines how the context of the military shapes the effects 
of this us/them discourse. 
In addition to answering questions about the experiences of Muslim service 
members, this project also speaks to broader sociological issues of inclusion and 
exclusion. It contributes to a greater understanding of processes of othering by extending 
the analyses of experiences of inclusion and exclusion from the civilian world to the 
military. As a distinct and powerful social instituon, the consideration of the processes 
of othering within the military is an important contribution to the understanding of these 
processes both theoretically and empirically. I examine ways in which the structure of the 
military can form a protective environment. I also consider the connections between 
military service and citizenship, extending traditional arguments that focus on the role of 
military service in claiming citizenship by exploring the ways in which military service 
itself can be an expression of citizenship and how the military can be a place where 
questions of identity and belonging are negotiated.  
Although my findings are not generalizable, the results of this project show that 
the us/them atmosphere found in civilian society is also found in the military, though 
whether or not it meaningfully affects the experienc s of Muslim service members seems 
to depend on unit-level factors, most notably leadership. In this chapter I outline a theory 
of mitigating factors that shape experiences of othering.  
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I also explore themes of citizenship that emerge from my data. Based on the 
narratives of my respondents, I connect serving in the military with feeling American. 
The conceptualization of the relationship between military service and citizenship has 
often been one that sees military service as a way for minority groups to prove their 
loyalty and their worthiness to belong. In this coneptualization, military service is a 
route to citizenship, or a way to make citizenship claims. While conceptually the role of 
military service in communicating citizenship has also been acknowledged, this has not 
been the focus of these arguments. My respondents by and large do not see their military 
service as a way to claim citizenship rights. Rather, military service emerges as an 
organic expression of citizenship. That is, because my respondents feel American, they 
express institutional motives to serve in the military, often describing their decisions in 
terms of patriotism, dedication, and a sense of servic . In this project, it is this 
conceptualization of the relationships between citizenship and military service that is 
illuminated.  
In addition to the relationship between military service and citizenship, my 
respondents engage in everyday practices of citizenship during their service. My 
respondents engage in active negotiation with us/them discourses. Through discussion, 
dialogue, and formal education, my respondents actively counter claims that being 
Muslim and being American are mutually exclusive. They address misconceptions and 
stereotypes, while demonstrating in everyday ways that these identities can be fully 
integrated.  
In this chapter I discus the contributions of the project focusing on theoretical 
contributions to complexity of theories of othering as well as substantive contributions in 
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the form of empirical data on an understudied population. I then address the key findings 
surrounding my research question: What are the experiences of Muslims serving in the 
U.S. military? I consider the overall experiences of my respondents and the effects of the 
us/them atmosphere on these experiences. I also conider themes of citizenship that 




In this study, I began with a dichotomous conceptualization of us-versus-them. In 
the introductory material I discussed the centrality of this framework in investigations of 
the experiences of Muslim Americans following 9/11. Processes of othering that 
distinguish in-group from out-group are intensified by periods of conflict which can 
exacerbate a sense of competition or threat between th  groups, leading to situation of us-
versus-them. Frameworks of othering and us/them have dominated the literature on 
Muslim Americans. This is quite clear in scholarship since 9/11; however, reliance on 
this frame when studying this group is not new. Said’s (1978) seminal conceptualization 
of “Orientalism” which underlies most projects examining Muslims from a Western 
perspective, is a theory of othering and us/them. The use of this frame is not 
inappropriate. There exists much evidence of the activation of specific us/them 
boundaries, particularly following 9/11 and ideas and expectations of inherent 
competition, fundamental incompatibility, and the mutual exclusivity of identities of 
American and Muslim are quite clear and well documented.  
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However, these processes have often been treated as a given, a foregone 
conclusion. There has been little discussion of the factors that shape these processes. This 
is a contribution made by this study. While I use th us/them framework, it is not a 
perfect fit for the experiences of all of my responde ts. These areas of ill-fit alert us to the 
complexities in processes of othering. While us/them has been the dominant discourse in 
society following 9/11, my data makes it clear that the effects of these processes are not 
uniform nor universal. The effects of othering (and perhaps even the very processes by 
which othering occurs) are shaped by intermediary fctors. These intermediary factors 
may mitigate the effects of othering or they may exacerbate them.  
 




This conceptualization is also consistent with the data in the existing literature 
which often finds multiple outcomes but has not actively theorized what shapes these 
different outcomes. For example, in their studies of the experiences of Muslim youth 
following 9/11, Ewing and Hoyler (2008) and Peek (2003) both find a variety of 
experience. Some of their respondents receive stares or odd look, some received 
comments and insults, and a few were targets of violence. Considering the data from the 
FBI (Chapter 2), we can also observe this diversity of experience. While anti-Muslim 
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violence has increased dramatically overall, with only 481 incidents at the highest, it is 
clear that violence, while a part of the experience of this community, is not the only, nor 
even the primary, response. These leads us to querywhat factors shape these different 
outcomes. My data cannot to speak to these specific questions, but it can help illuminate 
some of the intermediary factors that shape experiences of othering.  
Throughout this study I have drawn the reader’s attention to the existence of 
narratives of us/them and processes of othering. I maintain that these processes are 
relevant to the experiences of my respondents; however, it is also clear from these 
narratives that these processes are complex and fluid. In this section, I will explore some 




The absence of official policies excluding Muslims for the U.S. military is a 
crucial characteristic that makes this group quite different from Japanese Americans 
during World War II and likely largely explains the difference in outcomes for these 
groups.  
In the civilian context, the negative treatment of he Nisei was much more 
formalized (and more extreme) than the treatment of Muslims since 9/11. On February 
19, 1942 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 which granted the War 
Department control of enemy aliens and the distinctio  between citizen and alien lost 
meaning (Shibutani 1978). Japanese Americans on the west coast were evacuated and 
interned. Over 100,000 individuals, many of these U.S. citizens, were forced to leave 
their homes. 
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Although there were early fears that something similar would happen to Muslims 
following 9/11, it did not. There are some parallels, for example the class action lawsuit 
Turkmen v. Ashcroft alleges that male Muslim non-citizens in the U.S. were targeted 
following 9/11, subjected to unnecessarily long detentions, and kept in harsh conditions, 
prevented from seeking legal help, and subjected to physical violence. Another example 
would be the policy from 2001 until 2011 requiring the registration of young men from 
certain countries. However, these policies and practices are distinct from the experiences 
of Japanese Americans during World War II. While th registration policy was publicly 
known and mandated by the government, it did not force relocation of individuals, nor 
did it target the entire Muslim community, focusing i stead on a specific sub-population 
of non-citizens. The alleged situation of non-citizen detainees, was not public knowledge, 
and the culpability of the government remains an issue the courts are debating. As with 
registration, it also did not target the entire Muslim community. These policies and 
practices, disruptive as they were to many families, did not include the wholesale 
rounding up of the Muslim community and relocation. In addition, the official rhetoric of 
the War on Terror sought to distinguish the enemy (terrorist) from Muslims. Though as I 
discuss in Chapter 2, this did not fully work, this is a very different institutional context 
than World War II when Japanese and Japanese Americans were explicitly and officially 
associated with the enemy, and even citizens of Japanese descent were treated as “enemy 
aliens”. 
Japanese Americans in the military were also subjected to official discrimination. 
In June 1942, all Nisei were classified as 4-C, “aliens ineligible for military service 
(Moore 2003a; Shibutani 1978). In 1943, Nisei were again permitted to serve, but in 
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segregated all-Nisei units. Unlike this, Muslims have never been formally prohibited 
from joining the military, nor has their service been segregated.  
The absence of formal policies of exclusion and othering makes the case of 
Muslim since 9/11 quite distinct from Japanese Americans in World War II, making it no 
surprise that these groups would have different outcomes. Japanese Americans employed 
a narrative of citizenship, they used their military service to claim citizenship for 
themselves, their parents and their children. This does not form a salient part of the 
narratives of most of my respondents, probably because their citizenship was not 
threatened in the same way the Nisei’s was. There hav been no formal call to strip 
Muslims of their citizenship, no policies that treat citizens as non-citizens because of their 
identity. Muslim Americans have many paths to citizenship. There are no formal barriers 
on the naturalization of the parents of my respondents as there were for the Nisei.  
My respondents’ narratives are that they serve because they feel American. 
Inclusion is empirically much different for this group than for the Nisei. They feel like 
citizens because they are (or they have access to be). Formal policies that exclude the 
group being othered matter for the process of othering. These policies shape the 
experiences and opportunities of the group, and as my data demonstrate, shape the 
narratives respondents tell about their decisions t join the military.  
 
External Labeling (Name & Appearance) 
Being physically distinct can contribute to othering. Again, this is an area where 
World War II is instructive. While Japanese Americans were easily identifiable, Italians 
and Germans could “pass”. Other markers, such as name and language, were used to 
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identify these groups. Unlike Japanese Americans, Muslims are not necessarily 
physically identifiable, and the markers of Muslim-ness include phenotype, attire, name, 
and other factors. . 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, Muslims are difficult to accurately identify based on 
a shared phenotype, though the social construction of this group in the U.S. often 
assumes that Muslims share a “brown” phenotype (and that all “brown” people are 
Muslim). Both are factually inaccurate but powerful conceptualizations in the 
contemporary period. There are Muslims of all races and all phenotypes.  
Most of my respondents either identified as “brown” or could be read this way. 
Most of my respondents were South Asian or Arab, ethnicities often associated in popular 
imagination with Islam. Two respondents were multi-racial, and could certainly be read 
as “brown” if an observer was so inclined. In addition there were three white respondents 
in my sample. Although my sample does not reflect the diversity of the entire Muslim 
American community, there is some room for analysis/comparison.  
The experiences of one of the white converts, Dani, illuminates the role of being 
externally identifiable in processes of othering. As a white man with a typical American 
name, Dani provides an interesting opportunity to explore how people are recognized or 
identified by others as Muslim. While many of my respondents discuss being identified 
as Muslim due to their name or appearance, Dani had neither external marker. Perhaps 
because of this, when his commander was asked aboutthe s atus of Muslims in his unit, 
he reported that they did not have any despite the active role Dani played in the Muslim 
military community.  
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Dress is an additional marker in the U.S. The military context shapes the 
applicability of using this marker to label someone as there is uniformity of dress. Only 
one of my respondents, Hakim, wore religiously identifiable attire while in uniform and 
he does note that elicited responses from people about his identity. Rahma, one of my 
women respondents, wears hijab (a headscarf) but only when she is not in uniform. Her 
discussion of this decision speaks to the role of external labeling, 
I never wore hijab while I was in uniform but [my leadership] did say if I 
wanted to I could fill out the forms and everything and they would support 
me in that decision. I just never took that step cause I felt that if there was 
some type of comments being made, even if it wasn’t directed towards me, 
I didn’t want to aggravate or instigate or whatnot.  
 
Rahma recognizes that wearing hijab in uniform willmark her as different, and perhaps 
open her up to comments that have previously not been directed towards her. Since 
Rahma does wear hijab when she is dressed as a civili n, she has had experience with the 
way this marker of Muslim-ness can shape interactions and processes of othering,  
 
Outside of the military […] I’ve had the whole people staring at me when 
I walk down the street if I have as scarf on my head or ‘Oh yeah, go back 
to your own country’ 
 
Name is also another marker of Muslim-ness that maysh pe processes of 
othering. I asked my respondents how their colleagus knew they were Muslim, and 
name was the most common response: Ahmed, Pervez, Tarek, and Yusuf all mentioned 
the role their names played in being identified as Muslim by others.  
I have a very common [Muslim] name, very popular name, and obviously the way 
I look, so most people are like where are you from? (Tarek) 
 
[The patient] looked at my name badge, she was friendly, she wasn’t angry 
towards me at all, and she’s like ‘Oh are you Muslim?’ So I said ‘Yeah I am.’ 
(Tarek) 
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I mean they recognized my name, me being Muslim (Pervez) 
 
As soon as they saw my name tag [they knew I was Mulim] (Yusuf) 
 
  
The Muslim American community presents a complex case for understanding the 
role of external labeling on processes of othering. Being “brown” is often associated in 
popular culture with being Muslim, but this measure is often inaccurate providing both 
false positives and false negatives. Attire and name re also used as ways to identify 
Muslims. Some members of this community may find themselves identified by a 
combination of all of these characteristics, while other members can “pass” on all of 
these markers. In addition, unlike ethnic categories, such as German and Italians in World 
War II, being Muslim is a more fluid identity. Some individuals may find themselves 
given this label even if they don’t self-identify with it, while other will rarely if ever be 
assumed by others to have this identity. 
Due to the set up of this study,  external labeling a d internal labeling was 
consistent for my respondents. They self-identified as Muslim, so when others identified 
them thusly based on external markers, this was conistent with their self-identification. 
How processes of othering play out in the case when self and external identification differ 




Location and culture of the local geographic area is lso a factor that may shape 
processes of othering. This is not something that my data provides much leverage on, but 
comments from a few respondents suggest that this is a factor that should be included in 
theorizing these processes.  
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 Geographic location will shape the diversity of the civilian community the 
military base is in and can also shape the acceptance of Muslims off-post. For example, 
when I spoke with Kareem he was stationed in the Dep South and noted the effect this 
had on his sense of belonging,  
 
I’m in the sticks of Georgia right now so there is nothing but white or 
black around me, everywhere I look is either white or black, no Hispanics, 
no Italian-Americans, definitely no Middle Easterns [sic] […] I’ve got 
another month left here and I can’t wait. The lack of diversity here is 
killing me.  
 
On a broader scale, Rahma, discusses the differences between her experiences in the 
United States and those of her sister in Europe,  
 
She’s been physically attacked, prodded with umbrellas, prodded by old people 
with umbrellas just sitting at the bus station and yelling at her ‘Go back to your 
own country’ […] Her kids have been attacked. She’s gotten discriminated 
against. So all the experiences that she’s experienced, I’m glad to have not had 
that here, that’s one of the reasons I choose to behere.  
 
Whether the setting is military or not can also have n influence, making this case 
study particularly interesting. Basim provides one f the clearest examples of the way the 
military can be a protective environment. After leaving the military Basim recognized 
that the military provided a level of protection absent in civilian society,  
it’s a big time adjustment. Just like going from a controlled area, a fish bowl, to 
an open sea where you can be a target to anybody and ou can’t do anything 
about it. [If] Anybody in the military called me names I would have just go to unit 
commander and he would reprimand them. Here people scream at you in the 
streets, calling you names, but you can’t do anythig about it.  
 
Another aspect of location specific to the military context is distance from 
combat. My negative cases were concentrated in language units stateside, while my 
respondents who had seen combat had some of the most positive things to say about their 
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experiences. Perhaps this is due to seeing practical value of diversity in the combat zone 
as several respondents spoke of. Likely it also a product of the different nature of in- and 
out-groups under combat conditions. In theater, in-group is very viscerally defined as 
those not potentially trying to kill you. The importance of trusting unit members under 
these conditions will override other possible schisms. On the other hand, most of the 
negative cases state-side were in office-like contexts. This perhaps encouraged peers to 
engage in office gossip and politics and to constantly be negotiating in- and out-groups 
within the office.  
 
Leadership  
Leader shapes the atmosphere of a unit for all members and can play a central role 
in experiences of othering. This is one of the elemnts that is most clearly expressed in 
my data. Some leadership is invested in diversity and provides support in a variety of 
forms that successfully mitigates the potential negative effects of us/them discourses. In 
these cases, my respondents are able to easily dismiss the examples of othering they 
experienced. Leadership that is supportive of divers ty may arise out of abstract 
ideological commitments, but in my sample it also seems to occur commonly in units 
where the practical value of diversity is clear. For example, my respondents who served 
in Afghanistan and Iraq often noted that their language and/or culture skills were valued 
by team members who saw the practical value of working with other service members 
who could communicate effectively with locals. In cases such as these, diversity is a clear 
advantage for the unit, and so there is a practical reason to value and support inclusion.  
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On the other hand, leadership that is not supportive of diversity or actively works 
against is can exacerbate us/them tensions. In these situations, us/them divisions are 
reified. These leaders privilege us/them identities over possible shared unit identities. In 
these cases, my respondents felt singled out for being Muslim, their Muslim identity 
became a source of suspicion and a lightning rod for negative treatment and experiences. 
In these cases, not only is leadership failing to be supportive of diversity, but often it is 
actively reinforcing discourse of us/them communicating in a variety of way that this 
division is real and important. In doing this, these leaders create weak unit cohesion, 
there is no shared unit identity, and these units are marked by cultures of gossip and 
suspicion. Interestingly, all of these cases occurred in stateside posts. In these situations, 
leaders may see little value to this type of diversity and so existing discourses gain power. 
In addition, unlike combat units that are separated from civilian society, these units may 
be in closer contact with civilian society and so be more susceptible to this discourse.  
 
Peer Relations 
In addition to vertical relationships with leaders, horizontal relationships between 
peers also shaped the experiences of my respondents. Tarek speaks to the importance of 
peer relationships in shaping his sense of inclusion, even in the face of behaviors that 
could have left him feeling excluded,  
There’s times where you feel uncomfortable but I think a lot of that was 
associated with people making remarks […] For example someone making a 
remark about terrorists or someone making a remark about al-Qaeda. All those 
negative things you hear on the news. It was never targeted towards me. I was 
always peer side by side. [emphasis mine] 
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The role of peer relationships in changing experiences from potentially othering 
to inclusive was also clear in Yusuf’s discussion of ame calling as a form of hazing. 
While being called “al-Qaeda” during training could have been an othering experience, 
Yusuf ties this experience into the process of becoming a soldier. In this context, the 
harassment is an indicator of full belonging. He was not treated differently, or excluded 
from this process of hazing that he sees as ultimately leading to being a member of this 
elite, cohesive group. In this case, not being insulted would have indicated he did not 
belong. Similarly, Mahmood saw teasing and joking between peers as a sign of strong 
group cohesion. This speaks to the importance of peer relationships. In those cases where 
peers are supportive and inclusive, this sort of experience becomes a sign of inclusion. 
However, when these peer relationships are weak or exclusive then this same treatment 
means something very different.  
Drinking off-duty was another example of the role of peer relationship. While 
Mahmood, who as we’ve seen was in a strong peer network, did not think abstaining 
from alcohol would lead to being othered, Omar, who as in much weaker peer 
networks, saw not drinking as something that led his peers to avoid spending time with 
him, 
They know that I’m not going to go drinking with them so I had less friends 
‘cause he’s not gonna do anything cool.  
 
Omar’s characterization of socialization with his colleagues is very different from 
Mahmood who argues that although he did drink alcohol, abstaining would likely have 
little impact on off-duty socialization. While there are several possible reasons for this, 
the nature of their peer relationships were quite diff rent, and the comfort level of being 
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different around your peers speaks to the importance of considering peer relations as an 
aspect of a full theory of othering.  
 
FLUIDITY OF US/THEM 
I found examples of processes of othering and us/them throughout my interviews; 
however, they were complex and fluid. Leaders, peers and other factors shape who is 
seen as in-group and who is out-group. Group membership changes as individuals move 
within institutions and social networks.  
The very framework of us/them requires recognition of this fluidity. Using a 
frame of us/them, even purely as an academic tool to describe processes of othering, 
requires the implicit use of a specific perspective. In identifying one group as associated 
with “us” and another with “them”, the researcher by necessity takes on the perspective 
of the dominant group. For example, in my discussions f discourses that pose Muslims 
as “them”, I must implicitly speak from the perspective of dominant American society. 
While this frame provides leverage on the experiences of being othered, it also limits. A 
few of my respondents, most notably Jamal, encountered xperiences that made the 
usually implicit perspective clear. Jamal found himself framed as “them” by two very 
divergent perspectives. As a “brown” Muslim man, he recognized that he was seen as 
“other” by many Americans. He expected this to shape his military experiences, though it 
largely did not; though he did discover the visceral power of these divisions when a 
young guard almost shot him late one night while in Iraq. While Jamal was “them” from 
this perspective, he was also framed as “them” by al-Qaeda. As a result he was personally 
threatened, and members of his family were physically t rgeted by agents of al-Qaeda, 
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who murdered both his uncle and his father. For Jamal, both aspects of his “them-ness” 
shape his experiences fundamentally. His case clearly illustrates the existence of  a 
multiplicity of us’s and them’s. Who is us and who is them is largely a matter of 
perspective, and every individual has the potential to be both “us” and “them” at the same 
time from different perspectives.  
 
EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research makes several substantive contributions o sociological knowledge. 
This project provides empirical data on an understudied and difficult to access 
population. I also contribute to the discussion of Muslim American identity. Most notably 
I add additional support to the idea that “Muslim” has become a salient label since 9/11, 
and that it is used in the contemporary period in ways that transcend differences in 
ethnicity, nationality, and even religiosity. My respondents all accepted the label of 
“Muslim”, unlike De Angelis (2012) who encountered resistance from her respondents to 
her use of the label “Mexican American”, none of myrespondents questioned my use of 
the category “Muslim” or what I meant by it. Additionally, despite differences in 
ethnicity, nationality, and religious history and practice, I found many similarities across 
the narratives of my respondents. My respondents are ethnically diverse, and my sample 
included individuals who identified as Arab, South Asian, white and multi-racial. In 
terms of religious practice, I had respondents who ere born into Muslim families and 
others who converted. Some of my respondents were pious and practiced regularly, other 
practiced only during the holidays, and a few were non-practicing, including one 
respondent who actively identified as an atheist. Despite this heterogeneity, these 
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individuals all recognized that they “counted” as Muslim and self-identified with the 
label in deciding to contact me. In line with current literature on the American Muslim 
population, this is a population that is quite diverse, and one that identifies along complex 
axes of religious practice, family history, and labeling by others. There is no monolithic 
experience of being Muslim, but my respondents did share a common understanding of 
what “being Muslim” meant to others, and many had common experiences with being 
identified as Muslim by others.   
Another contribution that this study makes is to refut  common claims of 
mutually exclusivity of Muslim and American identities. In the activation of us/them 
boundaries in the United States follow 9/11, the idea that being a “good” Muslim and a 
“good” American are impossible at the same time has become very common. Based on 
the data from this project, the expectation that Muslim and American identities are 
incompatible is utterly unfounded. This expectation arises from processes of othering and 
has its roots in particular histories of conquest and colonialism. This assumption is 
articulated throughout American society. From the variously expressed sentiment that 
Muslims “go back to their own country”, to formal congressional hearings on the 
radicalization of Muslim Americans, to Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations model, the 
idea that it is impossible to be American and Muslim is pervasive. This idea can even be 
found reproduced in publications seeking to demonstrate he integration of American 
Muslims. Pew (2011) in their report on Muslim Americans, reproduces this idea of 
mutual exclusivity when they ask respondents whether they think of themselves first as 
an American or first as a Muslim. This question forces the respondent to pick one identity 
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over the other in a way that does not seem to actually represent the experiences of many 
American Muslims.  
I do not find support for the idea that Muslim Americans must select between 
being Muslim and being American. Following the advice of Sirin and Fine, I avoided any 
questions that forced respondents to select between id ntities. That my respondents 
identify as Muslim is a given due to recruiting methods; however in their narratives none 
suggested a sense of tension between being Muslim and being American. Even when 
confronted with us/them attitudes, my respondents egage in dialogue and negotiation. 
They seem to see themselves quite naturally as both Muslim and American. They express 
strong senses of belonging, of being American. In the course of 16 hours of discussions, 
which covered a wide range of experiences, opinions, a d memories, the idea that they 
must choose or prioritize being Muslim or being American never once came up.  
An additional contribution of this study is the data on the value of institutional 
diversity it provides. While the data is not generalizable, and I can only speak to the 
perceptions of my respondents, consistent themes of seeing oneself as an asset to the 
military mission provides an avenue for further research and investigation. Many scholars 
have noted the ways in which the natures of the confli ts in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
differed from wars such as World War II. Whether it is characterized as 
“unconventional”, “asymmetrical”, or “fourth generation”, the nature of these conflicts 
shapes the need for quality training and investment in developing culturally competent 
troops. Cultural training and cultural competency have become components to successful 
mission accomplishment. Beyond classroom training, personal contact with diverse 
colleagues is crucial to developing cross-cultural competency. Cross-cultural competency 
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takes time and experience to develop. Within a setting such as the military where units 
may be insulated and tightly cohesive, there can be a tendency to mimic peers and leaders 
(O’Connor 2010). If you are surrounded by homogeneous peers and leaders it is more 
likely that a certain set of biases will be internalized. In cultural training sessions studied 
by O’Connor, she noted that soldiers felt that personal experience had the greatest impact 
and that “Having the opportunity to independently interact with someone for the targeted 
culture is the greatest element to learning a specific culture and reducing anxieties 
associated with uncertainty.” (196). This requires that the military itself be composed of 
diverse individuals.  
 In addition to serving as diverse contact for their colleagues, many of my 
respondents also felt they contributed to military missions through their language and 
culture skills. It is important to acknowledge that language skills in particular are in no 
way inherently tied to ethnic or religious identity. Non-Muslims are capable of learning 
languages and cultures associated with Islam, just as many Muslims have no linguistic or 
cultural fluency in these areas. However, within the current educational and social culture 
of the United States, many of these skills are concentrated in particular communities. 
Languages spoken by my respondents included Arabic, Urdu and other South Asian 
languages. While language and culture can be learned by anyone, several respondents 
also discussed the subtleties of language, dress, and behavior that they are attuned to 
through growing up in Muslim communities.  My respondents served as both formal and 
informal teachers. 
This project also contributes to the Institutional/Occupational theory in military 
sociology. I use this frame to understand the motivations of my respondents and to link 
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these narratives with ideas of citizenship. I found both institutional and occupational 
themes, sometimes expressed by the same respondent. This finding runs counter to the 
original model described by Moskos which conceptualizes institutional and occupational 
motivations as opposite ends of a spectrum. In the original conceptualization, to become 
more occupational was to become less institutional. This aspect of the theory has since 
been strongly critiqued, and my data add to the literature that argues that institutional and 
occupational are better conceptualized separately.  
In the process of completing this research, I also provide some methodological 
insight. An unexpected finding of this study is that there are several substantial barriers to 
accessing this population and there appears to be a lack of social network connecting this 
population. Other scholars engaged in work with this community should be aware of 
these barriers and plan accordingly. Working within personal networks provided some 
leverage on this issue. Other researchers may benefit from institutional support; however, 
my experiences suggest that this may be difficult for an outsider to obtain. Additionally, 
discussions with researchers within the military attempting work with this population 
suggests that even with institutional support of the military this population may remain 
difficult to access. Researchers should take into consideration the small size of this 
population and the degree of surveillance this population may feel subject to between 
media inquiries and the over-surveying of military populations generally. 
 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
Most of my respondents had positive experiences that reflected their own 
personality, their fit with the military lifestyle and their willingness to pursue 
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opportunities presented by military service. As with the general population, experiences 
were varied. Just as it would be foolish to speak about “the Lutheran military 
experience”, it is similarly useless to speak of a monolithic shared experience for Muslim 
service members. Some loved the discipline, for example Hakim who left civilian school 
to join the military, other hated it as in Omar who felt the military lifestyle was akin to 
fictional soul-sucking creatures.  
 My analysis of the narratives of my respondents is structured by three central 
themes: us/them, leadership, and citizenship. In my consideration of us/them, which 
occurred primarily in Chapter 6, I consider whether or not the us/them discourse that is so 
common in civilian society can also be found in the military. Finding that it is present in 
the military, I turned to leadership in Chapter 7 to determine how leadership shapes 
us/them tensions. Leadership had varied effects, in some cases it mitigated us/them 
tensions, in others it exacerbated them. Finally, in Chapter 8, I considered themes of 
citizenship in my respondents’ narratives; I focus on the idea of military service as an 
expression of citizenship and the ways in which many of my respondents engaged in 
negotiation of their identities and bridge building between communities.  
 
Us/Them is in the Military 
Us/them attitudes similar to those in the civilian sphere can be found throughout 
the military. This is consistent with discussions of the permeability of the 
military/civilian boundary in American society. In general, my respondents articulated a 
sense that being Muslim set them apart to some degree. Many of my respondents spoke 
of hearing jokes or stereotyped comments about Muslims. Mahmood and Yusuf both 
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discuss epithets such as “al-Qaeda” being directed towards them during basic training. 
While these examples are generally minor, they do demonstrate that us/them can be 
found throughout the military. Additionally, many respondents reported being identified 
as Muslim because of their name and/or appearance. The respondents I spoke with 
recognized that a distinction between American and Muslim was being drawn. Although 
many of my respondents acknowledged the presence of this boundary, the relevance was 
less clear.  
Most felt that while they were aware of this boundary, nd often expected it to 
have negative results, it rarely did. For example, Ahmed anticipated that his name would 
negatively impact his chance at promotion, but was happily surprised to find that it did 
not. Similarly, Jamal remains surprised that his background never came up. Rahma is 
publically recognized as the first Muslim member at a local VFW post; her identity is 
singled out as salient, but it poses no barrier to her membership. I characterize this as the 
presence but irrelevance of us/them in the military. While the idea that Muslim and 
American are mutually exclusive categories is identifi d by my respondents in the 
military, for most it has no practical effect. 
The irrelevance of this boundary may be attributable to certain characteristics of 
the military that have facilitated integration of other groups, such as the hierarchy of the 
organization and formal EO policies and procedures. For several, formalized EO 
procedures made the military a particularly protectiv  environment in the face of this 
attitude. Several respondents utilized military equal opportunity offices to address 
instances where us/them attitudes did affect their mil tary careers, and most were 
successful. Basim even notes the difference between the military where hate speech can 
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be directly addressed versus the civilian world where there is little accountability for such 
behavior.  
As another way to establish the existence of the us/them discourse in the military I 
briefly considered the role of Islam in military education. Using the narratives of Omar 
and Dani I was able to discuss the absence of Islam in language training at the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI). I consider this a facet of us/them in the military as this lacuna 
seemed to stem from concerns about teaching about “them” even in courses that are 
dedicated to learning language and culture. In addition, this void seemed to foster the 
development and maintenance of negative stereotypes and misconceptions among 
students. The absence of nuanced discussion of issues uch as the use of religious texts by 
insurgents allowed students to grow more convinced in their own perceptions, potentially 
reinforcing attitudes that perpetuate and reify the differences between “us” and “them” in 
primarily religious terms.  
While most of my respondents articulated a recognition of this us/them boundary, 
for most it was not seen to have a practical effect on their experiences of their career. 
With a few exceptions, my respondents acknowledged th  us/them boundary but declared 
it irrelevant. As Yusuf puts it, “I think it’s no matter who you are as long as you 
perform”. Most of my respondents felt that being Muslim had no effect on their military 
careers or experiences. For the most part, these respondents felt like full members of their 
units. They worked towards shared goals with their colleagues, and felt that their abilities 
were respected by others.  
 The experiences of Kareem and Jamal also added depth to the analysis by 
illuminating the ways in which conceptualizations of us/them may problematically 
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oversimplify the issues. Kareem discusses the ways in which who is “us” and who is 
“them” depends on perspective, discussing the way in which al-Qaeda’s ideological view 
categorizes us/them differently. Jamal’s experiences demonstrate this clearly.  
 
Leadership 
The idea of us/them appeared in almost all of my interviews. However, for some 
respondents this discourse had little effect while for others it fundamentally shaped their 
experiences. A theme that emerged in exploring this dichotomy of experience was the 
role of leadership. Leadership involves using social influence to get a group of people to 
accomplish a goal. Leadership is a central component of U.S. military culture, and plays a 
crucial role in the success or failure of efforts to integrate diversity in the force. Leaders 
shape both behavior and atmosphere of the unit as it relates to diversity, tolerance, and 
integration. Leaders serve as role models, shaping the behavior of other members. They 
also directly shape behavior through the enforcement (or non-enforcement) of anti-
discrimination and equal opportunity policies. Leadrship that saw value in diversity and 
was invested in supporting it, mitigated negative eff cts of othering, making this an 
irrelevant frame. However, leadership that repeated s reotypes or fears reinforced this 
tension, creating toxic environments in which Muslim service members felt excluded.  
I presented three cases of strong leadership and three cases of weak leadership. 
For Tarek, leadership sets an example of support. Fllowing a troubling encounter with 
us/them, his colleagues rally around him allowing him to contextualize the experience as 
minor and exceptional. Despite its presence, us/them does not come to characterize him 
military experiences. Najib experiences the benefits of institutionalized religious 
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accommodation during Ramadan at a military academy. The normalization of this 
accommodation makes Najib feel included and like a valued member of the team. Later 
in his career, Najib serves with a leader who models the value of cultural competence. 
Although Najib does not serve in a unit with a langua e, culture, or intelligence mission, 
his commander values cultural competence and even holds imself up to this standard by 
learning Arabic and engaging in dialogue with locals to improve his cultural 
understanding. In this way he is not just paying lip service to the importance of diversity 
but is demonstrating the value he sees in diversity through his own actions. Pervez finds 
that his particular skill set makes him useful on the ground in Afghanistan, and the clear 
practical value of diversity serves to shape a context in which diversity is valued and 
supported. 
On the other hand, for those few respondents who had negative experiences 
related to being Muslim, leadership played a central role in exacerbating tensions.  
Zafir spent a short career consistently at odds with a commander who called him names, 
accused him of supporting the insurgents, and singled him out of harassing treatment. 
Sadia spent two years under formal investigation after her ex-husband made unfounded 
accusations against her following a domestic quarrel. Basim felt that his previously 
positive experiences soured following 9/11. Questioned by security and denied religious 
accommodation, Basim felt insulted and degraded. In all three cases, the respondents left 
the military earlier than planned and with negative impressions. In all three cases unit-
level factors, particularly leadership seemed to play a crucial role.  
That both Zafir and Sadia reported that other minority service members were 
negatively treated in their units (Zafir notes racism against black service members, Sadia 
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notes abuse of LDS service members) suggests that the poor leadership may be creating a 
generally toxic environment. At the same time that ese cases may both be products of 
generally toxic unit cultures fostered by weak leadership, it is clear that us/them informed 
the particular treatment Zafir and Sadia received. Among other things, Zafir is called 
“Taliban” and is accused of supporting insurgents. Sadia is accused of being a “terrorist”. 
The generally destructive leadership in both cases suggests that us/them was simply the 
form this mistreatment took for these service members rather than us/them being the 
source of the mistreatment. Omar observed the general tendency to find an “other” in the 
military. While Muslims are an obvious choice following 9/11, he was convinced that 
military culture (and perhaps human nature) would always lead to finding some group to 
treat with suspicion,  
They do that against, even if there’s no Muslims, or any minority religion, or even 
race in the military, they do it against themselves. Like the ones who are just so 
Republican are constantly bashing the ones they see as Democrats. And it’s like 
what’s the point? There is no point. You’re still like 1% of America, like the 
military is like 1%, and you have more in common than opposite. It was 
frustrating. But even if you weren’t there, they’d still be at each other’s necks. 
They needed us to pick on, and they were united at that.  
 
 Zafir and Sadia are visually very different, Zafir is a quintessential “other”; a 
recent immigrant, Zafir identifies as brown and speaks with an accent. Sadia, however, 
appears to be “one of us”, she is white, speaks fluent American English, and does not 
wear hijab. That such dissimilar individuals have experiences so flavored by us/them 
supports my argument that it is Muslim identity that is salient here.  
The cases presented here, both positive and negativ, clearly demonstrate the 
difference leadership and institutional support can make in the experiences of individuals.  
 




I began this project with the expectation that citizenship would be a central 
narrative for Muslim service members, as it was for Japanese Americans in World War 
II. However, the respondents in my sample rarely use their military service to directly 
make claims on citizenship. Some of the difference may be due to historical experience. 
The right to serve in the military has not been seriously threatened for Muslims, nor have 
they been systematically interned as Japanese Americans were. My respondents serve for 
a myriad of reasons, but they all take their ability to serve for granted. 
I argue that rather than seeing military service as a way to fight for rights, my 
respondents take their rights for granted, and in so doing, military service become a 
symbolic performance of citizenship. My respondents don’t feel that they need to serve to 
prove their loyalty or their American-ness. They don’t serve to become Americans; 
because they see themselves as Americans, they serve.  Additionally, many respondents 
spoke about the importance of being outspoken and standing up for their rights and 
correcting anti-Islamic sentiments when they encountered them. Opportunities to engage 
in dialogue with non-Muslim colleagues and build bridges were also common motifs. 
Many of my respondents also recognized that they were in unique positions to break 
down barriers/stereotypes within the military and within Muslim communities in a clear 
illustration of the contact hypothesis.  
Themes of citizenship flow throughout the narratives I collected. Most of my 
respondents are not using their military service to make direct claiming to citizenship, but 
the connection between service and citizenship remains clear. These themes included the 
repeated articulation of institutional motivations to join the military. For many of my 
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respondents, serving in the U.S. military is a way to express their sense of being 
American. They frame their service as a way to “give back”, not as a way to prove 
themselves.  
 Citizenship can also be seen in the frequency with hich my respondents engaged 
in dialogue and education. In spite of the us/them at osphere which I have discussed at 
length, my respondents reject the idea that they must choose between being American 
and Muslim. They embrace both identities and when necessary engage in interactions 
both formal and informal to demonstrate this compatibility. Yusuf, as with many of my 
respondents, is seen as an asset by others in his uit because of his cultural competence. 
As part of a combat team, he does not have to engag in much discussion, his actions and 
the usefulness of his knowledge, demonstrate for him t at he is both American and 
Muslim. Hakim and Rahma engage more directly in negotiation. Both see it as a 
responsibility, and a privilege, to engage in dialogue and education, explaining and 
demonstrating the compatibility of these identities. Hakim is quick to stand up for his 
rights, and literally engages in a display of uniformed difference as he wears religious 
headgear in uniform. He, as with several other respondents, also uses his position in the 
space between us and them to build rapport with locals. In the face of us/them pressures 
he redefines a world in which Muslim American is not just a possibility, but a reality. 
Rahma also engages in bridge building activities. A ource of information for her unit, 
she also takes on the role of dispelling stereotypes about both Muslims and service 
members. She sees her combined identity as giving her a unique perspective which she is 
eager to share.  
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LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
Although this study provides some very interesting information and insight into 
the experiences of Muslim service members, there are some limitations that must be 
acknowledged. Most importantly, I would like to remind the readers that these data are 
not generalizable. Due to the nature of the research question and the nascence of this field 
of research, this project was not designed to be gen ralizable, but rather to provide a 
starting point for examining themes. The data used in this study comes from a small 
sample (15 respondents) that was selected non-randomly. Although I believe the data 
used in this project to be of high quality, the composition of the sample certainly shaped 
the themes I identified and the conclusions I draw. 
I faced several challenges in finding willing respondents. The sample that I ended 
up with produced some coherent themes; however, there is reason to suspect that there 
may be bias in the sample. Given the nature of my research announcement, Muslim 
identity was highlighted in the recruitment process and framed the narratives of my 
respondents. I did not have access to respondents who were “passing” as non-Muslims, 
though I do have information from respondents that indicates that some Muslim service 
members do engage in this practice. My sample only ref ects the experiences of service 
members who were openly known to be Muslim. This likely does have an effect both on 
experience and perspective. My sample also does not include any Black Muslim service 
members. Whether or not being black and Muslim would shape military experience in a 
different way is unknowable from this study.  
Additionally, although leadership is a central theme that came out of my data, it 
was not one of the original framing concepts of this project and so the interviews were 
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not designed to elicit detailed information about leadership styles and experiences. As 
such, I can speak only in a very general way about the role of leadership. Themes in my 
data suggest that it is a relevant characteristic, but my data is not able to provide 
comparisons of styles or answer many questions about the role of leadership.  
 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The primary avenue for further research is confirming the patterns and themes I 
have identified here with other sources of data. My sample is small, and although some 
fascinating themes and patterns are suggested, it is impossible to establish the existence 
of these patterns at a larger level from these data. The value of this project has been in 
opening the door of this research and suggesting a framework for understanding the 
experiences of Muslim service members serving in the post-9/11 U.S. military.  
In addition to confirmation of patterns I have outlined, research that was designed 
to elicit data about differences in leadership style and effectiveness of different styles 
would also contribute to this topic.  
Several respondents discuss feeling that they were ass ts to their units and helped 
achieve the mission; it would be valuable to empirically establish if having Muslim 
service members and leadership that supports them has facilitated the mission of winning 
hearts and minds in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
 




APPENDIX A: RESEARCH ANNOUNCEMENT 





I am a PhD student in Sociology at the University of Maryland and I am writing my 
dissertation on the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military. I am seeking 
volunteers who are either currently serving in the U.S. military or who have served in the 
military in the last 10 years for interviews.  
 
The interview will take about an hour and includes questions about personal experiences 
in the military. The names of people participating i  the interviews will be kept 
confidential. Interviews will be summarized and quoted in ways that protect each 
individual’s identity.  
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
• Could you tell me a little bit about your military service [probe for when served, 
branch, significant events, such as deployments, and MOS] 
• What made you decide to join the military?  
• How did you family react? [probe for community reaction if applicable] 
• What would you say was the most positive experience you had in the military? 
• What would you say was the most negative experience you had in the military? 
• Did/Do your colleagues or commanders know you are Muslim? 
• How did they become aware that you are Muslim? 
• Could you give me an example of a situation where bing Muslim might come 
up? 
• Could you tell me about a situation where you found being Muslim was helpful? 
• Could you tell me about a situation where you found being Muslim was a 
disadvantage? 
• Tell me about your relationship with other members of the unit? Your 
commander? The chaplain? 
• Did/Do you practice Islam while serving? In what ways? [probe for specific 
examples like prayer and fasting] 
• Could you describe what it was/is like [praying/fasting/etc] in the military? 
• Overall, what was/is it like being a Muslim serving i  the military? 
• [veterans] Why did you leave the military? [active duty in first tour] Do you plan 
to stay beyond this term? [active duty career] Why did you decide to make the 
military a career?  
• Do you identify with the label “veteran”? Are you proud of your service? 
• [veterans] If you had the chance, would you do it again?  
•  Do you talk about your experiences in the military with other Muslims? 
• I have visited communities that are both supportive and unsupportive of military 
service. How do you think this community treats the idea of military service?  
• In what situations with other Muslims will you bring up the fact that you are a 
veteran/soldier? 
• In what situation with non-Muslims will you bring up the fact that you are a 
veteran/soldier? 
• Could you tell me a little about your family background? (probe for ethnicity, 
immigrant status, citizenship status if not already dressed) 
• Are you a member of any veterans’ organizations? 
• Are you a member of any other Muslim organizations? 
• Do you know other Muslim veterans or soldiers who might be interested in 
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